The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

College of Education

THE CREATION OF FACULTY SENATES
IN AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES

A Thesis in
Higher Education

by

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2007
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ABSTRACT

This study examines how and why faculty senates were created in American research universities. Senates were created by faculty in reaction to conditions on campus, such as faculty dissatisfaction with their role in institutional governance, or were created by presidents as a means to proactively modernize the functions of the university. In some cases, the conditions that lead to the creation of a senate were dramatic crises that immediately brought to light the limitations of the campus governance system. A major cause for the creation of senates was the growth of the faculty of the university, which created a need for a representative body to replace meetings of the faculty as a whole. At the time of instituting senates, universities were also making improvements in the quality of the faculty and becoming increasingly focused on research. This study employed theories of political power (agenda setting) to demonstrate how the creation of a senate took place. The creation of a senate was advocated by an entrepreneur who took advantage of existing conditions during a window of opportunity to advocate for a change in the role for faculty in university governance. The creation of faculty senates at 151 universities was investigated and historical case studies were conducted at six institutions: the University of Utah, the Pennsylvania State University, the University of Virginia, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Pennsylvania, and Carnegie Mellon University. The study is divided by era, examining senates created in the university building period, during World War II and the post-war period, and during the 1960s and 70s. Universities that have not created a university-wide senate are also discussed. Ultimately, senates were created proactively to improve the campus organization or reactively, in response to conditions or crises that drew attention to inadequacies in the governance structure.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have completed this project alone; and even if I could have, I would not have wanted to. Through the process of taking courses and writing this dissertation I have gained many great friends and colleagues.

I am grateful to my advisor and chair, Roger Geiger, for his help and guidance throughout my graduate program and on this dissertation. I appreciate the insights and advice of my committee: Dorie Evensen, Mike Dooris, and Marie Hojnacki. I have been fortunate to work with and learn from the excellent faculty in the Higher Education Program at Penn State, and each has contributed to my understanding of the study of higher education. I appreciate Tim Cain and Susan Richardson for providing feedback on sections of the dissertation.

I have benefited from many wonderful friendships in the Program, at the University, and in the greater higher education community. In particular, I appreciate the friendship of David Tandberg, who has been a colleague and collaborator from the beginning of my program at Penn State. He allowed me to talk through ideas and provided helpful feedback on parts of this dissertation.

I am thankful to the archivists at the universities where I conducted archival work. The archivists at the University of Utah, the Pennsylvania State University, the University of Virginia, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Pennsylvania, and Carnegie Mellon University greatly facilitated the process of finding the resources I needed. Staff and faculty members at numerous universities provide me with information about their faculty senates, for which I am very grateful.

Most importantly, I could not have completed this dissertation without the support of my extended and immediate family. I am especially thankful to my wife Michelle for her love, forbearance, and patience. And to our two wonderful children, Jacob and Lauren, I appreciate the laughter, joy, and welcome and happy distractions they bring us every day.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The Creation of Faculty Senates in the American Research University

When our professors cease to be qualified to share in the power of the College, it will be proper to dismiss them, for government and instruction are inseparably connected.¹ – Benjamin Rush

The first necessity for a body of men engaged in the pursuit of learning is freedom from the burden of political cares. It is impossible to enjoy the contemplation of truth if one is vexed and distracted by the sense of responsibility.² – F.M. Cornford

Should the professor be concerned with administering the university or solely with research and teaching? The response to this question has varied throughout the history of American higher education, depending on who answers it. Faculty members have always played some role in institutional management and governance, even if only to discipline students. Today faculty members face myriad opportunities to participate in academic governance through departments, colleges, and university-wide committees. And through their campus senate.

This dissertation explores the creation of faculty senates in American research universities: who created them, how, and why.

The faculty senate is a body through which faculty exercise their governance role on university-wide matters; a manifestation of the ideal of shared governance. Defenders of faculty senates see them as a guardian of faculty rights, including academic freedom, and as a voice of the faculty in decision-making. Critics view them as ineffectual and merely symbolic relics. About sixty to eighty percent of all institutions of higher
education, and about ninety percent of four-year schools, have faculty senates (no exact figures exist). All but a few research universities have a faculty senate.

In summarizing the evolution of faculty governance at the University of Vermont, Beal Hyde explained that, “The faculty struggle to find an appropriate role in university governance continues without end. Successes, and there are a number, come fitfully, as in any democracy; and old battles must be fought again and again. Heroes, if any, are as rare as the villains.”

Professors, it is commonly said, are the “heart” of the university and their influence is lasting since many often stay much longer than administrators such as deans and presidents. The conflict for professors comes as they “struggle to maintain their centrality and to reestablish control over the direction their professional are taking.”

The faculty senate can serve as the symbol of this desire to maintain professional control.

This study chronicles the creation of the faculty senate in the American research university and explains the development of this administrative form and governing body. In addition to adding insight into the history of faculty governance, this study serves to help us better understand the faculty role in shared governance and the role of the senate in the modern university, especially in light of recent controversies, most of which revolve around issues of academic freedom. “The nexus between governance and academic freedom is vital,” explains Robert M. O’Neil, because a component of academic freedom is that faculty have the right to voice criticism of the administration and the governing board on matters of faculty concern “without fear of reprisal or loss of influence.”

Yet controversies highlighting the relationship between governance and faculty rights continue. In 2007 four universities—Loyola University New Orleans, Southern University at New Orleans, Tulane University and the University of New
Orleans—were censured by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) for not safeguarding faculty or involving them in the decision to eliminate faculty positions, many of them held by tenured professors, after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. The presidents of the censured universities responded that the AAUP did not understand the challenges facing a university so drastically altered financially. Other challenges to senates are more direct such as when the president of Texas A&M at Kingsville suspended the campus senate and barred dissenters from membership in 2005.

This study focuses on the creation of senates in research universities, which, probably due to their size and complexity, were the earliest adopters of senates. Senates are considered a “useful mechanism for campus wide faculty participation at research universities” but “less useful in others.” Senates are less frequent in liberal arts colleges (where faculty are still more likely to meet as a whole) and in community colleges; and while they have emerged in comprehensive (state) universities, this is a more recent phenomenon. And they are less frequent in less prestigious institutions. In leading universities faculty influence has generally been strong where most departments, and their academic leaders, have a great deal of autonomy and bodies “such as senates have primacy in personnel and curricular decisions.” Although senates are viewed by some as ineffectual, “What is needed is not so much a critique of their inherent weaknesses, but an explanation of their persistence in spite thereof.” This study digs into their origins and explores why they have been able to persist. It is in the research university that senates have had the greatest relevance for the longest period.
The modern American university emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth centuries as an important social institution. Laurence R. Veysey\textsuperscript{12} chronicled the emergence of this new form in American higher education, Roger Geiger\textsuperscript{13} has described and explained the rise of research universities, and others\textsuperscript{14} have written general histories of American higher education. Yet, no one has penned a history of the faculty senate. Individual institutional histories speak of their senates (with varying degrees of detail) but the overall story of the emergence of the faculty senate has not been told.

**Research Questions**

This study explains how and why faculty senates were created on university campuses. This study is guided by the following research questions:

1. When did the faculty senate emerge in American higher education?
2. Why were faculty senates created?
3. How were faculty senates created?

Other related questions are addressed in the study: What was the impetus for the creation of faculty senates? What were the internal and external pressures that motivated their creation? And, who championed the creation of faculty senates? What were the goals of these early faculty senates?

Historical methods were used to answer these questions. Furthermore, theoretical frameworks were employed that can help us understand why and how senates were created.
Justification for the Study

To understand the current condition of institutions of higher education, we should understand its past. As John Thelin argues in the introduction of his history of American higher education, colleges and universities may at times “suffer amnesia” or may have “selective recall.”\textsuperscript{15} As such, it serves an institution, its leaders, its stakeholders, and its faculty to remember its purposes and history. In this case, it is worth understanding and remembering the roots of the faculty senate. An institution is well served to ask why it has a senate; why it was created in the first place. Perhaps its senate has veered from its original course or mission or has, to use James Minor’s typology, become ceremonial or subverted instead of influential or functional—or vice versa.\textsuperscript{16} The modern senate on a campus is born from its history. If a senate has indeed changed course, was it an intentional move or something that happened \textit{de facto}, a result of unsupervised or mismanaged drift?

This study does not trace the origins or history of every faculty senate in American higher education; not even in every American research university although an earnest attempt has been made to cover more than a few. However, the conclusions on how and why senates were chartered and came into being—what their original purposes were—are very likely similar to those of other research universities not discussed at length here. As such, scholars and institutional leaders can use this study as a springboard or guide for understanding and studying faculty governance in other institutions. Even those studying institutions with dissimilar missions may find helpful cues on how to uncover the meaning of their senates. As historian of higher education Walter Metzger argues, “I believe that knowledge of the history of academic governance is apt to improve
the social science of it, and may work wonders for anyone who confronts the nagging question of how American colleges and universities should be run.”

In writing the preface to the history of faculty governance at the University of Michigan, Peggie J. Hollingsworth, chair of that institution’s Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs, wrote that the many constituencies and members of the University community (regents, administrators, faculty, staff, students, and alumni) had an inadequate understanding of the governance of the institution. She asked, “Is it surprising that few within any of these groups possess a truly global vision of the mission of the University and that many lack even a rudimentary understanding of the significance of their role in the overall university community?” She lamented the lack of communication among these groups and an erosion of trust and respect between them. The preparation of the report on the history of faculty governance at Michigan was aimed at helping to alleviate the tensions among these groups.

The same could be said of this dissertation. There is a lack of understanding between constituencies of any given university regarding the role of each in governance. The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on the role of the faculty and thereby help increase our understanding of university governance.

This dissertation is a means for examining whether governance structures are adequate for the cause or appropriate for their purposes. Should universities reevaluate their structures and how can this historical knowledge of governance aid in this type of restructuring or reorganization? If faculty do not participate in areas of governance most closely related to their functions, how will they gain a sense of ownership and direction over its management?
Definitions

For purposes of this dissertation, senate and governance are defined as follows:

**Senate:** There are many names by which the organizations under study in this dissertation are known, including senates, faculty senates, academic senates, university senates; councils, and faculty, academic, and university councils. Also, in some cases they are known by other names such as administrative council or planning councils. The key is not the name but the membership and function of the body. For purposes of this study, a senate must be dominated by faculty membership and be the organism through which the faculty participate in university-wide decision-making. Senates known as “pure” senates are those that are made up exclusively by faculty members (or with very few administrators, usually as ex officio members), while “mixed” senates have a combination of faculty and administrators and sometimes students, but faculty generally hold the majority.

**Governance:** The governance of an institution is defined by the way issues affecting the institution or its units are decided. There are many types of governance and it takes place at a variety of levels. Governance may be dominated by the president or by the faculty; the “ideal,” as espoused in the literature, is an equilibrium of “shared governance.” Shared governance means that the various actors in governance—trustees, the administration, and faculty (and some would include students, alumni, and staff)—share the responsibility of governing the university. Governance, whether dominated by one party or shared, takes place at all levels of the university—in programs, departments, colleges, at the university-level, and in some cases on a state-wide basis for multi-campus
universities. This study is primarily concerned with the level and type of governance in which senates participate.

**Overview of the Study**

This dissertation examines the creation of faculty senates chronologically, divided into three main eras. The context for this historical study is provided in a review of the literature in Chapter Two. This literature review begins with a discussion of the professoriate, its claim to professional autonomy and the role of collegiality, followed by a discussion control within the academy and the nature of shared governance. The chapter is primarily concerned with the literature on faculty senates, what they are, how (and if) they operate, authority, and functions.

Chapter Three provides an explanation of the research methods and the theoretical models employed in the study. The historical method is employed, utilizing primary sources from university archives and secondary sources such as institutional histories, historical literature, reports, senate histories, and other documents. A means for understanding how and why faculty senates were created is found in political theories known as “agenda setting” which explains how problems are identified and who has the power to propose viable solutions.

The nature of faculty governance before faculty senates were created is the focus of Chapter Four. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the role faculty played in governance before senates were created as representative bodies at universities.

Chapter Five discusses senates created in the era of the university movement (defined as 1890 to 1939 for this study). The chapter includes a discussion of the very
earliest senates (e.g., Johns Hopkins, Chicago, Catholic University). Three case studies, supplemented by several secondary examples, are used as examples of the main trends of why senates were created during this formative period of American higher education. The first trend includes senates created as part of the modernization of a college or university, demonstrated by the creation of the senate at Penn State (1921). Faculty initiated senates are the second trend, exemplified by the senate at the University of Virginia (1926). The third type of senate is one born out of crisis, as was the case at the University of Utah (1915). Each of these trends is treated chronologically. The case studies for Chapter Five and subsequent chapters are based on primary documents from university archives, supplemented by secondary sources such as institutional histories.

Senates created during and after World War II, are chronicled in Chapter 6. The senates of the University of Pittsburgh (1940) and the University of Pennsylvania (1952) are described as examples of senates created due to organizational modernization and faculty activism, respectively, supplemented by secondary examples.

The faculty senates created during the 1960s and early 1970s (along with a brief treatment of latecomers, those created after 1975) are discussed in Chapter Seven. The creation of the Faculty Senate at Carnegie Mellon University (1968) is described, followed by a description of the Columbia University Senate (1969). The factors involved in creating faculty senates during this era are then treated thematically.

Among the 151 universities included in the sample for this study, only four percent (six, in all) were identified as not having a university-wide senate. The reasons why these institutions do not have a senate are explored in Chapter Eight.
The final chapter provides a summary of the findings of the dissertation. The theoretical models proposed as holding explanatory power in Chapter Three are then applied to the study. The limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and implications of the study are discussed.

This study examines the senates created at American research universities with a total of 150 universities. The institutions examined in this study include the 151 universities classified as Doctoral/Research Universities—Extensive in the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (2000). Teachers College was included as a separate university by Carnegie but I included it with Columbia University since it participates in that senate. I found information on all 150 institutions and their senates but could not identify with certainty the “founding date” of thirty-three senates. Therefore, data is presented on 117 senates in this study.

Senates were introduced slowly through the university building era, with about seventeen percent (twenty-six) of research universities having a faculty senate by 1939. The movement to create senates accelerated in the 1950s, adding thirty-two senates in only two decades but the greatest number of senates was created in the “Long 60s” (defined as 1960 to 1975 for this study), where an additional forty-seven senates were added in less than fifteen years. Only a handful of universities have added senates since the mid-1970s. An overview of when senates were created is provided in Figure 1.1, which displays when senates were created from 1880 to the present. Seven institutions do not have a senate, and are discussed in Chapter Eight.
Figure 1.1 – Faculty Senates Created, by Decade, 1880 – 2000

The reasons behind the creation of these senates will be explored in depth in subsequent chapters. However, at this time it is worth setting the stage with an understanding of what is often afoot with the creation of a new senate. A quote from Ray Howe from his study on the “Roles of Faculty” will suffice for now. He argues that when faculty members acquire a modest sense of well-being and then seem to acquire the realization that they are worthy of much more, coupled with the recognition that they have already secured the base from which they may reasonably hope to achieve it. In Weber’s words, these aspirations take the form of the demand for “the full prerogatives of professionalism. This means the professors, like members of other professions, seek direct participation in the formulation of the policies and rules that govern their performance.” The key word here is direct.20

As will be discussed in Chapter Three and in the Conclusion, Howe’s argument is an example of the reasons that faculty may attempt to set the agenda for the creation of an
institutional senate. This dissertation is an examination of the various means and reasons for which a faculty senate is created.

Endnotes


4 Ibid.

5 Robert M. O’Neill, “Academic Freedom: Past, Present, and Future Beyond September 11,” in American Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century: Social, Political, and Economic Challenges, ed. Philip G. Altbach, Robert O. Berdahl, and Patricia J. Gumport (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 94-95. O’Neill has surveyed academic freedom cases over the past century which examines the similar periods as this study: the 1915 era when the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was founded; the McCarthy period in which loyalty oaths and witch hunts disrupted campus life and about 170 tenured or tenure-track faculty were dismissed, usually on poorly documented evidence, and the turbulent 1960s. Academic freedom faces new threats and challenges in the post-9/11 world and we may soon see whether or not the trends of the past will be repeated in terms of faculty asserting themselves.


7 Piper Fogg, “President of Texas University Suspends Faculty Senate and Plans to Reform It by Barring Malcontents,” Chronicle of Higher Education, October 10, 2005.


Publishers, 1997).


16 As their names indicate, an influential senate is one that has influence on the institution while a subverted one has little influence and is often under the control of the president. Minor’s typology is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. James T. Minor, “Understanding Faculty Senates: Moving from Mystery to Models,” *Review of Higher Education* 27, no. 3 (2004).


18 Nicholas H. Steneck, “Faculty Governance at the University of Michigan: Principles, History, and Practice,” ed. University of Michigan Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1991), 1. In the conclusion to this same study, Nicholas H. Steneck, concludes that, “Today discussions about teaching and the curriculum are no longer as central to the vitality of the university as they once were, having been replaced by greater and greater emphasis on scholarship or research. However, the governance structure of the university has not changed accordingly. Faculty do not participate as directly in discussions about the planning of research at the University as they once did in discussions about teaching” (p. 12).

19 For some senates it was not possible to verify its exact date origin so they are counted as having a senate but their origins are not discussed.

CHAPTER TWO
Review of the Literature

This chapter provides a review of the literature on the nature of faculty senates and the role of faculty in governance. Because most of the literature ignores the historical development of senates, this chapter will provide a means to understand current views of faculty senates and shared governance but will also highlight how these views have developed and changed over time as expressed in the literature.

Among the questions addressed include: What are faculty senates? Why are they called “senates”? What do they govern? (And what do they not?) What are the criticisms of faculty senates? How effective are they? Why are they important to study? In particular, why is it important to understand their history? Why does so much of the history and analysis of the administration of higher education focus on university presidents?

This review of the literature on academic senates begins with an examination of the nature of the professoriate in American higher education, the idea of shared governance, and then addresses the literature on faculty senates. The review on senates includes an examination of the relationship of senates with the administration, characteristics of senates, the sphere of influence of senates, their functions and types, and alternative faculty organizations. This review does not attempt to address the writings on specific senates but focuses on articles and books that discuss the nature of faculty senates in general.
Studies of faculty senates are typically contemporary analyses of their structure and authority. This is both problematic and advantageous to a historical study. It is problematic because most of the literature ignores the historical aspects of faculty governance. Each generation of scholars may look back to the previous generation of literature, but hardly any look back any further to gain a broader historical perspective. As such, these studies describe the current status of senates while ignoring their history. For example, a number of scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s refer to faculty senates as “new forms” of representation or “new campus structures.”¹ None refer to senates of earlier periods—even to compare how these “new” senates are truly “new” or different from their predecessors. As early as 1938 Edward Blewett in an article in the Journal of Higher Education explained how the University of New Hampshire had created a “new type of faculty organization” without noting those already in existence.² The advantage of this approach, on the other hand, is that each generation of scholars provides a historical snapshot of what faculty governance looks like at the time. Even though previous scholars do not distinguish between “old” and “new” forms of governance (or even acknowledge the “old” forms), their contribution will still be valuable to evaluate the differences between senates of different periods.

The most useful and analytical articles on faculty senates are Robert Birnbaum’s 1989 article, “The Latent Organizational Functions of the Academic Senate: Why Senates Work Do Not Work but Will Not Go Away”³ and James T. Minor’s 2004 article, “Understanding Faculty Senates: Moving from Mystery to Models.”⁴ Birnbaum looks at the espoused and actual roles that senates play in university administration. He uses four alternative organizational models—bureaucratic, collegial, political, symbolic—and
examines their manifest and latent functions. Minor argues that faculty involvement in governance is a fundamental part of American higher education and embodies a central value on most campuses although there is not universal agreement on the areas in which faculty should have authority or how widely construed their authority should be. To date, researchers have not clearly delineated senate types and we know little about their structural, cultural, or functional qualities. Minor contends that the state of theory that helps explain the role of senates is primitive, a problem he attempts to correct.5

Birnbaum and Minor’s observations provide important clues for looking back at the history of the faculty senate. For each of the models Minor suggests, or functions that Birnbaum catalogs, we can ask if it was part of the original design (explicitly or implicitly) of a faculty senate. We can also ask if the goals, functions, and roles of contemporary senates are in line with the reasons for which they were created. Minor argues that, “faculty senates remain an integral part of campus governance”6 and as such, their place in history deserves to be better understood.

The Professoriate

The professoriate in American higher education faces myriad challenges and has undergone substantial changes in recent decades in the United States. The professoriate is increasingly diverse demographically, with some gains in the past half-century among women and minorities. A growing fraction is made up of part-time, non-tenure track faculty who are increasing responsible for teaching, especially of undergraduates.7 Employing faculty on short-term contracts has effects on institutional governance because, “A university that views its faculty as short-term or part-time employees gives
them little or no say in governance, and subjects them to continuous checks blunts its competitive edge by encouraging timidity and conformity among its faculty.” The ratio of tenured versus untenured faculty has radically shifted to where the number of tenured faculty are nearly equaled by non-tenure faculty in American higher education. This greater reliance on adjunct and non-tenure faculty is changing the nature and face of the professoriate, including decreasing institutional commitment by faculty and the quality of academic programs.

The life of a faculty member is increasingly complex, each serving in multiple roles, such as scholar, peer reviewer, mentor, editor, and consultant. Faculty members face a host of issues in the modern era including, increasing institutional resource competition, mission ambition/creep among institutions, a peer review/quality system under stress, and outsourcing in auxiliary services in universities, which is increasingly apparent in the academic services of a university as well. For many faculty at research universities and other institutions, maintaining a productive research and publishing agenda is paramount, which has led to a high level of specialization and isolated fiefdoms. These competing demands can have an effect on a faculty member’s willingness to take an active part over time in university governance because it may create difficult career trade-offs.

Among the unique features of academic life is the relative security afforded by tenure and academic freedom. And although the tenure system has been under attack at various times in recent decades and regarded as “problematic,” academic freedom remains largely free of structural restraints and has been “reasonably secure.” Nonetheless, those on the tenure track have seen escalating standards for gaining tenure
and the academic path has become increasingly difficult for aspiring scholars. Even so, faculty continue to voluntarily associate themselves with the academy and choose it as a way of life. They become shareholders with a large stake in the “business” of academe where the key investment is not physical assets, but themselves.  

These unique qualities of the professoriate have not escaped public scrutiny or criticism. Universities are commonly criticized for their inefficiency and faculty are often “cast as either the problem, characterized as unproductive and self-interested, or as the obstacle to the solution, with norms for shared governance rendering faculty participation ineffective—or, at worst, obstructionist.” This can give administrators a rationale for taking more control of the university and leaving less of the locus of control with the faculty. Such a trend is important to understand because it runs counter to the expectations of faculty, who have been, “socialized in the ideal of shared governance or, stated more pragmatically, the right to active participation or at least consultation in academic decisions.” Even during periods of affluence faculty seek out the “the full prerogatives of professionalism” meaning direct “participation in the formulation of the policies and rules that govern their performance.”

A sense of discontent by faculty had led many by the early 1970s to shift toward quasi-union and union organizations. This may have been in part because of changes in the environment—a glut of Ph.D.s saturating the market and increasingly negative public attitudes toward higher education. These negative public attitudes have been consistent. Joseph Garbarino scholar wrote in 1971, in sentiments that could be echoed even today, that, 

There is no substantial group in society that is not critical of the present system of higher education and particularly of the status of the faculty within the system.
Legislatures and other fund sources complain that faculty are shirking their main task of teaching undergraduates, administrators routinely describe the faculty as the principal obstacle to desirable academic reform, the public and some of its political leaders complain of their personal irresponsibility and their failure to ‘manage’ the student population. In a version of academic ‘consumerism,’ the students rail against pedagogical neglect and against constricting and ‘irrelevant’ programs, curricula, and teaching methods.19

What will the face of faculty look like in the future? Trends likely to face faculty in the coming years include increased competition for grant funding, financial cutbacks for libraries and journals (thus making scholarly publication more difficult), changes in enrollment patterns from traditional liberal arts to business and engineering, increased demands for accountability which may result in vesting more power with administrators, budgetary difficulties for institutions, a decline in public esteem for higher education, an increasingly fragmented and differentiated professoriate, a shrinking academic employment market20 and increased demands for academic entrepreneurialism. The increasing number of part-time and non-tenure track faculty could have an effect on the nature of faculty governance in the university, as one Patricia Gumport asks: “Will the ranks of faculty who can participate in faculty governance be diminished—thereby leaving more decision-making power in the hands of full-time administrators?” 21

Professional Autonomy

The professional autonomy of faculty members is a complex problem. Faculty make a claim to professional autonomy yet the professor is not truly autonomous in the same way other professionals are. An architect or dentist can be self-employed in a way that a scholar cannot because academics are at the same time professionals and employees of bureaucratic organizations, where “Their self-image as independent
scholars dominating their working environment is increasingly at odds with the realities of the modern American university.22

The traditions of faculty autonomy have evolved because they are well suited to the nature of the university. The policies and practices that govern the main work of the institution—teaching and research—are set by the people who actually do that work and as such, the faculty are individually and collectively responsible for the intellectual standards of the institution. It is in this sense that the commonly held belief that “the faculty are the university” has meaning. “Thus, in spite of the fact that these powers are delegated to the faculties by boards of trustees, and, in theory a least, can be withdrawn, in reality these are virtually plenary powers. Boards and administrations rarely challenge them, and turmoil is the result when they do.”23

The structure of a university imposes certain limits and creates certain tensions between the administrative professional and the autonomous professor, because administration assumes a power hierarchy with a sense of order and control. Knowledge and creativity, however, are “basically individual and can only to a very limited degree be ordered and coordinated by the superior in rank. … Only if immune from ordinary social pressures and free to innovate, to experiment, to take risks without the usual social repercussions of failure, can a professional carry out his work effectively.”24

Complicating the picture of professionalism is the question of whether professionalism refers to the profession of professor generally or to specific disciplines. One could argue that, “each academic discipline, not higher education, constitutes a profession”25 which raises the question of where the locus of control should rest—with the college or department or at the university level?
Academics exercise considerable autonomy over their basic working conditions, despite these tensions. The classroom is considered sacrosanct and largely beyond bureaucratic controls (the effects of recent debates about political correctness and the possible effects of emerging technologies on teaching styles notwithstanding). Furthermore, professors retain much autonomy over the use of their time outside the classroom in choosing their own research projects and what and where they publish.\textsuperscript{26}

In leading universities, faculty influence is relatively stronger than at less-prestigious colleges and universities. As such, an important distinction can be found between the kinds of restraints placed on faculty at community colleges and at non-selective teaching-oriented institutions versus the greater level of freedom and autonomy enjoyed by faculty at prestigious research universities. Similarly, the growing numbers of non-tenure-track and part-time faculty have less autonomy than their tenure-track colleagues.\textsuperscript{27} Most units, and their academic managers, have a great deal of autonomy and bodies “such as senates have primacy in personnel and curricular decisions.”\textsuperscript{28}

Threats to faculty autonomy have come at different times in the form of trustee and administrator influence and the professionalization of administrative occupations clustered around central management thus making faculty seem more like “managed professionals.”\textsuperscript{29} Yet the academic class can still counter with strong countervailing power that is rooted in their personal and collective expertise and “they expect to be consulted in many matters rather than to receive orders from those in nominally superior positions.”\textsuperscript{30} These threats have become manifest in the tensions between the norm of professional autonomy and the pressures for accountability. Philip Altbach counters that, “Professorial myths—of collegial decision making, individual autonomy, and the
disinterested pursuit of knowledge—have come into conflict with the realities of complex organizational structures and bureaucracies. Important academic decisions are reviewed by a bewildering assortment of committees and administrators. These levels of authority have become more powerful as arbiters of academic decision making.\textsuperscript{31}

The regular and cyclical financial strains on higher education are problematic because they force institutions into facing unprecedented challenges, in particular to the role and autonomy of faculty. These strains introduce a whole host of challenges to institutions, and thus, to the professoriate. The balance of autonomy (the right to self-regulation) and accountability (obligation to others outside the academy) is shifting more and more toward the accountability side of the continuum, which threatens the “sociological compact” that binds faculty and their institutions. If this trend goes unchecked, the degree of autonomy will continue to decline and be replaced with increased public accountability, weakening public institutions of higher education, and increasing the ease with which non-tenured faculty can be hired in place of tenure-line faculty.\textsuperscript{32} As Dorothy E. Finnegan reminds us, “Scholars are faculty members only by virtue of being employed by an institution of higher learning. The role of faculty can be transformed through a managed partnership of faculty and administrators working to strike an appropriate balance between autonomy and accountability.”\textsuperscript{33}

Because the faculty member is both an employee of an institution and an autonomous professional, the guarantor of the professional status is the granting of tenure, that condition a professor achieves after a trial period which grants him or her certain protections from summary dismissal or arbitrary treatment from the employing institution. It is generally tied to the idea of academic freedom—the right to conduct
research and teach within one’s field of expertise—which may be offered to non-tenure faculty but is not always guaranteed to them.

**Faculty Collegiality**

Related to the idea of professional autonomy of faculty is the ideal of faculty collegiality. Collegiality refers to the voluntary sharing of power and the sense of community a group enjoys within an institution. However, the increasing number and diversity (of individuals and disciplines) within academe have made creating a sense of community more difficult. The size of institutional academic staff has grown enormously in recent decades where even the size of departments makes a sense of collegiality at the department level difficult to achieve. The result is of “elected senates and other, more bureaucratic, governance arrangement taking the place of the traditional general faculty meeting,” and “committees have become ubiquitous, and the sense of participation in a common academic enterprise has declined.” This means that achieving a common sense of purpose has become more elusive.

Institutional leaders rely on the idea of the “invisible senate” where a faculty member’s loyalty is to more than just their own department or school. This type of loyalty is to the institution, to the context of interactions that benefits the common good. The faculty member is both contributor and beneficiary of a collegium at the university. It is the institution (and not the department) to which a faculty member is beholden—the university confers degrees on students, tenure on faculty, and is corporation that pays and provides benefits (health, legal, etc.) to the faculty member. As such, when faculty resolve or allegiance to the university (or its main body politic such as the senate) weakens, so does the university itself.
Some scholars, at a time when university staffs were bulging such as in the late 1960s, argued for holding onto the past values of the academy, that even while the academy becomes more of a managed community, arguing that it needs to, “retain its historic sense of community—the sense of being a collegium,”\(^{37}\) not to be managed by remote directors, in a corporate sense, but by those most invested in the community, those at the institution itself.

The need for collegiality in the university setting is intertwined with the idea that most of the goals of the institution require a larger buy-in from the body-politic. As Burton R. Clark explains, “Personal leadership has its place in academe, but the window of opportunity for arbitrary top-down policy generally does not last very long. Anything worth doing in university or college requires a number of people who want it to happen and will work at it for a number of years.”\(^{38}\)

What makes this sense of collegiality possible is the attitude of most faculty members toward their job; that it is more of a lifestyle or “calling” than a mere job. Again, Clark ably explains this phenomenon of participatory citizenship in higher education:

Under all the strengths and weaknesses of American academic life, we find the persistent problem of professional calling. When academic work becomes just a job and a routine career, then such material rewards as salary are placed front and center. Academics stay at their work or leave for other pursuits according to how much they are paid. They come to work “on time” because they must (it is nailed down in the union contract); they leave on time because satisfaction is found after work is concluded. But when academic work is still a calling, it “constitutes a practical ideal of activity and character that makes a person’s work morally inseparable from his or her life…” A calling transmutes narrow self-interest into other-regarding and ideal-regarding interests: or is linked to peers and to a version of a larger common good. The calling has moral content; it contributes to civic virtue.\(^{39}\)
These intrinsic rewards of the professoriate provide for a greater sense of committed productivity that “political and bureaucratic controls cannot generate—nor can ‘market forces’ guarantee. Those who seek to replace professional commitment with the nuts and bolts of bureaucratic regulation run down the calling; they take intellectual absorption out of the absorbing errand.”40 The result of instituting greater administrative controls on faculty lives, instead of allowing a consensus to rule, is to introduce “confusion, conflict, and clamor.”41

Who Controls Academe?

Who is in charge of an institution of higher education—who holds the controlling interest? The president, the faculty, or the trustees? The answer to this question has always been a matter of some controversy and a source of conflict in the university. As universities have become larger and more complex, there has been an increase in the administrative offices of a university. The tensions have become more pronounced between the three bodies—the administration, the faculty, and the trustees—that participate in the so-called “shared governance” of a university. Indeed, it may be the inequality in the “sharing” of governance that helped lead to the creation of faculty senates. To understand the context in which faculty senates operate it is important to first understand the other competing governing bodies, the administration, and the trustees. Logan Wilson offers axioms that he believes are necessary to understand for good governance to take place: “First, no group—trustee or other—can have absolute power. Another axiom is that order must be maintained alongside freedom and justice. Still another is that the university cannot be transmogrified into a microcosm of the body
politic, a welfare agency, a retreat from reality, or an arena, without thereby ceasing to be a university.”

But academic power at most institutions is diffuse and “can be brought into focus only with difficulty.” The purpose of sharing power is to achieve the educational goals of the institution and is not usually considered an end in itself.

Around the turn of the century, faculty began to demand more control. Writing in 1911, Charles Richard Van Hise, president of the American Association of Universities, described the role of faculty in governance, that when “an educational institution was small the faculty could do its administrative work” but as it grows in size and complexity it must use committees or an “academic senate, or academic council” which prolongs and adds expense to the process. (If this were true in 1911, how much more so in 1960 or 2006!) But, he argued, university unity is more important than administrative efficiency, and “in order to secure harmony in a university it is necessary that the faculty exercise authority with reference to educational policies.” Of course, if all matters were handled by the faculty they could not focus on their main functions: “instruction and investigation.”

He laments that, “At the very same time that they are complaining of the extent of authority of the executive officers they are also complaining of the amount of committee work which is required of them.” Some things never change! One check on presidential power he suggests might be to “have the professors, rather than the governing boards, elect him and determine his powers” but then he says, the powers and efficiency of the president would not change much whether selected by trustees or professors.

Others who have historically played a role in the governance process include donors (especially founders), trustees, religious leaders (if the college is sectarian),
presidents, alumni, and more recently, students. Presidents, especially, had special dispensation over shaping their university and might do so with little or limited input from faculty. When faculty were consulted during the early period of the American research university, it was often only on the subject of faculty appointments (e.g., Andrew D. White, founding president at Cornell, endeared himself to the faculty by delegating authority and utilizing faculty input). In many cases faculty had no voice even in the selection of their colleagues. Henry P. Tappan at Michigan did not tolerate challenges to his authority, David Starr Jordan at Stanford denied faculty a voice in appointment matters and disliked the ideas of tenure and autonomous departments, and William R. Harper did not want the input of faculty or donors.

During the early era of the American research university, presidents generally restricted any authority given to the faculty to educational matters. This could have been in part due to an unwillingness on the part of faculty to deal with additional duties but more likely this may have been due to the lack of professional security of the faculty. The faculty did not yet differ significantly from their pre-Civil War colleagues; many still did not have advanced degrees and many were still generalists and not creators of new knowledge, but transmitters. By the 1880s more faculty returned from European universities (mostly German) with graduate training in hand and a desire to focus on creating new knowledge and introducing graduate education.

And as the American research university became more fully formed, “the scope for academic entrepreneurship diminished” meaning that university presidents could no longer run the institution autonomously (or autocratically) because the university became too complex and that the checks and balances that came into play with increasingly
powerful boards and faculty, and especially the “professional managers” (members of the president’s administration) made swift unilateral changes by a president more difficult.

Into the twentieth century it was the institution’s president that dominated. Even by 1912 a full 85 percent of faculty at American universities felt limited in their authority and desired greater participation in campus affairs. In 1915 the American Association of University Professors was founded on the promise of securing faculty rights to conduct their affairs—teaching and research—without undue outside influence and with lifetime tenure. As Walter Schenkel explains,

Only the introduction of tenure finally made it possible for the faculty as a group to claim the right participate, without fear of reprisal, in some areas of governance. Limited faculty control over certain aspects of the educational program had existed in some of the early universities, but the faculty received the right of control only over the educational area in the first decade of the twentieth century. By that time, the battleground between faculty and university administration had shifted from control over educational matters to the issue of academic freedom. In the American university the faculty members were rather closely supervised by their governing boards, and academic freedom came to mean a faculty’s right to a private life outside the university. This right was not safeguarded until well into the twentieth century. Most academic freedom cases involved political activities of faculty outside the campus, but some even dealt with the morality of professional conduct outside the classroom. The long and continuous struggle for academic freedom eventually led the faculty to form the American Association of University Professors in 1915. The backing of this prestigious national association made it considerably easier for an accused faculty member to hold his own against the administration of his university.

While faculty made great strides in the first half of the twentieth century, this type of change in faculty power accelerated after World War II. Since WWII the great growth of faculty power and rapid faculty professionalization have resulted in a higher degree of professional self-government and checks governing boards and the administration.

The increasing size and professionalization of faculties has decreased old vestiges of collegiality. T.R. McConnell paints a quaint story of how it once was in the old-time
college: “Standing in the court of one of the quadrangles, a member of Oxford’s St. John’s College, which then had only about 200 students, observed that in that small enclosure the Fellows often met informally to decide many of the questions facing the college. This is the picture of true collegium.”

But is it not the case of any organization that must institute bureaucratic regulation as it grows? Could true collegium really be achieved in an institution with more than a thousand faculty members or even within a college that might have one or two-hundred members of its faculty? What even of the department that now has 40 or 50 or more members? It is common that administrative structures will arise to address the increased complexity. Among the faculty, their committees or senates may create a parallel administration—a set of committees that parallel the functional areas of the administration. The result of all of these factors is that the faculty becomes less of a collegium (a community) and more of a formal organization. Logan Wilson comments that, “Although universities of bygone eras were probably never the serene places depicted by nostalgic sentiment, academic enterprise then was without question more orderly than now. Greater consensus prevailed about the ends and means of higher education.”

The ideal of shared governance is that the president, the faculty, and the trustees share equally in the governing of the university but it has been noted that this triangle is more often “isosceles than equilateral.” This unequal level of power can create tensions among the governing bodies. Indeed, it would seem it is not a triangle at all. The key relationships are between the faculty and the president, and the president and trustees. The president is often a mediator between trustees and faculty and there is not a great
deal of direct interaction between these two bodies. The senate, for example, may approve a new curricular program, which must then pass through the president’s office before it is considered (even though rarely questioned) by the governing body.

In terms of this relationship between the faculty and president’s administration, consider the model in Figure 2.1. This model could be used as a means to evaluate the state of shared governance on a campus at any given point in its history and where the balance of power resides on the continuum may provide useful clues about the reason for the creation of a faculty senate.61

Figure 2.1 – Models of Distribution of Authority: A Continuum of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Dominance</th>
<th>Faculty Dominance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Primacy</td>
<td>Faculty Primacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared Authority</td>
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On one extreme of the continuum, Administrative Dominance, the administration and the governing board make decisions almost unilaterally with little or no faculty input. Faculty are informed of decisions after the fact. Administrative Primacy occurs where authority resides primarily with the administration but faculty are consulted for their views, either through the administration proactively seeking their input or by faculty presenting formal petitions or resolutions. Administrative power generally trumps any faculty influence.

Shared Authority is where both the faculty and administration exercise effective influence in decision-making. Formulation of policy is carried out in forums such as a senate where faculty and administrators work through the terms and conditions of a policy. Grievances or differences are handled jointly in a predetermined process.
Faculty Primacy exists when joint consultation on policies occurs but more authority for decision-making rests with the faculty. The faculty at an institution with this type of authority may have been vested with certain administrative authority by the administration or the governing board. And Faculty Dominance exists when near unilateral decision-making authority rests with the faculty, either for the broad spectrum of issues at an institution or for certain, specific issues. Faculty Dominance is not very common in American higher education in the broad sense but may exist for specific issues, such as the curriculum.

Underlying these tensions is not just which group holds power but the values of each group. The line of authority within the administration is what matters (for organizational effectiveness and efficiency and for the sake of order) whereas for the professor, it is his or her own prerogative that counts. “The ultimate justification for a professional act is that it is, to the best of the professional’s knowledge, the right act…. The ultimate justification of an administrative act, however, is that it is in line with the organization’s rule and regulations, and that is has been approved—directly or by implication—by a superior rank.”62 The result of these cultural differences and normative orientations can be seen in the different ways ambitions and success are measured, which means combining professional and administrative authority in an organization can be problematic.63

Further complicating these tensions is that faculty and administrators have skewed views of each other where faculty can perceive administrators as more powerful than the administrators view themselves and vice versa, which can result in poor communication or a culture of distrust.64 As administrators have become managers and spokespersons for
the institution, faculty “become more like employees in a setting that emphasizes the need to meet performance expectations.”

One example of these gaps in perception is apparent in Harold Hodgkinson’s study of campus senates. One problem was the discrepancy between the questionnaire data (mostly from presidents or other administrators) and participant-observer data (faculty and student members of senates), which may mean that presidents and senate members interpret the meaning of “participation” differently. Administrators may see participation as simply meaning “access” to decision-makers while senate members may see the term as meaning decision-making itself. This disconnect between expectations can lead to conflict and tension between administrators and faculty senators. In schools where the mission of the institution is more clarified and agreed upon, the better possibility there is for “success” of a campus senate. (Do they mean liberal arts colleges? Community colleges? They don’t say.) As Allan O. Pfister noted, around the same time as Hodgkinson’s study, that,

No small part of the problem of governance in higher education may be traced to the predisposition of members of the academic community to interpret the same events quite differently. More bluntly, when faculty and administration are the two parties involved, it is not a question of whether the events may be interpreted differently, it is almost inevitable that they will.

A second aspect of the faculty-administration problem is the growing complexity of the university, the academy having “become of necessity a managed organization, yet by and large the faculty persists in viewing the academy as a collegium.” In other words, the simple organization of universities of the past is no longer adequate. Yet, the institution of higher education is still a community, albeit a more complex one which struggles to allow a high degree of participation while trying accomplish tasks in an
efficient manner; two values that are not always mutually complementary. Furthermore, institutions are trying to balance these competing values at a time of “almost perpetual crisis.” The professor is more likely to desire a long, studied approach; the administrator must respond as deftly as possible.

A key relationship in the triangle of shared governance (if it is a triangle) is between the faculty and president. This relationship can be affected right from the beginning of a president’s term by the role the president takes on upon joining the institution. Certain initial actions (or “gestures”) they take—to take on a faculty role, to let the voice of the faculty be heard, to be a follower, or as advocate to outside parties—can have positive effects on president-faculty relations. Other gestures wherein the president does not take on a faculty role will likely be seen as negatively affecting the faculty-president role: failure to communicate, failure to consult, and failure to acknowledge faculty governance. All of these behaviors help create an image of the president in the eyes of the faculty will affect the relationship between the faculty and the president.

A significant gesture that creates a positive working relationship is letting the voices of faculty be heard. In one case, described by Estela Bensimon, the president helped facilitate the restructuring of university governance, which resulted “in the establishment of a true faculty senate that helped to focus the voice of faculty more clearly.” At another institution a president (a woman who some felt was more open to divergent views) was credited with disbanding the “oligarchy” that controlled the senate and opened the governance process up to a wider group of faculty.
Conversely, a president who fails to acknowledge faculty governance has a chilling effect on faculty attitudes towards and willingness to work with a president. At two institutions in Bensimon’s study faculty felt intimidated and ignored by the president. In one case, the president ignored the fledgling senate and circumvented it instead of truly collaborating or at least consulting with it. Faculty asked of this president, “Does he have the experience to run a university or was it politics that got him the job?” In another, faculty leaders were invited to discuss matters of importance but it seemed only for appearance’s sake—the president would routinely ignore the advice or wishes of the senate. This caused faculty members to be suspicious of the president and characterize him as “an autocratic politician.”

Administrator attitudes and willingness to acknowledge their own roles play an important role in shaping how well shared governance works on a campus. Faculty and administrators must share the burden of making shared governance work. “Faculty are responsible for making institutional issues a priority, for coming to the table prepared and informed, and for acknowledging the time frame within which decisions must be reached. Administrators are responsible for creating the climate in which good governance can operate.” The formal structure on a campus is only a part of what makes shared governance workable or effective. The legitimacy of authority (of administrators or faculty) is grounded in “campus expectations, histories, and norms” and as such, each campus must adapt its system to its own individual needs and situation. These convergent roles require constant attention. As Burton Clark explains,

As the gap grows between “faculty” and “administration” inside universities and colleges, faculty seek to promote their special interests more and administrators increasingly see themselves as the only ones who uphold overall institutional concerns. “Shared governance” only works when it is shared to the point where
some academics sit in central councils and the rest of the academic staff feel they are appropriately represented, or where decision-making is extensively decentralized to deans and department heads and faculty sit close to these newly strengthened “line managers,” or in various other complicated combinations of centralized and decentralized decision-making.\textsuperscript{77}

Senates face conflicts such as governing boards and administrators withdrawing powers previously granted, subjecting faculty recommendations (previously rubber-stamped) to increasing scrutiny, imposing budgetary constraints on the senate’s operation, and the unilateral introduction of policies that would have normally required (or at least received) faculty senate input. The senate, limited in its authority and resources, may find itself impotent to challenge these developments.\textsuperscript{78}

The divide between presidents and faculty senates may revolve around the types of tasks each takes on. Martin Trow argues that senates play little or no role in major institutional planning—the main work of presidents—and are better equipped to advise than lead. Indeed presidents are more ambitious than senate leaders and must have the ability to see opportunities, take decisions, define goals, and mobilize support. The president must act quickly with authority and does not have the leisure of long deliberation. Furthermore, presidents are supported by large staffs while senate members and even leaders are “part-time amateurs.” Most importantly, presidents need to master four types of leadership: symbolic, political, managerial, and academic. Not all do each of these perfectly, of course, but most senate leaders usually have the opportunity to develop only the last of these (whereas department chairs and deans can practice all of these types).\textsuperscript{79}

The relative strength of presidents currently may be historical, due to their long tradition of control over university affairs. Presidents dominated the earliest colleges and
there was no body of scholars to check his authority. The only check on a president was
the board of trustees, which, if handled favorably by the president, could be his allies.
This near absolute authority diminished over time, especially with the rise of the research
universities and the emergence of a genuine academic profession.\textsuperscript{80}

Cases showing that shared governance works exist, despite the popular cry that it
does not. Peter Eckel’s study looks at program discontinuation at four universities, the
decision-making process, and the role of shared governance in the process at each of
these schools. Despite the often-heard claim that shared governance is to blame for many
of higher education’s difficulties and inefficiencies, Eckel finds that shared governance
can enhance institutional decision-making. Although the processes at each of the four
institutions varied greatly, he found that shared governance facilitated the program
cancellation process in three ways. First, governance set the stage on which
administrators could frame the seriousness of the problem. Second, the presence of a
system for shared governance brought together the various interest groups in legitimate
ways to tackle a serious task. Third, shared governance provided a means for correcting
potential errors.\textsuperscript{81}

Eckel’s findings refute two commonly held beliefs of shared governance; that
faculty are not willing to participate in a constructive way in institutional decision
making, especially where there are dire consequences (e.g., program discontinuation) for
colleagues; and that faculty are responsible for the success of shared governance.\textsuperscript{82}
Instead, administrators have an important role in making shared governance successful.
Although some argue that shared governance weakens the role of the president and
makes institutions less adaptive, Eckel demonstrates that, done right, shared governance
can enhance institutional decision making and that faculty are willing and able to work productively with the administration to bring about necessary changes, even when those changes are difficult to accept. Though persuasive, his study was based on only four cases.

But others still decry the “death of faculty governance” claiming there is a breakdown in trust and communication among the various boards, bodies, and officers that control higher education. Faculty, these critics would claim, should not assume that their input, given through traditional means, is being authentically considered because presidents are more likely to consult hand-picked committees for advice.

Philip Altbach summarizes the condition of the faculty member’s status in the control over the university:

Just as the realities of postwar expansion shaped academic organizations and affected salaries, prestige, and working conditions and gave more power to the professoriate over the governance of colleges and universities, current diminished circumstances also bring change. While it is unlikely that the basic structural or organizational realities of American higher education will profoundly change, there has been an increase in the authority of administrators and increased bureaucratic control over working conditions on campus. In general, professors have lost a significant part of their bargaining power, which was rooted in moral authority. As academic institutions adjust to a period of declining resources, there will be subtle organizational shifts that will inevitably work to diminish the perquisites, and the authority of the academic profession. Universities, as organizations, adjust to changing realities, and these adjustments will work against the professoriate.

External influences play an increasing role in the work of faculty members. State legislatures have put increased emphasis on linking institutional funding to certain performance-based outcomes, among them to improve undergraduate teaching, to assess faculty performance, and by justifying an academic program’s existence based on its contribution to state economic development. Another external pressures is the erosion
of public confidence—“a dissonance between the goals of the public and the faculty”—which has brought into question faculty commitment to teaching and thus increasing scrutiny of teaching loads and to attacks on tenure.\textsuperscript{87} Also, the public increasing doubts the benefits of higher education; whether the high price tags create the supposed benefits.

One could argue that it is reasonable to have administrators deal with these issues because faculty do not have the time, expertise, nor inclination to deal with these types of external demands and that administrators are better equipped to respond to these challenges. As Patricia Gumport notes, “As university managers and governing boards have been at the forefront of institution, nonfaculty actors have also taken on the role of speaking on behalf of institutions in discussions of how much time faculty should teach, what and how faculty should teach, and how administrators can enhance faculty teaching. Whether by design or by default, traditional faculty governance structures have been bypassed in formulating these expectations.”\textsuperscript{88} “Faculties will be increasingly frustrated in academic planning and administration as educational decisions are more and more made by external agencies.”\textsuperscript{89}

Retaining as much autonomy as possible is important for a university because, “The intricacy and unpredictability of both learning and investigation requires a high degree of freedom from intellectually limiting external intervention and control if an institution of higher education is to perform effectively.”\textsuperscript{90} Even though autonomy cannot be absolute, “only a high degree of independence will permit colleges and universities to devise and choose effective academic means of realizing their professed goals. … Autonomy does not guarantee intellectual independence, but some forms of external intervention, overt or covert, may undermine such freedom.”\textsuperscript{91} The ideal form of shared
governance is that the checks and balances of one group on another “renders it almost impossible for one person to make all major decisions alone.”

**The Faculty Senate**

The academic senate is generally considered to be the “normative organizational structure through which faculty exercise their role in college and university governance at the institutional level.” Faculty senates can be classified as “pure” senates which are a formal, representative governance structure at the institutional level that may include only faculty or a “mixed” senate which, in addition to a faculty majority, may also include representatives of other campus constituencies, such as administrators, academic staff members, and/or students. The “pure” senates are usually referred to as faculty or academic senates while “mixed” senates are often referred to as a university senate but may be also known as master planning council, college management council, or shared governance assembly. Larger institutions tend to call their body a senate. Councils tend to serve a more advisory function while senates served a more political, more legislative, function. Senates are present on campuses of all sizes, type of control, and mission (but are much more common in institutions offering the Ph.D.).

The proportion of institutions with senates has increased over the past few decades. Birnbaum found this growth perplexing given the amount of criticism that has been directed at the senate structure. The campus senate has been called, “weak, ineffective, an empty forum, vestigial, unrepresentative, and inept.” About ninety percent of institutions have a participative governance body with larger institutions being more likely to have such a body (ninety-eight percent of institutions with 10,000 or more
students have senates). In this study, almost all had an executive committee (three-fourths of all senates and ninety-seven percent of larger institutions have one), which was responsible for creating an agenda and working directly with the top-level administrators. These bodies further organized themselves with standing and ad hoc committees to examine issues related to academic affairs, faculty concerns, student affairs, and management issues. The trend toward multi-constituency bodies that emerged in the late 1960s and into the 1970s as a means to bring faculty, administrators, and students together had waned by the 1990s.

Characteristics of senates that affect their effectiveness include structural and cultural issues and the posture of the administration takes towards the senate. The most important structural issue is its composition, and especially the identity of the chair. Senates with larger portions of non-faculty members (including academic administrators) have been perceived by both faculty and administrators as less effective than faculty-dominated senates and the same held true for senates where the president was chair. Where the president or provost sets the agenda, the senate holds less legitimacy in the eyes of faculty. A smaller committee structure is generally related to higher satisfaction than those with large numbers of committees, presumably because there seemed to be fewer jurisdictional problems to get in the way of things getting done. Another important structural element is that of the executive committee because of its role in setting the agenda, framing issues for meetings, and negotiating with the administration. Structural problems are not the only cause of a poorly functioning senate but it is more difficult for a senate to function well where the inherent structure works against it.
An elected officer presides over most participative governance bodies (sixty-seven percent in one study) while other models include the president of the university (seventeen percent) or academic vice-president (eleven percent) as the chair of the body. Most bodies have institutional support (professional staff and related resources). The role of the president varies in these senate bodies. In some cases, the president is the chair, in others a member of the executive committee. Sometimes the president can vote and in a minority of institutions the president can veto senate actions. Among Ph.D.-granting institutions, the president was less likely to have veto power but was also more likely to serve on the senate.

The functions of the senate can be characterized in a number of ways. Robert Birnbaum lists the manifest and latent functions. William Tierney categorizes the functions of the senate as directional (where the chair gives direction to the members, usually bounded by the senate doors), news-related (where the chair or president or another administrator shares official campus news), ceremonial (emphasizing important events), decisional, and confirmational (wherein the senate confirms a decision). The most important is the decisional function, which is where the bulk of the senate’s work takes place. As important as the other functions may be, the raison d’etre of the senate is its decisions affecting the university and this is the function which takes up the most time and energy of the senate. Tierney concludes that the governance of the university is an exercise in governance by conversation, a demonstration of the senate as a form of collegiality. Minor provides a typology of senates: functional, influential, ceremonial, and subverted.
The purpose of the senate has been for faculty to collectively go beyond defending their prerogatives and to force university administrations to let them participate in other areas of governance. Senates have not become unions, which would have meant a greater emphasis on collective bargaining and contractual issues. Instead, unions developed on their own, working parallel to senates.

The cultural context plays an important role in how a senate functions, including the governance history of the institution where “old disputes between long-gone provosts or presidents and the faculty shaped the governance system in ways that even two or three decades could not change.” Other important cultural factors include faculty attitudes towards the senate, the quality of the people who choose to participate, and leadership continuity. In fact, “quality of senate leadership varied with the intensity of faculty emotions about certain issues in certain years, with the better leaders being energized by anger over an issue.”

Administrative posture toward the senate plays an important role in the effectiveness of a system of shared governance. The willingness of administrators to give deference on academic matters is a critical factor to a senate’s success, but this deference could be affected by the university’s governance structure or culture. Overall, administrative responsiveness to senate recommendations plays an important role in shaping the perceptions of legitimacy of the senate.

Why are these bodies called senates? Founders of faculty senates surely looked to the United States Senate for their name. And the creators of the U.S. Senate, the framers of the Constitution, looked to the ancient senates of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage. Indeed, Madison, writing as “Publius” in Federalist No. 63 argued, “It adds no small weight to all
these considerations to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate.”¹¹⁰ For the founders it was not just the matter of representation but of deliberation that produced the Senate. Similarly, it is equally interesting to think of the name faculty chose for their governance body. The senate, calls its name from more deliberative body in the United States Congress, which itself called back to the days of ancient Rome. The idea of the senate is rooted in the ideal of equals coming together to deliberate over a problem in a democratic manner. W.T. Hewett, in advocating for a more formal faculty structure (before such bodies were common in American higher education) looked to European roots. “The proposition which is here advocated, namely, the participation of the faculty in the government, has been shown to be the prevailing system in the Continental universities…and to be, with shades of difference, the practice in the English universities. In one or two of the great universities of this country, and in its most successful scientific school, the government rests practically with the faculty.”¹¹¹ He argued that creating such a body gives a “sense of responsibility which is felt for the prosperity of a university on the part of all the professors is one of the most valuable results of this system. Instead of being merely assigned to a department of instruction, and administering laws laid down for them, powerless to remedy flagrant abuses and errors of government, they become the active custodians of the order and the culture of the university.”¹¹²

Authority of Senates

What do senates control? One way to examine senates is to think of their structure as approximating the college’s management—a committee structure that mirrors the administrative structure of the university (not unlike the Congressional oversight
committees or state legislative committees which oversee executive agencies). However, their areas of influence are more limited than to include all aspects of university affairs. Most college presidents, for example, have said that senates had a high level of influence over curricular affairs and limited influence over long-term planning but very little influence over institutional policy. A gap in the literature is the lack of studies providing detail about and analysis of what senates actually consider on their agendas.

The development of the senate represents a new type of faculty claim about faculty authority. This claim is about the need for “participatory democracy in which the students and employees possess a kind of organizational citizenship entitling them to representation in decision making, at least in some areas” instead of being based on the idea of professionalism.

Related to the scope of senate authority is the source of a senate’s power. Senates generally operate on delegated authority (from the trustees or administration) and their ability to affect change is dependent on their authorizing body while unions are creations unto themselves. As such, senates are susceptible to being considered “company unions.” Senates cannot easily convert into unions—they must disband first and then reconstitute as a union or start a union as a separate body. The dependence of the senate on the institution means that its powers are delegated, and not innate (as would be the case in the civil legislatures where the legislative branch holds its own powers), meaning that most of its actions are subject to at least pro forma ratification. Faculty senates work best when the administration and the senate agree on the parameters of senate concerns, namely, those of academic concern.
The type of decision a senate is faced with can affect its approach. For example, according to Minor, functional senates show greater levels of interest in decision-making when an issue threatens faculty authority. The other senate types are more stable across decision types. How issues are framed is often key to how the senate will respond to that particular issue. The role of senates is also influenced by its relationships and ability to communicate with key institutional personnel (senate leaders, president, provost, et cetera). Participants are able to influence the role of the senate within existing cultural norms (e.g., the level of trust, consultation, communication) or can create new norms.

The senate concept has been broadened to include other “constituencies” of the university community, especially students but also professional research and library staff members. True or “pure” faculty senates, those with only faculty or with an overwhelming majority of faculty, can be viewed as oligarchic in nature because they represent only one faction of the university community. As Garbarino notes, “Faculty senates are likely to lose their monopoly in the consultative, decision-making process as students, nonfaculty professionals, and ‘irregular’ teaching ranks such as teaching assistants and lecturers gain representation.” Interests become fragmented as the base of participation expands. The senate, as Garbarino describes them in 1971, are “membership” organizations but rather an organization where all faculty are automatically considered members. (I disagree—it seems that senates were created to avoid having an organization where everyone was automatically a member but rather so there could be a degree of representation.) The senate is usually mixed, with faculty and administrators as members.
Some believe that the voice of faculty on certain matters is diminishing. Matters traditionally left to faculty such as class size and the future of low-enrollment fields, have been shifted from the faculty to the administration or even to systemwide agencies.\textsuperscript{123} Perhaps some faculty would agree with the words written more than a century ago: “No satisfactory reason has ever been given why the immediate control of a university should be taken from the faculty, a body of competent scholars, and entrusted to others with less experience in educational questions. The president was originally a teacher, \textit{primus inter pares}, like the rector of a German university, — a relation which has been changed by the unwise limitation of the powers of the faculty, and by the increasing needs of a general executive officer.”\textsuperscript{124}

A problem regarding the authority of senates is who is in charge of what. Etzioni claims that the practice in professional organizations is that administrators should be in charge of secondary activities. In other words, they administer \textit{means} to the major activity carried out by the professionals and “to the extent that there is a staff-line relationship at all, professionals should hold the major authority and administrators the secondary staff authority. Administrators offer advice about the economic and organizational implications of various activities planned by the professionals. The final decision is, functionally speaking, in the hands of the various professionals and their decision-making bodies, such as committees and boards. The professor decides what research he is going to undertake and to a large degree what he is going to teach.”\textsuperscript{125} But in practice, the reverse is often true. As Richard Howe notes, “One could well argue that the faculty is organized to a fault—and it \textit{is}, because, in increasing numbers, faculty members perceive that the outcomes of such overorganization, if not the intent, have been
to concentrate rather than diffuse power and to make the faculty an instrument of the
board and the administration rather than the converse—which is what, so faculty tradition
holds, the university or college operation is all about.”

Birnbaum claims there is a “curious mismatch” between the agenda of faculty
senate and the issues that are actually facing institutions of higher education. A key
question is whether this is true at the inception of these faculty senates? Weren’t they
created to specifically deal with certain issues in the academy? And, if that is the case,
how did they get off track over time?

Perceptions and Criticisms of Senates

One criticism of senates is that their importance has been overstressed in the
literature on academic governance given that at most institutions they do not often deal
effectively with matters of substance. More commonly, matters of importance such as
curricular issues, student relations, and faculty hiring and promotion are dealt with at the
department level while other substantive matters related to budgets and long-range
planning are handled by the administration. Recent evidence suggests that faculty are
more active in departmental rather than in university-wide governance, perhaps
displaying a preference for more localized control. Similarly, older faculty are more
likely to participate in campus-wide faculty governing than their younger counterparts,
which begs the question of who will participate in and run the senate as these faculty
members retire.

One survey revealed that perceptions held by chairs and presidents of
participative bodies were overwhelmingly positive (seventy-nine percent), suggesting
that both believe that these bodies play an important role. However, both presidents and
faculty play a role in the governance structure. A more reliable statistic might come from a survey of the general faculty. On the negative side, those who responded to the survey noted that they felt there were insufficient rewards for participation, that operating budgets were insufficient, that the most able faculty did not participate, and that the bodies did not always operate efficiently.\(^{130}\) There are deterrents to decision-making on campus such as haggling over inconsequential matters to the growing complexity of universities to a lack of faith in the campus senate.\(^ {131}\)

Some regard senates as fragile, “possessing little de jure authority” and, like democratic government, “they depend upon the willingness of individuals to work on their behalf.”\(^ {132}\) The conventional wisdom, when unions began to appear on campus, was that weak senates were more prone to succumb to unions but this has proven not to be the case.\(^ {133}\) Indeed, during a period of great growth in the number of senates, observers worried that senates, “if not protected and supported, they will be destroyed by the political winds sweeping the campus.”\(^ {134}\) Yet, now, about 40 years later, senates persist and have not been destroyed as predicted.

Another scholar, John D. Millet, criticizes senates as ineffective, unable to be resolve the very issues for which they were created\(^ {135}\) and others have claimed that senates are not as representative as they claim to be.\(^ {136}\) It will be interesting to investigate whether senates start up on a particular issue but are not always able to finish them.

If senates do not work as Birnbaum suggests in his provocative article, is it because of the way they were created? Or is it because they have changed from their original purposes? Is there a historical reason for their current status? Birnbaum argues that they only work in certain types of institutions, if at all, and suggests they have “never
Many complain about senates but concerns about their effectiveness are difficult to address in the absence of models that explain senate functions. Few (if any) senates use benchmarks to assess their own behavior. In another work by Birnbaum, primarily on the academic presidency, he shows skepticism as to whether faculty organizations can provide real leadership stating that, “Shared authority implies shared leadership, and since both senates and unions are formal structures, the heads of these organizations at least by title fill leadership roles. But whether senates and unions…actually provided leadership is another matter. While both senates and unions had the potential for real leadership, certain factors could inhibit the realization of that leadership potential on many campuses.” But he later concedes that under certain conditions a senate may have some utility.

While senates may not be effective at accomplishing the goals of their manifest functions (bureaucratic, political, and collegial) but may still play an important role due to their latent functions. Birnbaum says they are “slow and inefficient” (bureaucratic perspective), “oligarchical and not representative” (political), and are more likely to expose latent conflict than to increase a sense of community (collegium). But I ask: Should senates (any legislative body) really be “efficient”? Isn’t it more important that a senate be effective—achieve stated goals? And why are they “not representative” if members are elected? He criticizes them as being “a solution looking for problems.”

Effectiveness of Senates

Are faculty senates effective at discharging their duties? Birnbaum describes an effective senate as one where senate leaders and administration leaders meet regularly (formally as members of committees and cabinets and informally), communicate, and
cooperate on goals, and recognize and respect each body’s scope of authority. However, even in the case of an “effective” senate it can be criticized as slow and overly complex. Alternatively, an ineffective or “paralyzed” senate is characterized by a patriarchal president who worked around instead of with the senate.\textsuperscript{142}

A barrier to ongoing effectiveness is the problem of turnover. Describing senates created in the 1960s, Hodgkinson noted that, “The creation of the campus senate at its inception is less significant than the re-creation of the senate every year. To some extent, campus senates arise phoenix-like out of the ashes of previous years’ efforts, and every senate, no matter how consistent or structured in previous years, has to take its future one year at a time and is highly dependent on the kinds of individuals that make up the body in any given year. ‘Great expectations’ in the formative years can be a major problem.”\textsuperscript{143} It seems that the presence of professional staff would help stabilize senates more than what they describe—perhaps too few had institutionalized staff structures at this time. Unfortunately, his study has not been replicated to see if these conditions exist more than 30 years later.

While some regard senates as primarily symbolic or as scapegoats, others recognize that they can and do play an important role in managing an institution. As Lee notes: “Given the substantial amount of time, energy, attention, and nurturing that is needed to create and maintain an academic governance system, senates are obviously perceived either as useful or as a necessary evil.”\textsuperscript{144}

Senates can gain legitimacy and be more effective where the culture fosters a strong (and trusting) relationship between faculty senate leaders and the administration, where governance leaders are respected and rewarded, where administrators defer to
senates on issues traditionally under their purview (which does not mean abdication of administrative roles), and where frequent formal and informal communication takes place.\(^{145}\)

From the limited number of empirical studies available on the effectiveness of senates, the “virtues” of senates are improved communication and “democratization” of the campus while achievements in solving specific problems and building consensus. The most frequent “problems” are related to jurisdictional issues (who is in charge of what) with other issues relating to policy-making responsibilities, representation, apathy, and a sense of powerlessness of senates. Large senates, especially those at public Ph.D.-granting schools, had the most problems.\(^{146}\)

**Manifest Functions**

The functions of a senate can be divided into its manifest and latent functions. The manifest functions of an organization “can be thought of as those for which behavior leads to some specified and related achievement. Institutional processes that usually lead to expected and desired functions outcomes should be expected to persist.”\(^{147}\) Organizations often continue to follow a pattern of behavior even when the manifest function is not or clearly cannot be achieved. Birnbaum suggests three organizational models that can be used to evaluate the senate: as a bureaucracy, as a collegium, as a political system. In writing their history, we can ask: Which of these were the reason(s) behind the founding of academic senates?

*Bureaucracy.* Under this model it would be expected that an academic senate would clarify institutional purposes, specify program objectives, reallocate income resources, develop new income sources; be involved in issues such as the management of
operations, degree requirements, academic behavior, and program evaluation. Under this model, a senate is an “integral part of the hierarchical, rational organization.” A senate, under the bureaucratic perspective, might be considered effective “to the extent that it efficiently considered institutional problems and, through rational processes, developed rules, regulations, and procedures that resolved them.” Was the senate founded to be part of the rational hierarchy of the university?

**Political.** In the political model “the senate is seen as a forum for the articulation of interests and as the setting in which decisions on institutional policies and goals are reached through compromise, negotiation, and forming of coalitions. Senates serve as a place for campus politicians to exercise their trade.” Senates provide a means for conflict resolution over the mission and operation of the institution. A senate, under the political system, might be considered effective “to the extent that, perceived as fully representative of its constituencies, it formulated and clarified goals and policies.”

**Collegium.** In this model the idea of the senate is as a forum for achieving the “goal of a dynamic of consensus.” A senate, under the collegial perspective might be considered effective “to the extent that, through interaction in the senate forum, it developed shared values leading to consensus.”

**Latent Functions**

There are several latent functions of the senate: symbolic, status provider, garbage can and deep freeze, attention cue, personnel screening device, ritual and pastime, scapegoat. Senates may persist because they are “fulfilling unintended and unrecognized latent functions that are important to the organization.” Organizations persist in behavior even when they do not fulfill their manifest functions—those that are planned
and intended—because they may still fulfill their latent functions—those that are unplanned and unintended.

*Symbolic.* Academic senates fill important symbolic functions such as symbolizing “institutional membership in the higher education system, collective and individual faculty commitment to professional values, and joint faculty-administration acceptance of existing authority relationships.”  

Although they are often criticized because their powers are largely advisory, “senates have nevertheless played a valuable function in symbolizing the academic community’s commitment to shared governance.”

Creation of a senate can represent a general commitment to substantive values. In particular, “faculty emphasis upon salary, working conditions and other mundane matters has eroded in the minds of the public their claim to professional status. Creating a senate may be a response to that erosion, symbolizing a commitment to professional values and faculty concern for more purely academic matters. This helps to legitimate the institution’s desire to be treated differently than other organizations and the faculty’s claim to be treated differently than other groups of workers.” This represents a desire to increase status as well as to deal with “values.” It may all be for show inasmuch as the senate may “serve as a forum through which, individually and collectively, faculty may symbolically embrace values in place of actual behavior.” For example, in the senate, “academics who have never had controversial new ideas can publicly defend academic freedom, and those without scholarly interests can argue for reduced teaching loads to encourage research.”
Senates can also serve as “symbols of campus authority relationships.” Birnbaum claims that senates often exist at the pleasure of the administration and board of trustees. Because they rely on delegated authority, they symbolize faculty-administration cooperation, even in cases where it does not exist. Symbolically, a senate is important to have on campus even if it does not work in terms of its “obstensible claims.” What would be the reaction if a senate were shut down? Even if it could be shown empirically that the senate in question had made very modest or hardly any contribution to the campus’ administration or management?

*Status Provider.* People at a college are often more concerned with playing a role in decision making (and having their role acknowledged) than they are with the content of a decision. As such, the existence of a senate “certifies the status of faculty members by acknowledging their right to participate in governance, while at the same time not obligating them to do so.” Normative organizations, like universities, tend to have more “formal leaders” (who influence through their personal power and through positions) and fewer “informal leaders” (personal power only) or officials (positional power only) which means that formal leadership “provides a relatively effective means of exercising power in a decentralized and loosely coupled system.” Formal leaders (university presidents, for example) may co-opt informal leaders and gain their loyalty by giving them part-time organizational positions. Being a member of the senate gives a faculty member legitimate roles but at the same time prevents that faculty member from “disrupting ongoing organizational structures and processes.” There are other faculty members who might attempt to disrupt campus processes as agitators and having the senate gives them an outlet to vent grievances. They may be disruptive to the senate itself
but are unlikely to disrupt the whole of university governance. Also, they may soon find that their idea has little or no support and they lose enthusiasm as an agitator. The right to participate is key inasmuch as, “Most people in a college are most of the time less concerned with the content of a decision than they are with eliciting an acknowledgement of their importance within the community…Faculty members are more insistent on their right to participate in faculty deliberations than they are on exercising that right.”

*Garbage Can and Deep Freeze.* When various streams of participants, problems, and solutions get attached together they converge into what has come to be known as the garbage can. “One of the latent functions of the senate may be to function as a structural garbage can, and the inability of the senate to make speedy decisions may increase its effectiveness in this role by putting some problems into an organizational ‘deep freeze.’” The senate may be the place for an administrator to send an irrelevant or trivial problem or issue—especially if they hope that it won’t be heard of again because it is swirling around in the senate with no foreseeable solution. “Through the presentation of alternative positions and arguments, participants come to realize that an issue whose resolution initially appeared to be self-evident and therefore enjoying wide support is in fact complex and contentious.” This can become governance for the “committees-for-the-sifting-of-sawdust” to give an appearance of faculty participation. Faculty, he says, are willingly self-deceived into thinking their input matters and self-perpetuate by creating more committees and structures.

Particularly relevant is F.M. Conford’s cynical classic *Microcosmographia Academica* which remains as relevant today as it was in 1908. “My heart is full of pity for you, O young academic politician. If you will be a politician you have a painful path to
follow, even though it be a short one, before you nestle down into a modest incompetence,”¹⁶⁵ he warns. He goes onto explain the nature of political parties and caucuses within the academy, on acquiring influence and political motives, on argumentation (“There is only one argument for doing something; the rest are arguments for doing nothing.”), and on how to conduct university business, relating chiefly to not whether you will obstruct business, but which form of obstruction you will employ—the Red Herring or the long study, “a scheme unanimously agreed upon by experts after two years’ exhaustive consideration of thirty-five or more alternative proposals.”¹⁶⁶ Richard Howe, in more modern times, echoes this cynicism about the “deep freeze” function of senates:

Weaving its way through this pyramid are channels of communication. Sometimes they are called chains of command, but not in educational circles. To many faculty members such channels seem, however unintentionally, ingeniously constructed to serve two functions: to delay, alter, emasculate, diffuse, divert, or blunt any missive emanating from the nether regions; yet simultaneously, in some mysterious legerdemain, to accelerate, expedite, substantiate, even hopefully authenticate such pearls of wisdom as may be either hurled or casually dropped from the Olympian heights, which, the laws of falling bodies being what they are, tend to splatter when they hit, having consequently a more negative than positive acceptance.¹⁶⁷

He criticizes faculty committees as a place where faculty “keep minutes and waste hours” and says that these committees “tend to outlive their administrative usefulness, sometimes perpetuated for no reason more apparent than to allow each aspiring bureaucrat-to-be another entry in his vita.”¹⁶⁸

Attention Cue. Administrative attention is in comparatively short supply, and administrators must decide to which of many different potential attention cues they should pay attention.¹⁶⁹ Birnbaum explains that administrators must make choices about what gets their attention and to do so must, “rely on heuristics (such as the ‘oil the
squeaky wheel’) to indicate when an item may have reached a level of concern sufficient to require administrative attention. There are many sources of such cues: a telephone call from a state legislator or an editorial in the local paper or student press are examples. So too is discussion and action (potential or actual) by the senate.”\textsuperscript{170} To whit: “Not every item that is proposed for the senate agenda actually gets on it, and not every item that gets on it is attended to. The presence of a specific item on an agenda that becomes the subject of extended discussion and possible action therefore signifies that it is of unusual importance and worth an investment of administrative time. By the same token, a matter proposed to the senate but not considered by it can be used as a justification for administrative indifference.”\textsuperscript{171} This is similar to the agenda setting process in the political world: the media or influential policy makers can set an agenda and the reactions to that agenda will determine an issue’s success or failure. Using the senate as an attention cue may be an efficient system for determining what items should be on the president’s agenda.

*Personnel Screening Device*. The senate can be used to screen individuals who may have administrative ambitions. Because a person should have the confidence of faculty colleagues and should also be sympathetic to the administrative point of view, “the senate provides a forum in which such persons can be more easily identified and evaluated.”\textsuperscript{172} As the quality and distinction of faculties in research universities has risen, academic senates, the governance organization of faculty, have assumed larger roles. Given this, Martin Trow asks whether senates might be an obvious place to train future university leaders. He answers, “I think not.”\textsuperscript{173}
Organizational Conservator. Presidents usually do not wish to change the university in dramatic ways, and they are generally conservative when it comes to radical change yet they, as the intermediaries between the faculty and external constituencies must satisfy the demands of both sets of groups. These pressures can cause the administration to attempt to introduce new programs or policies. Thus the senate can be an effective mechanism to restrict and constrain administrative ambition. “The senate’s ability to resist administrative initiatives can therefore be seen, at least in some cases, as protecting the institution from making changes based upon measurable but ultimately unimportant factors and thus preserving those enduring organizational and institutional qualities that are beyond routine measurement.” Birnbaum claims that “the existence of a senate reduces administrative aspirations for change and increases the caution with which the administration acts” but is this really the case? And if it is the case, wouldn’t this alone be reason enough to not want senates to go away? If the senate truly acts as a “check” on the administration, in the classic republican sense, is not that enough reason to justify their existence?

Ritual and Pastime. Organizational rituals help stabilize the order of the organization. Birnbaum explains that, “In an organization typified by ambiguity, it is often comforting to engage in scheduled and structured activities in which the behaviors of others can be generally predicted. The senate thus serves as a ritual, a ‘formality of procedure or action that either not directed towards a pragmatic end, or if so directed, will fail to achieve the intended aim.” Senates “can enable faculty members to ‘pretend that they are doing something significant’ or can simply serve as a means to provide sense of membership and yet for others the senate may be enjoyed purely as a pastime.
“It is a place where one can meet friends, engage in political intrigues, gossip about the administration, and complain about parking—all common forms of faculty recreation. It is also a place where speeches can be made, power can be displayed, nits can be picked, and intricacies of Robert’s Rules of Order can be explored at infinite depth. Those faculty who do enjoy such things have a vested interest in perpetuating the senate, for without it a forum for their involvement would be lost.”

_Scapegoat._ The best-laid plans do not always work out. And it is natural—human nature—to look for someone to blame. Because “cause and effect relationships are extremely difficult to assess in the equivocal environment of the college or university” it is easy to blame the senate.

Birnbaum makes these assertions but does not provide example or evidence that senates do, in fact, get the blame. This is true of many of his assertions—there is little or no evidence that his claims are accurate. Are his assertions testable? Are these assertions he made just based on his (extensive) administrative career and other observations as a scholar of higher education? Or are they drawn from some kind of systematic study of senates?

_Senates as Symbolic Organizational Systems._ Cohen and March, in their classic treatment of the American university, call senates a “prototypical organized anarchy” because “It does not know what it is doing. Its goals are either vague or in dispute. Its technology is familiar but not understood. Its major participants wander in and out of the organization. These factors do not make the university a bad organization, or a disorganized one; but they do make it a problem to describe, understand, and lead.” Birnbaum explains that organized anarchies “need structures and processes that
symbolically reinforce their espoused values, that provide opportunities for individuals to assert and confirm their status, and that allow people to understand which of the many competing claims on their attention they should respond.”\textsuperscript{182} “If one uses notions of symbolic or cultural systems to consider a college or university as an organized anarchy, academic senates may be effective indeed. This may be the reason they have survived and prospered even though they have not fulfilled the manifest purposes their charters claim. If senates did not exist, we would have to invent them.”\textsuperscript{183}

As such, Birnbaum offers a cautionary word about senates to those who would wish to eliminate them:

Those who observe the workings of senates and find them deficient should be particularly careful in making recommendations for change, because these changes might affect not only performance of manifest functions but their important latent functions as well. This is particularly true when making recommendations based upon normative and ultimately moral concepts such as “shared authority” or “representativeness.” Merton warned that “since moral evaluations in a society tend to be largely in terms of the manifest consequences of a practice or code, we should be prepared to find that analysis in terms of latent functions at times runs counter to prevailing moral evaluations. For it does not follow that latent functions will operate in the same fashion as the manifest consequences which are ordinarily the basis of these judgments.” Anyone who recommends that senates change or be eliminated in favor of some other organizational structure should carefully consider their latent functions.\textsuperscript{184}

**Types of Senates**

James T. Minor provides models for understanding faculty senates: functional, influential, ceremonial, and subverted. He claims that there is inadequate empirical and theoretical knowledge about faculty senates. Minor argues that because faculty participation in university governance is generally accepted as “intrinsically desirable” it is important to arrive at new understandings of senates, the main vehicle for this participation. Specifically, he finds the existing literature and its focus on the importance
of faculty governance and senate structures to be wanting. Instead, he argues we need a better analysis of the roles of senates. \(^{185}\)

Some senates, depending on the personnel and structure, have been able to shift from one model to another over time. This is not surprising given that senates exist in a fluid environment where actors in campus politics may come and go. \(^{186}\) Structure is an important factor in the roles a senate can play but it is not the most important variable in determining the models of senates. The turf wars that characterize the literature are like a tug-of-war in which the rope never moves far from the starting point.” \(^{187}\) Minor’s aim seems not to only be to gain a better understanding of faculty senates through new models but also to provide better understanding whereby senate leaders on campuses can improve their senate. He calls for more research on senates, especially on those which are effective models to be emulated because the “performance of faculty governing bodies can either promote or stymie the success of institutional initiatives.” \(^{188}\)

*Functional.* This type of senate operates primarily to represent and protect faculty interests by elected representatives. This type of senate generally includes deans and other administrators as members. Senate duties are delineated by governing documents (e.g., a charter, constitution, by-laws) and divided among committees and senate work is carried out through formal procedures and voting. Functional senates tend to focus their authority in areas traditionally reserved for faculty—curriculum, promotion and tenure policy, and academic standards—and hold little influence over nonacademic matters. In some ways these senates can be seen as perfunctory, given their limited authority, and because they are generally not assertive in setting their own agenda but opting, instead, to respond to administrative initiative with their advice and input or to respond to
environmental issues. Their main function is to safeguard faculty rights and to maintain the status quo.\textsuperscript{189}

\textit{Influential}. Influential senates serve as a legitimate authority in governing the university. These senates have a traditional electoral, representative structure and share some characteristics with functional senates, namely, their purview over matters traditionally faculty concern. However, influential senates create and frame their own agenda to promote policy changes within the institution inasmuch as they view one of their responsibilities to look out for the general welfare of the institution. They generally have collaborative, instead of confrontational, relationships with the administration.\textsuperscript{190}

\textit{Ceremonial}. These senates are relatively inactive, existing mainly in name only as symbolic artifacts, that have little real interest in, and thus, little real influence on governance. At institutions with ceremonial senates, the presidential power is generally strong. However, despite their ineffectiveness, they are not without merit: they may serve latent functions for the campus (see Birnbaum, 1989).\textsuperscript{191}

\textit{Subverted}. Subverted senates are ineffective because they have been subverted by other venues for faculty participation in governance such as informal or ad hoc “kitchen cabinet” groups of trusted faculty utilized by the administration for advice. They nevertheless maintain authority in traditional areas of faculty concern such as curriculum, tenure, and instruction but usually clash with the administration. The causes for subversion of the senate are often rooted in institutional history (e.g., fall-outs whose wounds never heal). Subverted senates are poorly perceived and received on campus but are held onto as a part of the culture.\textsuperscript{192}
Comparison of Faculty Senates to Civil Legislatures

A key issue in applying theories of political power introduced in the next chapter, especially agenda-setting, is whether there is enough commonality between civil politics, which formed the basis for these theories, and university politics. Several studies show that the similarities are, in fact, substantial even though important distinctions do exist.

The campus senate can be compared to the tradition of the New England town meeting, to public school boards, and other similar political bodies from more rural areas. However, in the case of the New England town meeting, the body politic was more homogenous and was more conformist. Campuses, on the other hand, have a greater diversity of people and ideas whereas true “representation” is unlikely. Nonetheless, senates, even if not truly representative in the classic sense, serve an important purpose even if only to increase “communication and understanding across factions.” Campus senates are more like citizen legislatures where a member’s attention is divided between duties to the senate and to the department and discipline.

Susan Hammond, a political scientist at American University, applies several theories commonly used in the field of political science to explain legislative politics to a case of curricular reform at her university. She comments that, “Legislative politics are legislative politics—whether in that premier legislative arena, the U.S. Congress, in state or local legislative bodies, or in a university.” She applies John Kingdon’s model to show how two “policy entrepreneurs” drew attention to an issue, then took advantage of a “window of opportunity” to reform the university’s general education program. A general ad hoc committee was formed (which she compares, admitting the analogy is not perfect, to a Speaker-appointed ad hoc committee in the House, or Iran-Contra hearings)
but it was an atypical committee (similar to the “little legislatures” in the House Bolling Committee of 1973-74) with overlapping memberships from other committees (characteristic to U.S. Senate committees). Analogous to American politics, there were a variety of types of participation: a small group of attentive supporters of the process, a watchful but uninvolved public (some of which might become active in the process if they felt directly threatened), and others who were apathetic. She makes other comparisons such as the gradual introduction of procedural guidelines (like how it emerges slowly in newly formed legislative committees) and the practice of polite disagreement (the congressional courtesy norm).197

Ultimately, the committee emerged with a proposal, which could be justified to constituents and be forwarded to the Faculty Senate for approval. That the proposal would receive attention in the senate was assured by the speeches of the chair of the senate and the provost, framing the issue and setting the agenda for its passage. The opposition took hold and the proponents had to activate a base of grass roots supporters to help shape public opinion and to “whip and count the votes.” Committee members and supportive administrators were galvanized into political action through media coverage (the Senate newsletter and the student newspaper) and through the Senate chair, acting as “Chief Whip,” urging senators to build coalitions to pass the proposal. The committee acted as a second whip and counted and tracked votes. Finally, the previous Senate chair was able to broker a deal by offering a simple amendment, and the proposal passed.198

While “legislative politics are legislative politics,” there are some clear differences. Consensus is more important in the university context than in a civil legislature and, unlike legislatures, university faculty members and administrators must
implement the programs they legislate, in this case, new general education requirements.199

Several similarities exist between civil and university legislatures such as the use of parliamentary procedure to process issues, election by constituencies to serve a term of office, as do their civil counterparts, and although not as strictly prescribed as it is in civil government, the administration and the faculty senate can be considered parallel to the executive and legislative branches of government.200 Several differences between civil and faculty legislatures are obvious: “Faculty senators are not subject to pressures from a judicial branch of government, nor do they wield as much power as civil legislators even within their own arena because there is no parallel to the separation of powers between executive and legislative branches of government described in the United States Constitution and most state constitutions. Civil legislatures also deal with a much larger array of issues than do faculty senates.”201

As in civil legislatures, senators form coalitions and remain somewhat stable over time, and decisions made by faculty senators can be predicted using the political scientist Kingdon’s model. However, important differences exist as well: coalitions are not as strong as in the U.S. Senate, and the motivation for action is different; faculty senators do not rely on their constituents for information but rather they use their own “ideology” (policy attitude) to make decisions. Indeed, some faculty appear to be uncomfortable with the idea of serving in a representational role.202 These differences may be due to the diffusion of power in institutional governance. One faculty senate was described in terms of its comparison to a civil legislature: “One senator believes that the Faculty Senate is apolitical, in the sense that Senators do not know how to use their political tactics and
techniques, while another points to the Faculty Senate as a ‘microcosm of local government,’ with senators engaging in the same kinds of activities as their civil counterparts.” Of course, related to this issue is the problem of apathy among faculty. Compromise among academics in a faculty senate setting may be difficult because of the inclination of individual faculty members to work individually toward their own goals. This individual focus was lampooned by nearly a century ago: “Other democracies have reached this pitch of excellence; but the academic democracy is superior in having no organised parties. We thus avoid all the responsibilities of party leadership (there are leaders, but no one follows them), and the degradations of party compromise. It is clear, moreover, that twenty independent persons, each of whom has a different reason for not doing a certain thing, and no one of whom will compromise with any other, constitute a most effective check upon the rashness of individuals.”

The problem with campus senate politics is that the traditional structure of universities, “virtually ensures that the faculty will be represented on campus government as members of interest groups rather than as acting, choosing, deliberating members of a common enterprise. Insofar as campus government follows the administrative organizations of the institution into departments, division, and schools based on the academic disciplines, the result will be a senate which is a legislature composed of the lobbyists themselves.”

In another study, Edward L. Lascher compares reforms in his university’s faculty senate (California State University, Sacramento) to reforms in political legislative bodies such as the U.S. Senate because he feels that the nature of the causes and cures for dissatisfaction with the senate may be of interest to political scientists. His conclusions
(based on faculty surveys) are that insiders were more disenchanted with the operation of the senate (mainly due to “loose rules”) than were outsiders (contrary to what was anticipated), that this disenchantment could be traced to internal operations, and reform of the rules led to greater satisfaction. \(^{207}\) Faculty wanted “less talk, more action,” to stop unnecessary grandstanding by a few senators, and for greater organization and prioritization of the agenda. This resulted in a series of reforms to address these concerns, resulting in much higher satisfaction among senators with the senate. \(^{208}\) “Even if the larger society needs to be reeducated about how messily democratic processes work, tinkering can make a difference to insiders.” \(^{209}\)

In this environment of a fractured professoriate, those who are willing and interested in serving in active roles among the faculty—a concentration of participation—can create oligarchies. \(^{210}\) In political terms these participants are known as “gladiators” (the political activists), while others are “spectators” (those who act when a crisis arises), and yet others, about a third of the group, are “apathetics” (those who do little or nothing). \(^{211}\)

Political scientist Dennis F. Thompson (interestingly at Princeton, a campus without a senate) comments why and how a university should have democratic involvement in governing the university. First, he argues that the case for democracy on campus is not the same as the case for democracy in general society. There are three traditional principles upon which democracy in the state is created: affected interests (Mill), consent of the governed (Locke), and competence of ordinary citizens (Aristotle). None of these fit neatly into the world of higher education: “None of these three principles used to justify democracy in a state can justify a general right of all members
of the university to participate in the making of decisions because none relates such participation to the purposes of the university.”

Participation in governing the university can contribute to the university’s academic purposes in three ways: it can improve the quality of decisions, it can secure willing and informed acceptance of decisions, and the participants can learn through the process. If such participation is worthwhile, the next question is what form should it take. Forms from the political world may not fit perfectly in the world of higher education, but they can inform the possibilities. One option is an elitist democracy where the chief executive is held accountable through regular votes; an option Thompson regards as unfeasible because of the diffuse nature of power in a university. A second option is direct democracy where all members participate in policy formation and decision-making (if not the daily management) of the institution, which is unfeasible at the macro level and unrealistic at the micro (department or college) level because, although decentralized, the university is highly interdependent. A third option is representative democracy which strikes a balance between the other two options and usually takes the form of a council or senate. Of course, a problem is that Michels’s “iron law of politics” applies in the academe as it does outside it: only a small minority participate. Thompson notes that, “The growth of democratic structures within the university has coincided with an intensification of pressures on the university from outside.”

Alternate Faculty Organizations

Alternatives and parallel organizations to faculty or university senates exist, namely, unions and faculty associations. Faculty associations are voluntary, membership organizations which are independent of but still focused on a single institution. Their
main activity is to lobby on behalf of the faculty to the legislative body responsible for
the institution’s budget and representing the faculty to the governing board. These
associations often coexist with senates and in some cases predate them, with part of their
mission to create a senate. Some senates have encouraged the creation of faculty
associations as a means to create a more independent voice (not being financially
beholden to the institution) for the faculty.\textsuperscript{216} The faculty association seems almost like a
Political Action Committee but in some ways (its focus on salary issues) is more like a
union.

External organizations such as the American Association of University
Professors, the American Federation of Teachers (more common at community colleges
and when present on major universities more likely aligned with radical causes), and the
National Education Association can also play a role in governance, and are most often
called upon when pressures within the campus become too great for easy resolution. The
AAUP links faculty to a traditional professional groups, the NEA offers “industry-wide”
connections, and the AFT a more labor-focused agenda.\textsuperscript{217}

Some would argue that academic department is the best avenue through which
faculty in large universities influence decisions and are more important and useful than
faculty senates. They are the most likely organization unit at the university likely to foster
a collegial relationship and the value of \textit{primus inter pares} and opportunities for informal
power and consensual decision-making. Nonetheless, some departments are run as
“dictatorships” (dominated by the chairman) and others as “oligarchies” (dominated by a
few).\textsuperscript{218}
The faculty union is another faculty organization. This type of collective bargaining changes the nature of power relationship whereas the relationship in a faculty senate is supposed to be more collegial, based on consensus. As unions began to appear in the 1960s and 70s many feared that the traditional roles of faculty would deteriorate under the weight of new collective bargaining processes and whether senates would atrophy as unions took more control of the faculty role on campus.\textsuperscript{219} The impetus behind union organization is the maxim that, “Those not willing to share their power willingly are likely to share it unwillingly—across the bargaining table, and with a professional union.”\textsuperscript{220} Unions generally have more influence on economic issues such as faculty salaries, promotions and working conditions. Senates retain more control over academic issues such as degree requirements and the curriculum.\textsuperscript{221} However, there are areas where influence overlaps and control is shared. Department budgets, hiring policies, promotion and tenure policies, and working conditions are each influenced by both groups.\textsuperscript{222} In 1976 Kemerer and Baldridge predicted that the growth of unions would threaten the power of campus senates. But they reported (to their surprise) five years later that unions have not whittled away at senate prerogatives but rather, senates and unions have been able to coexist in a “dual track” where senates concern themselves primarily with academic matters and unions with economic issues. Indeed, most unionized campuses do not even have governance provisions and when academics join unions they are able to maintain strong professional commitments, restraining union influence on traditional academic matters.\textsuperscript{223}

One role is as a check on the president where “an institutionalized faculty government is not mere window dressing but an effective mechanism for restricting
centralized control over educational programs, in accordance with the professional
demands of the faculty. Formal institutionalization of faculty authority fortifies it.”

“The broadly representative senate form, one of the last unicameral settings to be
found in American government, is not necessarily pre-ordained for extinction. But it
points itself in that direction when in spite of it promise (and partly in the light of that
promise), it fails to grow in power and sophistication.”

Overall, faculty members are ambivalent about participation in academic
decision-making. It is difficult to distinguish between educational and non-educational
issues and their effects on the academic core (issues related to student affairs, for
example), faculty and administrative power are more symbiotic than either side
recognizes. Such issues can lead to serious discrepancies in perceptions about the reality
of each group’s power. Logan Wilson, while president of the American Council on
Education (ACE), explained his views on the changing higher education landscape and
the future of university governance. An important point he makes is that many faculty, at
the time he was writing (1969), understood the effects that institutional growth would
have on decision-making: “The necessity for the shift from direct to representational
democracy seems to be poorly understood. Moreover, the faculty assume that they have
steadily lost power relative to that of the administration, with little historical evidence to
support their assumptions.”

Administrators counter that faculty members are disloyal, irresponsible and
indifferent towards students or that they spend too much time on campus politics,
campaigning for faculty senate seats than on teaching and research. Laser concedes
that both sides make valid points but more importantly, he asks, “Exactly how have we
arrived at this stage of exacerbated tempers, attacks and counterattacks, concealed or open warfare?" This is more than a struggle for power, as simple and attractive as that explanation might be, but is the result of the complex nature of the faculty member who is both an autonomous professional and employee of the university. Thus, the question is what is the proper role of the faculty member in managing the university since “he cannot function effectively either as teacher or scholar if he is barred from significant involvement in the determination of institutional policy. For, his argument runs, policy is intimately connected with every aspect of his professional activity.”

Conclusion

While a robust literature exists on the nature of the professoriate, including the roles and expectations of faculty and the role of collegiality, the literature on the creation of faculty senates is incomplete. One study briefly examined the creation of senates in the 1960s but without searching deeply for the causes behind their creation and without examining the senates from earlier eras. Another major gap in the literature is the lack of analysis of the agendas of senates. Scholars speak generally of the purview of senates but without examining what specifically they discuss or why. For the most part, general histories of higher education do not deal very closely with the evolution of faculty governance.

Kezar and Eckel argue that in the literature on governance there has been an overemphasis on structure (e.g., lines of authority, roles, procedures, and governance bodies), which too limited for a robust understanding of governance. They acknowledge the usefulness of the Garbage Can theory of decision-making and how it
applies to shared governance (problematic goals, a lack of understanding among
participants of goals, and fluid participation) but that we need to continue to build on it in
new directions. They contend that previous scholarship has focused “almost exclusively
on structural theories and to a lesser extent on political theories and provided limited
explanation of, or few ideas for, improving governance.” In particular, they note that,
“In periods of rapid and expansion such as in the 1960s and today, research is particularly
important” to understand critical eras of transition. They suggest that the interaction
between external governing boards and internal governing systems (e.g., an institutional
board and the institution’s senate) has received minimal attention but deserves
exploration. Bureaucratic models, characterized by structures and specific roles, began
to replace collegial ones, characterized by group consensus among peers, as campuses
became more complex after World War II. Campus decision-making became more
diffuse and decentralized as the bureaucracy of units and subunits grew and the
“professionalized bureaucracy” was introduced as professors exercised democratic
involvement. This may explain why certain campuses developed more bureaucratic
structures such as vice presidential roles, senates or other councils, and other
administrative forms—they simply “matured” earlier than other institutions, which were
forced to do so with the external pressures forced on them by the influx of students and
research dollars after WWII.

Endnotes

1 Joseph W. Garbarino, “Precarious Professors: New Patterns of Representation,” Industrial Relations: A
Journal of Economy and Society 10, no. 1 (1971), John David Millett, New Structures of Campus Power,
1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), Harold L. Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in
Democracy (Berkeley, California: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University


4 Minor, “Understanding Faculty Senates: Moving from Mystery to Models.”

5 Ibid.: 346.

6 Ibid.: 360.


13 Ibid., 306.


16 Ibid.

17 Howe, “Roles of Faculty,” 130.


19 Ibid.: 4-5.


21 Gumport, “Public Universities as Academic Workplaces,” 130.


25 Bennett, Collegial Professionalism: The Academy, Individualism, and the Common Good, 46.


27 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 34.

30 Ibid.


32 Finnegan, “Transforming Faculty Roles,” 480.

33 Ibid.


35 Bennett, Collegial Professionalism: The Academy, Individualism, and the Common Good, 158.

36 Ibid., 159.

Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 40.
Ibid.: 404.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 12.
Harper remarked, “A donor has the privilege of ceasing to make his gifts to an institution if, in his opinion, for any reason the work of the institution is not satisfactory; but as a donor he has no right to interfere with the administration of the university.” See Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid.
Ibid., 100.
Ibid.
Wilson, “Changing University Governance,” 397.
Howe, “Roles of Faculty,” 127-28.
Etzioni, Modern Organizations, 77.
Ibid., 83, 87.
Minor, “Understanding Faculty Senates: Moving from Mystery to Models,” 357.
Gumport, “Public Universities as Academic Workplaces,” 127.
Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 135-41.
Pfister, “The Role of Faculty in University Governance,” 430.
Ibid.: 432.
Ibid.: 434.
Ibid.: 645.
Ibid.
Ibid.: 651.
Ibid.: 650.
Ibid.: 35.
Clark, “Small Worlds, Different Worlds: The Uniqueness and Troubles of American Academic
Professions,” 38.
80 Ibid.
82 Ibid.: 32.
83 Ibid.: 33.
84 Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, “The Strange Death of Faculty Governance,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 6 (1996).
86 Gumport, “Public Universities as Academic Workplaces,” 126.
87 Finnegan, “Transforming Faculty Roles,” 486.
88 Gumport, “Public Universities as Academic Workplaces,” 126.
89 McConnell, “Faculty Government,” 122.
91 Ibid., 87.
94 Ibid.
95 Hodkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 17. Gilmour’s 1991 study showed that most (52%) used the word “senate” in their name while others referred to their body as “faculty” (18%), “council” (17%), or some other name.
96 Ibid., 3, 8-12. The researchers surveyed 1,863 campuses to determine the current status of their campus senate and found that 688 institutions had a senate. They surveyed these schools, with a response rate of 364, to determine the characteristics of these senates. Later 15 schools were identified and targeted for more in-depth case studies. Participant-observers (administrative, faculty, and student members) in these senates were trained to provide data about the practices in their senates. Other data were collected from the school’s newspaper, senate constitution and minutes, faculty handbooks and other documents.
98 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 38.
102 Gilmour, “Participative Governance Bodies in Higher Education: Report of a National Study,” 32. Gilmour’s chapter reports on the results of a national study on participative governance. The study defines participative governance bodies as campus governance units with a faculty majority such as academic senates, academic councils, faculty bodies of the whole, and other similar bodies. The study asked how such bodies are organized, how the operate, and what support they receive; what relationships they have with collective bargaining units; what perceptions administrators hold of them; what issues they address; and how they can be strengthened. A questionnaire was sent to all research I and II and doctorate-granting I and II universities and a random sample of other types of institutions.
103 Hodkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 28.
105 Ibid.: 177.

Lee, “Campus Leaders and Campus Senates,” 45.

Ibid.

Ibid., 46-47.


Hewett, “University Administration,” 161.


Minor, “Understanding Faculty Senates: Moving from Mystery to Models,” 353-56.

Ibid.: 356-57.


Ibid.: 10.


Hewett, “University Administration,” 159.

Etzioni, Modern Organizations, 81.

Howe, Roles of Faculty,” 129.


Wilson, “Changing University Governance,” 395.


Ibid.: 410.

Ibid.: 411.

Millett, New Structures of Campus Power, 200.

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———, How Academic Leadership Works: Understanding Success and Failure in the College Presidency, 115-16.

Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 141.

Lee, “Campus Leaders and Campus Senates,” 43.
Ibid., 58-60.

146 Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 58-59.


148 Ibid.: 426.

149 Ibid.: 427.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.: 425.

153 Ibid.: 428.


156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.: 430.

158 Ibid.: 431.

159 Ibid.


162 Ibid.: 433.


164 Cornford, Microcosmographia Academica: Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician, 1.

165 Ibid., 18.

166 Howe, “Roles of Faculty,” 128.

167 Ibid., 129.


169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.: 434.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.: 435.


175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.: 436.

177 Ibid. He probably means that senate meetings serve as rituals.

178 Ibid.: 437.

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid.: 438.

181 Cohen and March, Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President, 3.


184 Ibid.: 440.

185 Minor, “Understanding Faculty Senates: Moving from Mystery to Models,” 343-45.
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Ibid.
See John Kingdon. She would have been using his 1984 edition.
Ibid.: 288-90.
Ibid.: 290-91.
Karen L. Bowen, “Faculty Senate Voting Patterns and Decision Making: Faculty Governance at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh” (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987), 23.
Ibid., 22-23.
Ibid., 147-48.
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Ibid., 102.
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Ibid.: 168.
Ibid.: 167.
Howe, “Roles of Faculty,” 131.
Hodgkinson, *The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy*, 146.
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Laser, “Toward a Sense of Community: The Role of the Faculty Member in the Formulation of Institutional Policy “: 62-63.
Ibid.: 63.
Ibid.: 64.
Hodgkinson, *The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy*.
Ibid.: 373.
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Ibid.: 384.
Ibid.: 376-77.
CHAPTER THREE
Research Methods and Theoretical Approaches

This chapter gives an overview of the research methods utilized and the theoretical models that can be applied to help explain the phenomenon of senate creation. The methods employed were historical. The theoretical frameworks utilized are agenda setting and institutional theory.

Research Methods

This study employed historical methods to investigate the creation of faculty senates and to make meaning out of these trends. The purpose of any historical study is to add some level of enlightenment of the past. There is a dearth of historical understanding about the development of faculty governance and filling this gap is important to provide both scholarly and pragmatic understanding of this history.

Generally, descriptions of historical developments of faculty governance are brief appendages to other studies or they are specific to one particular faculty body, a senate at a particular institution, for example. Schenkel explains that, “The emergence of the American university has been the subject of numerous studies, although no study has specifically focused on university governance as it grew to become the highly complex organization it is today.” This study is one addition to this literature.

As historian of higher education Walter Metzger argues, “I believe that knowledge of the history of academic governance is apt to improve the social science of it, and may work wonders for anyone who confronts the nagging question of how
American colleges and universities should be run.” Metzger argues for finding patterns in the historical record to uncover how these trends have come about:

> In my view, history is at its heuristic best not when it focuses on discrete operational devices employed by either insiders or outsiders, but when it contemplates gestalts—patterns of academic power relationships that have internal and external manifestations—and when it undertakes to show over suitable sweeps of time how these relationships came to pass. At its most illuminating, a history of academic governance is a developmental analysis of basic interactive forms.⁵

This study employs Metzger’s suggestion to look for these types of trends, or “gestalts,” in the history of American higher education with the hope that it will “add something to general enlightenment.”⁶ While this study utilizes a number of secondary sources, it does so not only out of necessity, but because while an author of an institutional history may accurately record the events at a particular institution, he or she may not see how these events relate to larger trends. This study brings this information together from various sources to identify and make sense of patterns.

This study is divided into three main eras: the university building era, the era of and following World War II in which universities grew and expanded dramatically, and the “Long 1960s,” the era of great tumult on American campuses. The periods are not equal in length but are chosen more for the importance of they play as separate time periods. Historians have divided the corpus of the history of American higher education in different ways. Laurence R. Veysey’s massive work on the emergence on the American university focuses exclusively on the university building era, defining the eras as 1865 to 1910.⁷ Frederick Rudolph’s classic study treats this era in several chapters, breaking down the “emerging university” and the “flowering of the university movement” and giving special attention to university organization and academic life in
still other chapters. Other histories treat these periods thematically as well but the general chronological parameters are generally the same as how this study has framed them. John Thelin divides this study’s 40-year span of the first era (1890 to 1939) into two parts—the university builders (1880 to 1910) and the expansion and reform of higher education (1920 to 1945)—and Christopher Lucas uses a similar chronological organization. And this era, as defined in this study, is squarely equivalent to two of Geiger’s generational divisions: growth and standardization from 1890 to World War I (generation seven) and the hierarchical differentiation between the wars (generation eight). The final two eras are often demarcated in ways similar to my design.

Too often, histories of higher education focus on presidents and major figures and ignore other significant aspects of university development. The approach of this study was similar to that employed by Nidiffer and Cain in their analysis of the rise of vice presidents at research universities. In justifying their study, they remarked,

There is considerable literature about presidents, institutional growth, boards of trustees, and key faculty members of the University Movement. In contrast, little scholarship uncovers the history of others who worked and studied at the developing research universities: the experiences of administrators below the presidential level have received scant attention.

Their study brought to light the contributions of vice presidents and helped advance the growing field of scholarship. Similarly, this study advances our understanding of the faculty senate, its historical roots and purposes, and sheds light on the early development of this institution within the university. Furthermore, this study fills a void in the administrative history of American universities.

Many scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s referred to faculty senates that developed during this time as “new.” Hodgkinson explained that his study focuses on
the “campus senate movement” which the author determined had, by 1971, “grown large enough to merit study” and significant enough because of the greater participation in campus-wide decision-making bodies such as senates and more decision-making power being taken over by state boards (often influenced by legislative politics). But this study focused on the phenomenon of growth in senates during the 1960s and did not mention the fact that senates existed on many campuses, even though at least fifty-eight research universities had a senate in place by 1959. Yet Hodgkinson calls this a “new” phenomenon without any mention of the historical antecedents.

Hodgkinson admits that, “One of our early suppositions about the campus council was that it would not last for very long.” Why would they make that kind of assumption? Clearly, there was a failure to examine the history of the senate. Some senates had been in place since the late 1890s and had survived more than seven decades by the time of their study. They later determined that the senate had some “staying power” but only by looking at the recent senates. If these other senates from earlier decades are truly different enough to warrant calling this phenomenon “new,” the authors do not even address how these senates of the 1960s might be different from those created in earlier decades.

Data Collection and Analysis

The purpose of this study was to find out when the first formal faculty governance structure was developed at American research universities, information that was not previously available in an organized way, and to find out why and how these bodies were created. I first obtained a list of the 150 research universities and sought information about faculty governance at each institution through the institutional web site and
institutional histories. I found that of 143 of the universities (ninety-five percent) had a faculty senate.\textsuperscript{17} The second step was to discover when each faculty senate was founded. I was able to find a founding date for 110 of the 143 senates (77 percent).

As I was searching for the founding dates I looked for as much information as I could find on the reasons why these senates were founded. I was able to find useable information on the majority of these senates. Based on the data I had collected, I conducted a preliminary analysis, looking for the general trends of why these senates had been created.

I chose six senates to investigate in greater depth as representative examples. I visited the archives at the University of Utah, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Virginia, and the Pennsylvania State University to examine and collect historical documents. All manner of relevant and available documents were obtained: faculty meeting minutes, senate minutes, trustee minutes, presidential papers and correspondence, news clippings, memoranda, faculty rosters, and other documents. The purpose was to discover with as much certainty as practicable what happened and why.\textsuperscript{18} The data for the other senates—from institutional histories, scholarly publications, and individual senate histories—were analyzed, seeking to find as many themes relevant to the research questions, then reclassifying these into broader themes.\textsuperscript{19} The final step was to write narratives of these senates in thematic groups in each chapter.

Barbara Lee argues that the case study method is best for understanding governance: “It is only through case studies that a researcher can assess the dynamics of the governance system, the factors the enhance or impede its ability to function, and the
degree to which faculty and administrators support it.”

Furthermore, case studies of governance are useful “because they can identify practices or structures on one campus that may be either adopted or avoided by other institutions with similar cultures, missions, and problems.”

Theoretical Approaches to Understanding the Creation of Faculty Senates

Can social and political theories help us understand the phenomenon under investigation: the cause of the creation of faculty senates in American research universities? Was it an attempt to “set an agenda” by some participants in the university community? Was it the result of isomorphic forces—the actors at one university copying the actions of another? Was there some rational pursuit under way—to modernize the university or make it more effective—that caused the introduction of such a body?

Instead of attempting to apply these theories concomitantly with the historical data on the creation of senates, I present them here as ideas to consider while reading about the creation of senates. In the final chapter I shall draw on these theories as a means to make sense out of the history of faculty senates.

One can answer the above questions in part by employing two theoretical perspectives: agenda setting and institutional theory. Which of these theories best explains the creation of senates? Or does each contribute to our understanding of how and why these bodies were created? As Pamela Tolbert helpfully explains, “Organizational phenomena are much too complex to be described adequately by any single theoretical approach.”

What is under investigation is the creation and life of an organizational type. As part of answering the questions of “why” and “how” senates were created, I
explored several working hypotheses. Namely, I hypothesized that the creation of a senate is the result of some “disturbance” in the campus environment that spurs faculty to reconsider their role in governing the university and that universities mimic each other in the creation of administrative forms, and this isomorphism would be evident in the creation of faculty senates.

**Agenda Setting**

Agenda setting is principally about the identification of problems and who has the power to propose viable solutions. The issue of problems centers around the question of what is a problem and related to that is who has the power (or influence) to define that problem and bring it to the public agenda. In an institution of higher education, governance is “process of direct control by groups or individuals over university policies.” The creation of faculty senates is a manifestation of agenda setting, whether this agenda is that of a group of faculty (e.g., disgruntled faculty or faculty simply trying assert more formal control over the university) or administrators (who are trying to modernize the university or placate the faculty).

Political scientists have defined “agenda setting” as how political power is obtained and controlled. Groups that set or control the agenda holds the power within the organization. The participation by faculty relates to agenda power insofar as those who choose to participate and take a role have a greater chance of gaining agenda power. However, participation alone is not sufficient inasmuch as there may be inherent restrictions on participation by certain groups or parties in any society, be it a national political system or a microcosm such as a university. Furthermore, the methods employed
among the actors in the university are political—they are about controlling the policy choices and direction of the institution. As Robert Rosenzweig explains,

> Universities, like all successful social organisms, have developed political systems fitted to their intrinsic characteristics. The dominant characteristics of the modern American university in this context are the extraordinary degree of autonomy of individual faculty members and the strength of the academic disciplines and the departments and schools into which they are organized. Successful political institutions must, therefore, balance the intrinsic dispersion of authority in the institution with the need for some collective decision-making mechanisms—another example of the classic problem of how to balance liberty and order, in this case in a setting in which liberty is highly valued, order considerably less so.\(^{26}\)

Agenda-setting models can be utilized as a means to understanding why senates were created. This study is essentially an examination of the internal politics of the university—how who gets power and why. Although a university’s administration cannot be equated exactly with American government, similarities are sufficient, as explained in the previous chapter, to make the use of political theory useful in understanding how power and control are gained within the university. It comes as no surprise that many faculty members simply choose to avoid involvement in university governance or campus politics. And the complicated nature of the life of an academic is nothing new.\(^{27}\)

Any change in the structure or number of participants causes a change in the nature of power and thus the amount of conflict, as E.E. Schattschneider’s explains in *The Semisovereign People*.\(^{28}\) As the size and scope of an organization changes, the potential for conflict accelerates and those who originally held power may lose some portion of their control. Furthermore, private conflicts may emerge as public issues. These phenomena are what are happening when a senate is created on a campus—the conflict becomes contagious. While interest groups are not typically considered to exist on university campuses in the traditional sense, they do appear in more informal ways on
camperuses and in faculty senates (but may be more likely to dissolve once a pet issue is resolved). But the conflicts over issues do occur and the competition for attention on a campus is a manifestation that politics is at play at the university. The way political conflict is managed in the long run may be different than in American politics but in the short-term, the similarities are striking. Also, the attitudes of the general public (generally apathetic with intermittent spikes in interest) is quite similar to the level of interest in campus politics by most faculty members.

A key to understanding the phenomenon of agenda setting is considering how problems are defined and constructed. How does a certain issue become a problem that is considered “important” enough to enter the public agenda, or the public consciousness?

For an issue to become an agenda item, it must be recognized; be considered salient, legitimate, and important to people, especially those in the media who play a role in framing the problem in the public’s mind; and someone or some group must be affected (usually negatively) which often plays out as one group blaming another for the problem. Problems, therefore, are socially constructed and are important only to the extent that someone makes them important, claiming they are worth our attention. This claims-maker demands to be heard and that something be done to rectify the problem. The issue may become salient given its severity, incidence, novelty, and proximity. The “problem” that precedes the creation of a senate may be a faculty grievance against the administration such as an academic freedom issue or a lack of representation in governance decisions. And if it is faculty who are trying to set an agenda to create a faculty senate, to whom are they lobbying—the administration, the trustees? The answer to this question may appear in the agendas (literally) of administrative or trustee
meetings, or they could also appear on the agendas of general faculty meetings, if such meetings were held.

Given that problems are not problems in an objective sense but rather subjective issues, the matter of how the issue is framed plays an important role. Framing is the process of shaping what information is or is not deemed relevant to the debate on an issue. A problem receives more or less “weight” or importance depending on who is framing the issue and how much attention this problem receives.

Three possible agenda-setting models provide the means to evaluating whether agenda setting processes are taking place in the creation of faculty senates. Anthony Downs, in his oft-cited article, provides an intuitively appealing model for understanding the attention span towards an issue. He explains that the attention cycle comes in five stages: 1) The pre-problem stage happens when a problem exists but people do not know it; 2) Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm happens when people become aware of a problem and want to solve it; 3) Realizing the cost of significant progress happens when people realize that solving the problem is costly; 4) A gradual decline in interest then ensues as there is a suppression of interest; and finally, 5) Post-problem is when remnants of the solution may remain even if the problem has been “solved” or no interest in the problem still exits. A problem will go through this cycle if the majority of participants is not affected and benefits from the status quo and the problem has dramatic appeal even if it does not have any “intrinsically exciting qualities.”

Does the creation of faculty senates fit this cycle? Once the proposed solution (the creation of a senate) triumphs (or fails), does interest in it stagnate (even though the solution remains)? Downs’ ecological cycle provides a useful model for understanding
both the creation of new senates and of campuses with no senates (especially where an attempt has been made to create one). The latent functions of the senate likely play an important role in why the solution remains even if a senate is not deemed effective in its manifest functions; functions which were likely related to the early stages of the attention cycle which instigated its creation.

John Kingdon provides another compelling model for understanding how organizations choose among agenda alternatives.\(^{32}\) His explanatory model shows how alternatives are explored and how problems and solutions come together through “streams” and are coupled by a policy entrepreneur during a key window of opportunity. This “garbage can” model can provide a means to examine what problems the creation of a senate was purportedly going to be able to address.

A third explanatory model is the idea of “punctuated equilibrium,” offered by Frank D. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones.\(^ {33}\) They argue that certain issues garner little Congressional, public, or media attention and then a spike occurs due to a dramatic policy proposal or outcome. In the campus context, the Congressional attention would more likely be substituted with trustee or administrative attention and the “public” attention would be that of the general faculty. A punctuation in the equilibrium of a stable campus can be the spark that causes a change in the governance system. As Robert Rosenzweig explains,

> When things are going well, when the institution is not under stress, one set of [governance] arrangements works about as well as another…However, when stress is introduced into the community in any of the many forms it might take, the situation changes quickly and dramatically, and weaknesses in the decision-making structure—that is to say, the political system—compound the problem. The stress may come in the form of any sudden, discontinuous change—financial stringency, or attack from outside forces, or internal disruption. Whatever its source, stress produces controversy, controversy produces factions, the struggle
between factions produces winners and losers, and the absence of authoritative and legitimate decision-making structures make the acceptable resolution of disputes difficult to achieve.\textsuperscript{34}

Specifically, we see this process of how campus events can spur change in campus governance after the crises of 1966 at the University of California-Berkeley. A study was commissioned by the Berkeley faculty and student senates to reassess the political structure of the university and to devise “modes of governance appropriate a modern American University.”\textsuperscript{35} Of special interest was the budget, a major source of contention. However, the major weakness in the university’s system, it soon became apparent, was the inability to work effectively during periods of acute crises: “At such times informal, unplanned consultation between members of the administration, faculty, and students is inadequate, and in the absence of defined responsibility in any one agency, a maze of intermediary bodies and self-appointed groups have been frenetically active in seeking to press their views on the Chancellor and his staff.”\textsuperscript{36} Their goal in reorganizing the nature of the senate was to increase faculty participation and power and to defend the campus believing that a powerful senate to be an essential instrument for the defense of the campus against regents deemed “ineffectual in protecting the freedom and integrity of the university.”\textsuperscript{37}

These uproars of the 1960s provided dramatic opportunities to change the locus of control of the university, if not to shift it completely, to at least move it along the continuum of control. Marvin Laser, writing in 1968, lamented that faculty were generally moving further away from circles of influence, relegating themselves to secondary roles, and not exerting themselves in the governance of the institution due to their apathy. But, demonstrating how campus events can cause a sudden shift (or
punctuation) in the attention cycle, he explains that, “Efforts of faculties to enlarge their role have frequently taken their starting point from a sense of outrage at what are often called arbitrary or uninformed administrative decisions.” This outrage can lead to claims on a role in governing the university.

The family of agenda-setting theories provide a useful means for evaluating how and why senates were created. Downs’ ecological cycle shows how attention spikes and wanes for an issue and Kingdon’s model helps us understand how different problems and alternatives come together, resulting in the creation of a new senate. These conditions may be seen as punctuations in the equilibrium on campus, which cause an issue to rise to such prominence as to cause a new solution to be proposed and implemented.

Institutional Theory

In 1958 David Rieseman commented in his book, *Constraint and Variety in American Education*, “There is no doubt that colleges and universities in this country do model themselves upon each other, and the question remains: which other?” He compared this phenomenon to a snake: the head (the top institutions) leads and the body (all other institutions) follow (the head and each other). Does this hold true in the creation of faculty senates? Do faculty members look to other institutions to model their behavior and administrative structures? Institutional theory asks why there is so much similarity in organizational forms and practices. DiMaggio and Powell explain that there are three types of isomorphism—coercive, mimetic, and normative. This similarity may be less a function of technical efficiency than of desire for legitimacy (i.e., those actions that are seen to be the norm even if not effective for a particular organization). This conformity, or institutional isomorphism, may occur through coercive means.
(political, regulatory influence), as a mimetic process (copying as a response to uncertainty), or as a normative decision. And as an institution makes a choice to go down a certain path, it may find the cost of turning back too great,\textsuperscript{41} which may help explain why senates persist, even when they are ineffective.

There seems an isomorphic quality to senates. They may be founded as a means to show legitimacy in the higher education arena and as means for fulfilling aspirations to gain higher status. “By establishing an academic senate structure that was more typical of the system to which they aspired than it was of the one from which they developed, an institution could suggest the existence of faculty authority even when it did not exist. This structural symbol of a faculty voice could support a claim to being a ‘real’ college.”\textsuperscript{42} This will be an important clue to look for in senates that were created in later periods, especially if a particular college was one type of institution at an earlier time but developed a senate, as it also became a research university.

This would suggest that less prestigious institutions might have created their senates later—as a form of aspiration. For example, as one emerging university’s faculty began to grow, many of the new faculty members held degrees from research universities where there was a longer tradition of involvement of faculty in governance, compared to the faculty already in place who were accustomed to little or no formal faculty involvement. Thus, as new faculty became “politically active, polarization developed between faculty senates and administrators. Campus leadership during the late 1960s and early 1970s apparently had no experience with this expectation on the part of faculty; the newly organized Faculty Senate seems to have had little impact on fulfilling the need for participation for these new faculty.”\textsuperscript{43}
Conclusion

Historical methods were used in the collection and analysis of the data for this study. Historical case studies were conducted at six research universities and data was analyzed on a total of more than 100 research universities. Agenda setting and institutional theory were evaluated as possible theoretical frameworks as useful in the analysis of how and why faculty senates were created and will be utilized in the concluding chapter.

Endnotes

4 Metzger, “Academic Governance: An Evolutionary Perspective,” 3. He further illuminates on this topic: “Historical knowledge comes, of course, in a variety of lengths and packages. Like most historians, I fancy that any temporal inquiry, however brief, into any facet of human experience, however small, adds something to general enlightenment.”
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 4.
7 Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*.
12 Jana Nidiffer and Timothy Reese Cain, “Elder Brothers of the University: Early Vice Presidents in Late Nineteenth-Century Research Universities,” *History of Education Quarterly 44*, no. 4 (2004): 523. Another work by Nidiffer employs a similar approach to my study. It focuses on an aspect of the history of higher education that has largely been ignored. It discusses the historical background of coeducation, and the role of female institutional leaders (as chief academic officers and presidents). This book gives a new interpretation of what the role of women administrators in higher education has been—not just focusing on the discrimination they experienced but their contributions as change agents Jana Nidiffer, “Advocates on Campus: Deans of Women Create a New Profession,” in *Women Administrators in Higher Education: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Jana Nidiffer and Carolyn Terry Bashaw, *SUNY Series:*
In Chapter 2, “Patterns of Leadership: The Impact of Female Authority in Four Women’s Colleges, 1880-1910,” Cynthia Farr Brown describes the first college where a woman, Alice Freeman, was named and exercised power as a chief executive officer of a college in the United States. Freeman “redistributed power, entrusting much internal administration to the senior faculty, organizing twelve departments and consulting regularly with their heads, who made policy and did the hiring. Faculty formed the Academic Council, which legislated academic policy, with her blessing.” In Chapter 6, “Advocates on Campus: Deans of Women Create a New Profession,” similar to my own approach, Nidiffer examines the creation of a certain aspect of the administration of higher education, the development of the position of “dean of women” at American campuses.


14 Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 2.

15 Ibid., 17.

16 Do they assume that those from earlier periods are pure faculty senates without broader representation and this is what makes these “new” bodies “different”? If this is their assumption, it is never stated in any way.

17 The seven without a senate include Boston College, Brigham Young University, Harvard, Lehigh University, M.I.T., Princeton, and Yale.


19 I conducted these analyses in the tradition of qualitative research, coding for specific ideas and then creating axial codes. Anselm L. Strauss and Juliet M. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1998).

20 Lee, “Campus Leaders and Campus Senates,” 60.

21 Ibid., 60-61.

22 McLendon used this approach, using three competing agenda-setting models, in his article on the decentralization of systems of higher education, which resulted in a new model of agenda setting for state-level politics related to public higher education. See Michael K. McLendon, “Setting the Governmental Agenda for State Decentralization of Higher Education,” Journal of Higher Education 74, no. 5 (2003).


24 Etzioni, Modern Organizations, 3. It is useful to understand something of the nature of organizations, the planned social units, which are deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals. These organizations are characterized by “(1) division of labor, power, and communication responsibilities, divisions which are not random or traditionally patterned, but deliberately planned to enhance the realization of specific goals; (2) the presence of one or more power centers which control the concerted efforts of the organization and direct them toward its goals; these power centers also must review continuously the organization’s performance and re-pattern its structure, where necessary, to increase its efficiency; (3) substitution of personnel, i.e., unsatisfactory persons can be removed and others assigned their tasks.”


26 Rosenzweig, The Political University: Policy, Politics, and Presidential Leadership in the American Research University, 111-12.

27 American Association of Universities president Charles Van Hise speaks of the increasing demands put on the faculty members in a 1911 essay, for example. Van Hise, “The Appointment and Tenure of University Professors.”


33 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). One problem I would have in evaluating how an issue is framed is the lack of media coverage, an essential aspect of their model. The debate on whether to create a senate is largely one internal to the campus community, which is not likely to receive any media coverage from the local press. It may only receive coverage in the campus student newspaper or faculty newsletter once it is created. (At some campuses, student reporters were not allowed in faculty meetings during certain eras.) The surge of interest in creation of a senate—and how the issue is framed within the community’s conversations—will have to be measured through other historical records (e.g., minutes, letters).
34 Rosenzweig, The Political University: Policy, Politics, and Presidential Leadership in the American Research University, 113.
35 Caleb Foote et al., The Culture of the University: Governance and Education, 1st ed. (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1968), 9.
36 Ibid., 98-99.
37 Ibid., 103.
38 Laser, “Toward a Sense of Community: The Role of the Faculty Member in the Formulation of Institutional Policy “: 62.
39 David Reisman, Constraint and Variety in American Education (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1958), 35-36. One example is found in Illinois State Normal University, which underwent radical changes due to the influx of new students (growing from 3,500 in 1958 to 20,000 in 1970) and new faculty (many of whom brought ambitions for a greater university with them). The school had historically been committed primarily to teacher training but new faculty pressured the institution to become more research-oriented, hoping to improve the school’s and their own reputations. By 1963 the faculty engaged in regular discussions on whether Illinois State should adopt a multipurpose mission, but stalwarts decried the change as an unnecessary attempt to become a “a corn belt Harvard or something equally ridiculous.” But by 1964 the new guard prevailed and the Illinois State dropped “Normal” from its name and adopted a more comprehensive mission. This was a phenomenon witnessed in almost every state with its state teacher colleges. Daniel A. Clark, “Whirlwinds of Change: The Transformation of Illinois State University, 1957-1971,” Illinois Historical Journal 90 (1997): 226-31.
43 Bowen, “Faculty Senate Voting Patterns and Decision Making: Faculty Governance at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh”, 9. She notes later (pp. 10-12) that Robert Birnbaum was chancellor (selected with some input by faculty) and he expressed “some willingness” to delegate certain powers to the still young senate.
CHAPTER FOUR

Faculty Governance Before the Creation of Senates

Before faculty senates, councils, and other similar bodies were created at American universities the collegial model was the norm, where faculty met as a whole in a “town meeting” type format. The historical period for this collegial model is not easily defined. For the most part, it is the model in place at most universities before a senate was created yet at a few institutions (e.g., Johns Hopkins, Catholic University, and Chicago), the senate was created concomitantly at these institutions built on the German model with the university itself. The coda of this period is even less well defined and in a sense is still open as some universities had not created a university-wide senate or senate-like structure. As will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, universities created senates for various reasons and at various times throughout the last century. A major reason that faculty senates were created at many universities was the size of the faculty. This chapter will explore the role of faculty in governing colleges and universities before senates were created.

Professors and their Role in Governing the University

The professoriate has held special status in society since the earliest universities in the Middle Ages. As historian Homer Haskins noted, “a great teacher stands at the beginning of university development.” Early in university development, professors lived off the fees paid by their students as independent contractors, and thus were at their mercy as well. This lead to the rise of professorial guilds or “colleges” securing
professors a safe environment and more control over their affairs, and the conferral of the
licentia docendi (license to teach) which preceded the higher degrees of magister
(master) and doctor, which would come later. In mediaeval Italy and France we see the
origins of the principle of primus inter pares (first among equals) as the faculties were
organizing as early as twelfth century with deans and rectors but “administration in the
modern sense was strikingly absent.” Still, the earliest faculty members did have duties
outside of teaching: they held regular meetings to collect dues (universities simply being
unions in the beginning) and to discuss other university matters. Using part-time
instructors was apparent during this period, as universities would trade priest-scholars. The
symbols and rituals of today’s faculty—the regalia and ceremonies signifying the
levels of learning—survive from this period. The modern professoriate traces its lineage
to these early teachers.

The English universities were governed by the college fellows during the Colonial
period. However, American university founders did not import this idea but rather
appointed clergy to oversee the new colleges.

A stratified system in the American professoriate can be found as early as the
Colonial period. Harvard differentiated between types of faculty from its early days. The
Harvard system was comprised of endowed professors (after 1720) who taught in specific
subjects (which was based on the English model) and a group of tutors who were
responsible for the basic curriculum and the supervision of the students’ extracurricular
lives. Tutors lived on campus and were prohibited from marriage while the professors
lived off-campus but “near the college” and could marry. The tutor and professor had
different roles and responsibilities with regard to governance and instruction of students
and the tutorship was usually a starting point in a young man’s career toward a career in
the ministry or, in some cases, in education.

Although tutors made gains as professional educators, by the mid-1700s they had
been reduced to having a “short-term, temporary teaching assignment” and thereby
reduced in status as well. As John D. Burton explains:

The tutorship was purposefully made a second tier teaching assignment, its tenure
restricted and its authority reduced. The Harvard faculty of the eighteenth century
was faced with multiple models and with competing interests. The Harvard
faculty included both specialists and generalists. Just as the interests of teaching
and research-oriented faculty can clash today, the professional standards and
models of the tutors and professors clashed in the eighteenth century. The
professors won.5

The right of every tutor to a seat in the corporation at Harvard was early
discussed, and at one time allowed by the legislature. A controversy arose in 1824,
wherein instructors demanded representation in the governing board, claiming that the
term “fellow” in its historic sense conferred the right to participate in the determination of
university policy but their petition was refused.6

In the colonial college, faculty associated under the leadership of a scholarly
president, but within a century of that period, they began to realize a more autonomous
professional status. As they explored knowledge through developing disciplines, faculty
continuously refined their relationship to each other and to their institutions. By the
twentieth century, higher education had been greatly changed and had introduced new
research oriented universities. These increasingly complex institutions changed the nature
of the professoriate as, “Presidents sought assistance from deans and others to define and
manage the growing organizational complexity of their institutions. Since then, the
professorial role has been influenced by administrative strategies and tactics at ensuring the success of the institution’s mission.”

Over time faculty gained more voice in the management of the university as absentee trustees had to relinquish more duties to presidents and faculty members. In the colonial college it might have been easy for a president and the trustees to “overwhelm” the faculty but as the number and quality of faculty improved, they began to more be more assertive of their prerogative to have a voice in campus affairs. The president, presaging the modern term of “shared governance,” began to serve as an intermediary between the faculty and the trustees. This was especially true at the better institutions. For example, President John Thornton Kirkland (1810-28) of Harvard, showed an increasing reliance on faculty input as did Jeremiah Day (1817-46) at Yale, who especially relied on faculty input on the appointment of their future colleagues.

Jaspar Adams, president of the College of Charleston (1824-36) and a former professor, was especially passionate about the role faculty should play in governing the university. He declared in 1837 that, “No college in this country has permanently flourished, in which, the trustees have not been willing to concede to the faculty, the rank, dignity, honor, and influence, which belong essentially to their station.” The relation of the trustees to the professor is not that of a workman to his employer, Adams argued, but rather of the attorney and his client or the minister to his congregation, as co-advisors. He also called for the “functional allocation of powers” between presidents, trustees, and faculty (a term foreshadowing the modern term of “shared governance”).

The face of the faculty began to change during the early nineteenth century as colleges introduced scientific schools. Yale, with the Sheffield Scientific School in
1846, and Harvard, with its Lawrence Scientific School in 1847 had the most advanced models of faculty applying research to “useful knowledge” while lesser scientific schools were founded at West Point (1817), Norwich University (1834), and Dartmouth (1852). The Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute was founded in 1824 as one of the first engineering schools. Many of these schools were small, sometimes consisting of only one faculty member, but they represented the first forays into hiring faculty of engineering and other applied sciences. Also, multipurpose colleges sprang up in the country’s frontiers. These colleges included practical courses and the first formal collegiate experiences for women. During this period more medical and law schools emerged (only two medical schools had been founded in the colonial period).

The passage of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 introduced the practical arts into the college curriculum. As the Act reads, its purpose was to support and maintain “at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies … to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanical arts.” Because this meant an introduction of new curricula, new faculty with new and different skills than those who taught classical and literary studies would be needed, even if not always met with great success.¹²

The development of the first research-oriented universities further changed the nature of faculty roles as teaching gradually became more subordinate to scholarship; faculty would spend less time in lecture halls and more time in laboratories. The German model where Wissenschaftert (pure scientific research) was paramount was imported (if not in its exact original form) to the emerging universities, and by the late 1800s several new institutions with a research focus were founded, including Johns Hopkins (1876), Clark
University (1887), and the University of Chicago (1891). President Henry Tappen at the University of Michigan also attempted to follow such a model in the 1850s but not without his difficulties in promoting the Germanic model to a skeptical public.\textsuperscript{13} These schools adopted the ideals of \textit{Lernfreiheit}, the student’s freedom to learn, and \textit{Lehrfreiheit}, the professor’s right to inquiry and teach freely.

Walter Metzger has provided a history of the development of American universities during this era in his classic \textit{Academic Freedom in the Age of the University}. He explains that the German influence came to the American university by way of the more than 9,000 American students who studied in Germany during the nineteenth century. While some imported certain practices, more commonly these scholars brought with them the sensibilities of the Germanic university: the twin principles of \textit{Lernfreiheit} and \textit{Lehrfreiheit}, and the ideal of \textit{Wissenschaft}, even to colleges that were not quite ready for these ideas.\textsuperscript{14} What grew out of this Germanic influence was the American graduate school, with scholars and scholar-apprentices working toward the advancement of knowledge, independent in their choice of work, methods, and conclusions.

Another Germanic ideal that was surely imported by the visiting American scholars was the level of autonomy the German university enjoyed. While the state was in charge of budgets, the appointment of chairs and professors, and the general parameters for instruction, it was the professors themselves who elected academic officials, appointed lecturers, and nominated the professors to be appointed.\textsuperscript{15} These principles complemented the ideals of academic freedom embodied in \textit{Lernfreiheit} and \textit{Lehrfreiheit}, which kept administrative coercion out of the learning environment, so the student and professor could learn, study, and teach as they saw fit. The pursuit of
Wissenschaft knew no boundaries, no limits, and was at the heart of making an institution a true university.  

But in the American university this tradition of autonomy for professors had not quite emerged. As Walter Metzger explains, in comparing the American professor to his European counterpart,

The status of the American professor in the university organization presented a unique set of problems. He was an employee of a lay board of control; he was not, as in Germany, a civil servant of the state or, as in England, a director in a self-governing corporation. Further, he was governed by an administrative hierarchy which possessed the power to make important decisions,; not by officials elected from the professors’ ranks, as in Germany and England, or by the Ministry of Education removed from the scene, as in Germany.

Because of the strictures of this type of control, as faculty began to assert their right to academic freedom, they lost sight of its true roots in Lernfreiheit but rather it became “institutional, not primarily educational.” The trustees stood in the way of professorial independence, and did nothing to discourage the idea that professors were incapable of self-government. Charles Eliot said of the freedom of teachers that, “so long as...boards of trustees of colleges and universities claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the officers of the institutions in their charge, there will be no security for the teachers’ proper freedom” and that it is “easy for a department to become despotic, particularly if there be one dominant personage in it.” So, while the professor attempted to gain his independence real institutional barriers stood in the way.

In addition to instruction, a major function of the professor was to watch over the students, providing discipline and guidance. They lived on or near the college campus in order to fulfill these roles in loco parentis. It was the need to constantly oversee student behavior that relegated the role of disciplinarian to the faculty instead of the non-resident,
absentee trustees. This restrictive lifestyle certainly had negative effects on the freedom, academic and otherwise, on professors who had little time for intellectual adventures. Likewise professors consumed with student discipline hardly had the time or stature with the president and trustees to assert a significant role in governing the college.

For faculty to become more autonomous there would need to be greater opportunity for autonomous activity, namely, in research, and faculty would have the need to have greater governance/control over their activities. While the college is, in addition being a place of teaching and learning, it is also a unit of government, an economic entity, and a congeries of social relationships; and “how it functions in these roles influences those opportunities for intellectual conflict, those expectations of indulgence, those inclinations to self-assertion, that kindle the demand for freedom.”

Under the old regime the president, with the trustees, ruled supreme; under the emerging research-focused institution, faculty would need and demand a greater voice. In this system, carried over from the colonial colleges, trustees could often be meddlesome, and presidents often tyrannical. Trustees of the colleges would prescribe the work of the classroom, write the laws of student government, shape the curriculum, and subject the private lives of teachers to scrutiny. Against these trustees, usually men of influence in the community, the faculty (and at times even the president) were often outclassed. They had to defer to these hierarchical superiors for their livelihood and had little authority, “something of the status of the nursemaid.” Furthermore, faculty prestige was damaged by presidents who, as an ex-officio member of the board of trustees, was both the guardian of college religiosity and head of the college faculty, and as such held a strategically powerful position.
The “dual hazard of student disobedience and trustee interference led to demands by the faculties for greater self-government. The demand was for partial autonomy, not for total independence… No European gild of scholars, autonomous in all its concerns, was envisioned by these reformers of the early and middle nineteenth century. No serious attempt was made to alter the charter so as to shift legal control to professors. The management of funds, the selection and appointment of the chief executive, the preparation and approval of budgets—which all lay within the province of English and Scottish professors—were powers neither sought by American faculties nor tendered by American trustees.”

Instead, the focus was directed at convincing trustees to relegate certain powers to the faculty, especially over discipline and the curriculum, to develop a “limited faculty imperium within in the trustee imperio.”

This effort met with some success at certain colleges. At Yale, Jeremiah Day willingly shared his powers with leading members of the faculty, not only over curricular matters but over new faculty appointments as well. Indeed, the famed “Faculty Report” (known as the Yale Report of 1828) was authored by him and faculty during his presidency. Similarly, at Princeton the trustees listened to, began to welcome, and even depended on faculty input on ways to best govern the college. At other institutions, trustees began to cede certain powers to the faculty, especially over the curriculum and admissions, and Walter P. Metzger calls this functional separation of powers one of the “important milestones in the development of American academic government.”

Countervailing forces worked at both preserving and breaking down the rigidity of the old collegiate ideal. Alumni, gaining seats on boards of trustees, wanted to preserve college life as they knew it. However, stronger forces led the colleges into new
directions. The great university builders—Gilman, White, Eliot, for example—were inspired by the possibilities of reforming the college. Two major forces helped move the university: Darwinism, which helped open up the possibilities of American science, and the influence of the German university.\footnote{30}

Political revolutions are “engendered by a series of events that inflame a segment of the population and reveal the injustice of the rulers. They are inspired by an ideology of resentment against those in positions of authority. They invoke the name (even as they transform the sense) of vital, though often dormant, human freedoms. The American academic revolution, foreshadowed in the ante-bellum period and fomented in the era of Darwin, reveals roughly analogous traits.”\footnote{31} Could it be that the effect of Darwinism was on more than just the scientific fields where scholars began to test it and expand it but also on academic governance where faculty began to assert their place in the academic family? It certainly had an effect on academic freedom as scholars began to infuse scientific inquiry with the need for academic freedom—the ability to pursue knowledge unfettered by outside influences, be they from the religious or business community. The “concept of academic competence gave the faculties new leverage against misuses of administrative power.”\footnote{32} The declining presence of overt power in the laboratory and classroom was apparent in the governance of the university.

To the scientist, all knowledge is only tentatively “true” and awaits further investigation and verification. As Julie Reuben explains, “Evolutionary theory encouraged intellectuals to question both the assumption that nature itself was immutable and the belief that scientists could understand nature through common-sense perception.”\footnote{33} New methods were necessary to discover scientific “truth.” Error was to be
tolerated as part of the scientific process. If this is true in the academic realm it can also be true in the government of the academy; presidents and trustees begin to cede functional authority over areas for which the faculty may be more qualified to preside— their area of competence. They do not have to hold a monopoly on how an institution must function but can allow some “error” to exist which will be worked out over time. If the professor is competent in his own academic realm, perhaps he is competent to address matters of university importance as well. “Academic freedom has come to be equated not only with free intellectual activity, but with an ethic of human relations and an ideal of personal fulfillment.” So, we can argue, it is with academic governance—that it is essentially about the ethics of human relations and of personal fulfillment within a larger community. As such, all “justifications for intellectual freedom rest upon a conception of the nature of truth which implies a reason for tolerating error.”

At the newly founded University of Chicago (1892), President William Rainey Harper announced that the primary focus would be research and graduate education and by the turn of the century “the University of Chicago faculty … had a well deserved reputation as advocates of Wissenschaft, the German ideal of research.” Harper expected faculty to conduct research and to instill in students a desire to do the same. He supported the idea of academic freedom, or “liberty of thought” as he put it.

It is with the emergence of the research university that we witness the introduction of several new types of faculty roles. For example, Harper at Chicago put together a scheme of faculty which included “head professors, professors, nonresident professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, tutors, docents, readers, lecturers, fellows, and scholars.” Each role had a purpose: the docents and fellows were
to conduct research under the supervision of a professor. Research was clearly the primary purpose of the institution as each department (or, in other words, each group of faculty) was expected to publish “either a Journal or series of separate studies” which would express the research of the faculty. Teaching would be subordinate to research and the greatest value a professor could pass on to a student would be an interest in conducting research, though not all students would be well prepared for such an endeavor.

During the late nineteenth century, American first conferred the Doctor of Philosophy degree (at Yale in 1861) and scholars began, in the latter half of the century, to create professional associations and journals. The Ph.D. grew in importance over time. Scholars from virtually every discipline organized national associations. These associations held annual meetings and published journals, which enabled individuals to share their research findings, both of which would compete for a faculty member’s time and allegiance. Harper at Chicago and others did, however, adapt the aims of their universities to serve undergraduates giving faculty more multifaceted roles.

The earliest American colleges were small, uncomplicated and, by today’s standards, easily managed. For example, in 1850 the University of Michigan was among the largest institutions in the nation, but it boasted only twenty faculty members. College teachers were not specialized but rather generalists whose only role in governing the university was to assist the president in disciplining wayward students. But as institutions became more complex, more involvement was both necessary and desired by the faculty. Faculty began to take on administrative roles such as registrar. Many institutions created the office of vice president even as the nature of the faculty evolved.
into a more sophisticated, specialized and well-trained group, organized more into
departments and divisions. Daniel Coit Gilman, founding president of Johns Hopkins,
observed, “The power of the University will depend upon the character of its resident
staff of permanent professors.”

In the early American Post-Bellum universities, the administration and
governance of the university was rather simple. The number of persons involved usually
limited to two or three and faculty involvement was usually limited where the governance
configuration included the founder, the president, and the board of trustees. Veysey
explains that the struggle between the faculty and the administration was not a
pronounced one in the early university: “early in the nineteenth century it had been
possible to speak of the officers of an entire college—its president, its faculty, and its
trustees—as being of one and the same mind.” The tradition of lay control of colleges
and universities, a uniquely North American phenomenon, had implications for the
stature and role of professors, as they are seen less as professionals in charge of their
profession, and more as employees, lessening their “organization, initiative, and self-
confidence.”

In later chapters I show how institutional growth and size played a role in the
creation of faculty senates. In the nineteenth century, we see a precursor to these
important variables as the size of the faculty at an institution, while not leading to the
creation of a representative senate (probably being unnecessary when even a larger
faculty might include only about a dozen scholars), did play an important role in giving
faculty a greater voice in university affairs. Richard Hofstadter explains that factors such
as size were important in the development of faculty roles in governance just as it played a role in the quality of the institution. Size, he argued,

> Also has much to do with problems of academic freedom and government; for these problems have an important relation to the growth of the faculty body. Larger faculties tended to have more self-government and to be more self-assertive. Prospering colleges could defend freedom more readily than poverty-stricken ones shuddering at every gust of criticism that might cost them a few students or a handsome benefaction.47

In other words, it was larger and more prosperous institutions were more able to protect dissent.48 Indeed, at more impecunious institutions the main freedom enjoyed by faculty was the freedom to walk away to a more lucrative career, usually in a non-academic field, which indicates the profession was suffering when the best means for obtaining freedom for faculty was to leave it. Among those faculty “least enterprising and self-assertive,” or least capable, were those “most likely to remain docile in their jobs under intolerable pressures.”49 This, of course, had an impact not only on the professors, but also on their students and the community.

An opportunity for some faculty control in the new universities may have emerged in the transitory period of the 1870s and 1880s, when secular alternatives to denominationally controlled institutions began to appear. Yet, alternative forms of governance were not sufficiently well known to serve as a model given that relatively few faculty members had been trained in Europe where most systems featured greater faculty involvement.50 Because faculty governance had not been practiced before, the state legislatures which granted charters and the wealthy individuals who endowed private universities “chose the management model they knew best by vesting authority in an outside board and appointing a president to run the university on the board’s behalf.”51
In a few cases faculty insisted they should manage the university. In 1878, Alexander Winchell (who had been dismissed from Vanderbilt that same year for being a Darwinist) stated that professors ought to have “sole authority to expend the income of the university” rather than presidents or trustees; and in 1902 James McKeen Cattell, famous for his battles with Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler, declared that presidents and trustees were not essential. At a national meeting of university trustees in 1905 Joseph Jastrow of Wisconsin, “boldly addressed the group, demanding that they relinquish their power in favor of the faculties.”

W.T. Hewett, writing in 1882, foresaw the day when faculty would need to play a more significant role in governing the affairs of the university. He argued for faculty representation:

In order that the voice of the faculty may be heard in all questions affecting the welfare of the university, and to prevent them, while sitting apparently in the places of authority, from being powerless to correct abuses and carry out needed reforms, it is necessary the representatives of the faculty should be come members of the corporation… The faculty should be authorized to elected two or more delegates to sit with the corporation, participating in its deliberations, and expressing freely their views on all questions; becoming thus the medium of communication between the faculty and trustees.

His suggestion that faculty become members of the corporation has not come about but there have, of course, been changes in the level of power enjoyed by faculty. Even more than a century later, the inherent tensions are still apparent, as has been more recently noted: “Whatever organizational form evolves, the prospects of preserving the tradition of shared authority and the working assumption that a community of interest exists will be enhanced if administration response to the present situation is more flexible, more positive, and not least, more realistic and practical.”
However, it can also be argued that universities are too complex to leave the ultimate governance decisions about them to a lay board and that, “governing boards should include a substantial proportion of faculty representatives.” In the early era of the university, especially in the case of state universities, the governance of a university was carried out by university presidents and governing boards (which at state universities seem to have been rather weak at first) as well as state legislatures. The outside control of higher education has been long been lamented. Hewett argued that many board members are simply “ornamental personages,” who are unqualified, in his view, to govern the university. Alumni had a stake but also, in his view, were also ill equipped to govern the university. Instead, Hewett proposed that, “The unity of government must be found the various faculties.” Making his case (again, in 1882), for faculty control, Hewett argues that, “To place the most eminent scholars where they can exercise the widest influence upon the culture of their age, and where the best resources for study and discovery are at their disposal, is an obligation which every institution owes to the cause of letters.”

In times past, then, American higher educational institutions were essentially collegial enterprises in which faculty could self-govern in informal ways over certain issues, deciding upon the purpose, procedure, and outcome of their actions. But the increasing size and complexity of the faculty and university necessitated some sort of management function. At the core of the university is the faculty, and “A university cannot exist with an unorganized faculty, forever tentative in its men and measures.”
Conclusion

The role of the faculty in governing the university evolved from the time of the founding of the first colonial colleges through the end of the nineteenth century. With the rise of scientific research and the establishment of graduate schools, requiring greater levels of education and credentials among professors, faculty began to require greater levels of autonomy in their professional lives. This need for autonomy extended to their desire for a greater voice in governing the university. While the relatively small faculty groups at universities could meet without a formal representational structure throughout almost the entire nineteenth century, they would begin to introduce formal structures at the turn of the century, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The existence of “General Faculties” or faculty “meeting as a whole” is apparent at most campuses until a faculty senate is created.

Endnotes

2 Ibid., 50.
5 Ibid.: 18.
6 Hewett, “University Administration,” 143-44.
7 Finnegan, “Transforming Faculty Roles,” 481.
9 Ibid., 234-35.
12 For example, in 1875 the Grange (an agricultural society) launched an investigation into colleges that taught agricultural sciences and called them a “farce” because they “failed to provide [farmers] with useful knowledge.” Ibid., 166.
13 James Turner and Paul Bernard, “The German Model and the Graduate School,” in *The American


15 Ibid., 112.
16 Ibid., 112-13.
17 Ibid., 124.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 125.
20 Quoted in Ibid., 124.
21 Ibid., 4-7.
22 Ibid., 29.
23 Ibid., 30.
24 Ibid., 31.
25 Ibid., 34.
26 Ibid.


28 Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University, 35.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 41-43.
31 Ibid., 46.
32 Ibid., 89.

34 Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University, 90.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 254.

39 By the early twentieth century, colleges made the Ph.D. an important factor in hiring qualified faculty because, in part, foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation, would make it a prerequisite for receiving funds by the early twentieth century, thus greatly accelerating “the transformation of the old-time college.” Rudolph, The American College and University: A History, 431-32.


42 Ibid., 15-17. Nidiffer and Cain, “Elder Brothers of the University: Early Vice Presidents in Late Nineteenth-Century Research Universities.”
43 Hofstadter and Smith, American Higher Education: A Documentary History.

45 Veysey, The Emergence of the American University, 57.
46 Hofstadter, Academic Freedom in the Age of the College, 120.
47 Ibid., 223.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 232.
51 Ibid., 15-16.
52 Quoted in Veysey, The Emergence of the American University, 392.
53 Ibid.
Hewett, “University Administration,” 157. Hewett was a professor of German at Cornell and penned an early history of the University, *Cornell University: A History* (1905).


McConnell, “Faculty Government,” 121.


Ibid., 150.

Ibid., 151.

Pfnister, “The Role of Faculty in University Governance,” 432.

Hewett, “University Administration,” 154.
CHAPTER FIVE
The First Senates, 1880-1939

This chapter examines the first faculty senates to be introduced in American universities, starting in 1880 with the academic council at Johns Hopkins University, modeled, along with a few other early adopters, on European models. Most of these senates emerged from efforts to modernize the universities, often by presidents, as these universities grew and positioned themselves as new producers of knowledge. Others were created out of faculty initiative to stake a claim to their role in the governance of the university. A few senates grew out of campus crises that necessitated an introduction of new governance structures. After a discussion of the period of the emergence of the American university, these inspirations for senates will be examined. These themes are treated separately, and chronologically within each theme, including longer case studies of three institutions: Penn State, Virginia, and Utah.

The Emergence of the American University

The modern American university began to emerge after the end of the Civil War through the early years of the twentieth century. The first faculty senates appeared during this period, beginning in the 1880s as the role of faculty evolved from transmitters to producers of knowledge and as faculty gained increasing rights to academic freedom and tenure, and began to have a more formal role in governing the university. How the division of authority and responsibility for governing the university was handled during this era will be explored in this chapter.
This period was nothing short of a revolution in higher education with “new mansions of learning, more imposing than any the nation had seen” built on the new campuses and mansions added to the established colleges.¹ But the change was more than physical; the outlook of the new institutions was different. Instead of focusing on cultural conservation, these new institutions (or old institutions in new forms) aimed at criticizing and augmenting the base of knowledge. The old American college had focused on tradition, looking to “antiquity for the tools of thought,” which were didactic and catechetical, and “to Christianity for the by-laws of living” with a limited appetite for intellectual adventure. The college was paternalistic, authoritarian, and conservative in its approaches to knowledge and student curriculum and behavior. The professor was a teacher, not a researcher, and lacked both the time and resources for systematic inquiry.² As the universities began to grow in stature they also developed greater autonomy. During this period the university we know today was shaped.³

The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was founded in 1915 with the purpose of defining faculty rights after several professors around the country had been fired or forced to resign. Arthur Lovejoy, John Dewey, and the other founders soon found cause to investigate “signs of improper pressure originating outside the university” on teachers and other perceived violations of academic freedom. While the AAUP held no special powers over universities, the faculty at the emerging universities came to expect the rights to academic freedom as expressed in the founding principles and declarations of the AAUP. The founders of the AAUP had several goals for their new organization and for its member professors. They expected professors to serve as experts to solve complex societal problems. They declared that the academic calling was a public
one, responsible to the public; the relationship of trustees to faculty was as executive to judicial branches.⁴

Under the old regime of colleges, academic freedom and, as such, faculty participation in governance over substantive educational matters could not flourish because professors were preoccupied with student conduct and were too constricted by imposed religious concerns. In this environment, it would have been difficult for faculty to become “governors” or even “senators” over the educational enterprise. The environment was hardly conducive to faculty taking time to debate hefty matters of educational policy. Furthermore, their preoccupation was with teaching, not scientific inquiry or research, thus limiting the focus of their profession.⁵ Faculty came into conflict with their universities’ benefactors, even sometimes resulting in several dismissals of faculty.⁶

By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, the American research university began to assume something resembling its current form. As Roger Geiger explains, by 1920, “the major research universities had become the corporations of the education industry—organized to gather the lion’s share of social resources available to higher education, and committed to produce the most valued educational products for the most important national markets.”⁷ These emerging research institutions (about twenty-five in all that were committed to research) evolved structurally, intellectually, and in their support of the research role.⁸ Graduate education was, from the beginning, a major focus of research universities.

As the newly established Cornell (1868) and Charles W. Eliot’s Harvard (1869) began to expand their curricular offerings in the late nineteenth century, an obvious
schism opened between those schools that “could and those that could not pursue advanced knowledge at the highest levels.” As universities introduced advanced study in the disciplines and graduate education, it became more clear that teaching advanced topics would be married to contributing to advanced knowledge. The most obvious example of this new institutional type was Johns Hopkins, with its importation of the Germanic ideals of scholarship, transmogrified into an American form.

The university presidents of this era are remembered, notoriously, for their autocratic administration and leadership of their institutions. However, there are notable exceptions. Columbia’s Seth Low, who served from 1890 to 1901, had served as a trustee but not as an academic and thus relied heavily on his faculty for advice about matters educational and apparently was influenced by them to create an environment hospitable to research. He developed a first-rate faculty, growing it from thirty-four professors in 1890 to one hundred more by the end of his presidency. The growth of Columbia’s faculty is typical of the period. As emerging research universities grew in size as well as in quality of their faculty. Only with a larger faculty body could the university hope to teach all of the major disciplinary specialties. Enrollment numbers grew as well, helping to provide adequate funding for the growing enterprise, due the institution’s heavy reliance on tuition.

This growth in size and curricular offerings required greater compartmentalization of the university into administrative and disciplinary units. The faculty of the university began to break into the faculties of history or political science or chemistry as universities began to introduce the departmental structure still recognizable in today’s university. To
manage these units, new administrative positions were introduced and deans and
department heads proliferated in the nascent universities.\textsuperscript{12}

Faculty, as members of departments, had a greater voice in the election of their
colleagues. They had a greater stake in who their future colleagues would be as
presidents had to increasingly rely on faculty as expert judges of who should be admitted
to the academy. The first to organize a university into departments was William Rainey
Harper who created them as original parts of his “new and different” University of
Chicago.\textsuperscript{13} He believed the department had to “flexible” and thus more able to respond to
the particular needs of a group of faculty. However, he thought that it should also operate
democratically, although in practice many of the early department heads acted as
autocratically as their university presidents.\textsuperscript{14}

As the locus of control gravitated more locally to the department, faculty demands
for a greater voice grew. The department represented a home for the faculty but its
creation also meant a greater distance between the professor and the president. So, while
the professor’s authority was growing within his “legitimate sphere” where his
professional and academic knowledge was meaningful, his influence outside that sphere
was waning. Presidents and trustees maintained control as they applied more businesslike
functions to the university’s administration. In part, the growing complexity of the
university required greater complexity in its governance and administration.\textsuperscript{15}

The research universities of the early twentieth century began to look more like
one another, as a result of their competition with one another, their growth in size and
quality, and changes in their organizational makeup. This was not simply mimicry at play
among these few research universities, Geiger argues, but instead was an example of
institutions responding in similar ways to similar problems, selecting similar innovations.\textsuperscript{16}

The Association of American Universities was founded in 1900 as a symbol of the university ideal. Its purpose was to establish greater uniformity in Ph.D. requirements, to attain greater recognition of the American doctorate abroad, and to improve standards among universities, and it aimed to achieve these goals acting as a type of accrediting agency for colleges, which had the effect of standardizing practices and improving academic standards among the universities.\textsuperscript{17}

Academic departments were based on the academic disciplines, which also began to “band together” during this era into disciplinary associations. These associations created social and professional networks for professors and provided the means for scholarly exchanges through meetings and journals. The creation of these associations played an important role in the development of the research universities because they created a venue and market for scholarship. The associations also provided the means to define the disciplines, what counts for membership and legitimate scholarship and what does not. The professor thus began to create a professional identity and sense of autonomy through the associations, even if he still depended upon his institution for employment and support. Thus, the universities and their professors needed the associations even as the associations needed the universities. And, just as the universities began to resemble one another in form and function, so, too, did the associations, even those in disparate fields. The associations of today—the Modern Languages Association (1883), the American Political Science Association (1903), and the American Sociological Association (1905), to name a few—all have their roots in this era of
university building and faculty professionalization. New professorial disciplines emerged in this era—specialties such as business and social work—that did not exist, at least not by their own names, just decades earlier.

The development of the American research university might not have been possible, or at the very least have been delayed and in a slightly different form, without the generosity and influence of the major industrialists/philanthropists of the era. Most notably, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, titans of business cum philanthropists led the way in providing funds to existing educational institutions and to create new ones. This era, in general, saw a rise in philanthropic giving and higher education received a large share of the gifts. Also, institutions that were already in good condition were the most likely beneficiaries of these gifts as the philanthropists’ foundations gave to the “strong instead of the needy.” But their influence extended beyond the merely financial; these foundations, Rockefeller’s General Education Board and Carnegie’s pension fund (CFAT), imposed standards—who was eligible to teach (those with Ph.D.s) and who was eligible to study (those who graduated from legitimate high schools with the requisite number of “Carnegie units”—on universities if they were to be offered their gifts.

These two philanthropists, captains of industry who volunteered large portions of their fortunes to institutions through their foundations, often relegating matters of how to organize and govern the university to presidents, shaped higher education, especially the growing and newly created universities. As John Thelin explains: “Although professors wrote profusely about the ideal American university, the donors and presidents who were the major builders were often silent on the matter. It’s hard to decipher the extent to
which the new great universities were the embodiment of a clear philosophical view or were the product of idiosyncratic notions borrowed belatedly and selectively from the clear ideas presented by scholars." The new presidents, so-called “captains of erudition,” often acted energetically but autocratically to create and mold their institutions. 

A vital component of the growth of the universities was the generosity of the businessmen-turned-philanthropists. However, this generosity did not come without possible conflict as the “big businessmen and professors came into fateful contact. The former supported the university and took command of its organ of government, the latter surveyed society and tried to sway its course: two spheres of action and interest, formerly far apart, drew close and overlapped. It was not immediately apparent, nor was it at any time inevitable, that this conflict would be hostile," but rather there was room for mutually beneficial friendship between the two parties, as the businessman admired the life of the professor and the university professor benefited from the businessman’s generosity. However, “to cultivate the good will of donors was a highly approved activity, betokening fine public spirit. To offend the bearer of gifts was an action sometimes defined as the deepest disloyalty and treachery.” As such, in the mind of the professor the businessman took the form of enemy, especially for those in the social sciences, and came to sharp conclusion in the form of some of the first academic freedom cases.

However, institutions of higher learning also borrowed practices from the world of business, especially in the realms of management and finance and also in the way they began to organize themselves into more bureaucratic structures. This was caused by the
fact that universities, as they grew increasingly large and complex, began to share
characteristics with businesses in terms of size and complexity and responded in similar
ways by adopting practices rooted in rational efficiency. They created new administrative
forms. The myriad specializations and functions the university embraced required new
administrative structures, and a strong impetus toward bureaucratization arose from the
ranks of professors, partly in response to the growing competition for placement.  
Between 1890 and 1900, the number of college and university teachers in the United
States increased by 90 percent, and “under these competitive conditions, the demand for
academic tenure became urgent and those who urged it became vociferous. And the
demand for academic tenure was, after all, a demand for rules and regulations—for
contractual definitions of function, for uniform procedures for dismissal, for definite
standards for promotion based on seniority and service—in short, for the definiteness,
impersonality, and objectivity that are the essence of bureaucratism.”  

The rationale for insisting on such bureaucratic regulation was not antithetical to
academic freedom, as some critics of the day, such as Thorstein Veblen, argued in
1918. It was in fact a means to avoid discretionary rule, which gave all power to
presidents and trustees without meaningful checks or balances. And a bureaucratic
system is not necessarily incompatible with a democratic system of governance.  

Cornell was an extreme example of the practice of democracy on campus in this
eyear era. In 1918 it was the only institution of 100 surveyed by the AAUP that allowed
for faculty representation on the board of trustees and was one of only 27 that formally
allowed professors to determine educational policy.
This era was one of rapid growth within the major universities, in terms of the number of faculty and students, but also in the variation of topics taught, which led to greater specialization and compartmentalization within the institution. And by the early 1900s it was possible to define the standard American university as admitting only bona fide high school graduates, a curriculum consisting of both general and specialized courses, doctoral training, and at least one professional school. Another sign of professorial development was the creation of the pension plan by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1905, giving faculty greater flexibility in where they could teach because their pension was portable.

**Academic Freedom**

This era also could be rightly be called the “era of academic freedom” if the focus were primarily on the role of faculty during this period. Professors had gradually but surely asserted their rights to freedom of teaching in the classroom and of research in the laboratory, even against autocratic presidents or meddling boards. This often resulted in dismissals, which then resulted in investigations of how and why faculty were terminated and if the method or reason was justified. The culminating event for academic freedom and the right to tenure for faculty was the creation of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) on January 1, 1915.

It was the university president who held the power over professorial appointments and dismissals. A marked shift came in the form of the new department structure, which gave greater power to a more localized academic bureaucracy, even though the seigniorial department chair would often wield his power in similarly autocratic form to the university president.
Some argued that faculty should be free to pursue “esoteric fields” that would be of little interest to the general public or legislators principally because the focus in colleges was around the collegiate experience of the undergraduates. It was usually only when a faculty member’s teaching, research, or other activities ran contrary to the president’s or trustees’ wishes or values and came to their attention that professor’s employment status was questioned.

Not surprisingly, those faculty members with skills in great demand enjoyed greater bargaining power, and these individuals were mostly located at the more prestigious universities. The founding members of the AAUP mostly came from the still fairly young but prestigious Association of American Universities (AAU) member schools.

The history of the AAUP has been well documented, but key elements are worth repeating. Some of the issues that led to the creation of the AAUP are relevant to the reasons behind the creation of the first faculty senates. As Walter Metzger explains, the formation of the AAUP was both a culmination and a beginning; a culmination of the of “tendencies toward professorial self-consciousness” and a beginning of “an era in which the principles of academic freedom were codified.”

Creation of the AAUP came more slowly than might have been expected, given that professors had already attempted to investigate cases of academic freedom as early as fifteen years before its formal organization. Other professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, were banding together during this period. Walter Metzger explains that the idea was “in the air” but not acted upon out of timidity that the professorial ranks had acquired and because of the constant tension between administrators and faculty. But it was this
tension that finally instigated faculty members to band together, to create an association and journal of their own to “be ourselves.” (The Association of American Universities, for example, was an association of institutions represented by presidents, not professors.)

Professors might make gains at one institution but there was no formal mechanism to compare rights and privileges at different institutions. Representatives of three learned societies joined forces to create a constitution, mission, and structure for the AAUP, with a who’s who list of American academics from the leading universities, chartering 867 members from sixty institutions on January 1, 1915 (and 4,046 members from 183 institutions by 1922), to create a union of “aristocrats of academic labor.” The main purpose of the new association was to appeal to professors as professionals, rather than as employees of their universities, and to promote their well-being and right to academic freedom. Calls of “distress” came swiftly, five in the first year, and the budding organization was thrust into a role of investigating cases of academic freedom.35

The premise upon which the association was built was that academic freedom is a necessary condition for a true university to exist and that professors served a public purpose, provided a public good, and thus should be allowed autonomy so long as they lived up to their obligations to their students, university, and community. The association promoted the idea of granting tenure as a necessary means to ensuring academic freedom in the academy.36 The AAUP had no governmental imprimatur and had only its own power of persuasion and the force of its membership to convince institutions to adopt its principles. But “when an institution was ready to be enlightened, it had a formula and a text to draw upon.”37 This “General Declaration of Principles” was outlined in the Association’s first publication, the Bulletin, in 1915.38
The creation of the AAUP did not have an immediate effect on presidents already predisposed to autocracy or trustees to meddlesomeness. During World War I loyalty of faculty members became an issue and advances toward academic freedom, painfully gained, were swept aside. Several professors were dismissed, at Nebraska, Minnesota, and elsewhere, but none as famously as James McKeen Cattell at Columbia, where president Nicholas Murray Butler, a dictatorial president backed by an overzealous board, had formally withdrawn the privilege of academic freedom for the duration of the war.\(^{39}\)

The Push for Faculty Involvement in University Governance

While faculty had played some role in university governance prior to the creation of the first senates, in this new era, as the modern university emerged, so did the idea of more formalized powers for faculty. James McKeen Cattell published his *University Control* in 1913.\(^ {40}\) The first part included five essays by Cattell on the rightful roles of faculty and administrators in governing the university. Cattell provided a historical retrospective followed by “A Referendum on the Administration” and “The Corporation and the President.” The final two essays addressed the position and duties of the professor. In these essays, Cattell advocated for greater control for professors, hearkening to the ancient university guilds, that the faculty should elect the president (instead of leaving this crucial appointment to the trustees), and that greater powers should be granted to departments or divisions within the university.

These essays were originally published in two issues of *Science* in 1912 and spawned the second part, which was a collection of letters from faculty around the country on conditions at their institution. More than 250 pages of letters are collected in this volume to show faculty dissatisfaction with conditions at their universities. However,
one rightly wonders if any letters displaying satisfaction were sent, and if they were, if
ythey were published. Some of these letters were originally published in four issues of
*Science* in the summer of 1912.

The coda of this tome is a compendium of ten articles on university control, by
Cattell and nine others. Each of these had been published between 1904 and 1912 in the
popular magazines of the day—*The Popular Science Monthly, The Atlantic Monthly,* and
*Science*—by academics at leading institutions (Wisconsin, Yale, New York University,
Cornell, Columbia, and California). These individual voices were brought together in
volume as a chorus of dissent against meddling trustees and autocratic presidents. They
sang in favor—in one form or another—of greater professorial control over the
university.

Cattell specifically called for the creation of a senate within the university. He
declared that,

> The departments or divisions should elect representatives for such committees as
> are needed when they have common interests, and to a senate which should
> legislate for the university as a whole and be a body coordinate with the trustees.
> It should have an executive committee which should meet with a similar
> committee of the trustees.  

41

At the time of the original essay, published in *Science* in 1906, few universities had such
senatorial arrangements in place and the proposal must have seemed quite forward-
thinking. By the time Cattell reprinted his idea for *University Control* he had received
nearly three hundred responses from around the country, which he summarized as
representing “with considerable accuracy the existing academic sentiment in this country
among those who have been most successful in their work.”  

42
The kind of arbitrary control Cattell criticized in *University Control* reflected his own experience with Nicholas Murray Butler. Butler in 1917 notified the Faculty Club that it would have to vacate its current location for a less-desirable one. The issue might seem trivial enough but “no issue regarding faculty-presidential relations was so trivial that it could not arouse Cattell’s principled wrath.” Cattell was furious over Butler’s cavalier attitude toward faculty privileges, thinking that Butler must not recognize the club’s importance as a means for creating faculty loyalty to the institution. Cattell, in typical form, worked toward a different resolution. In the end, Cattell was dismissed from Columbia for his opposition to World War I and the draft.

Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell, wrote the final chapter of Cattell’s *University Control* on “Faculty Participation in University Government.” He advocated that American universities look to their European ancestors for models, to apply to the American situation, of faculty participation in university government as a part of the calling as professors. “What the American professor wants is the same status, the same authority, the same participation in the government of his university,” he declared, “as his colleague in England.” What was missing at the turn of the century, Schurman contended, was a lack of representation, especially on the controlling boards overseeing the universities. Full suffrage should be extended to full professors (those with tenure) in councils that would deal with all business that affected the colleges or units within a university. Over time, he said, boards could empower these councils to take on more and more responsibility. Such representation in internal affairs of the university, combined with a voice on the board for faculty, would be the only safeguard against faculty being
treated as “employees” instead of professionals, in control of their own academic enterprise.

Part of Schurman’s plan came into practice in 1916 at Cornell. New York law forbade faculty from holding a voting seat on the board of trustees, but Schurman arranged with the trustees to have three faculty elected to the trustees’ executive committee, known as the General Administrative Committee, where they could voice faculty concerns, albeit without a formal vote. This arrangement came to be known as the “Cornell Idea” and was imitated at other universities, and often mentioned by other professors seeking a greater faculty voice in university affairs. While faculty considered Cornell the “land of the free” under Schurman, a formal senatorial body was not put in place as he had advocated in University Control, perhaps because the size of the college did not yet require a formal representative body, which it would later create after the student upheavals on campus in 1969. In the meantime, the Cornell faculty tried to gain a formal vote on the Board of Trustees in 1923, without success because the Board was reluctant to go to the legislature to request an amendment to the Charter but the faculty did gain this right within the following two decades.

Origo Senatorum Universitatibus Americis

The origins of senates in American universities can be found in the first research-focused institutions, beginning with Johns Hopkins University in 1880. The founding dates of faculty senates do not necessarily mark the beginning of faculty participation in governing the university, only the crystallization of an idea into a specific form.
Professors participated in plenary bodies in their universities, even if not always with the desired level of authority. The senates created in this period are listed in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 – Senates Created 1880–1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>1880</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>1892</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic University of America</td>
<td>1899</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</td>
<td>1901</td>
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<tr>
<td>California Institute Of Technology</td>
<td>1905</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
<td>1906</td>
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<td>University of Vermont</td>
<td>1911</td>
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<td>University of Minnesota</td>
<td>1912</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colorado State University</td>
<td>1915</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNY at Albany</td>
<td>1915</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Utah</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Kentucky</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California (Berkeley)</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pennsylvania State University</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California-Los Angeles</td>
<td>1923</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill</td>
<td>1925</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Virginia</td>
<td>1926</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida State University</td>
<td>1931</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Denver</td>
<td>1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Florida</td>
<td>1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Oregon</td>
<td>1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of New Hampshire</td>
<td>1937</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Washington</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the earliest academic senates in American higher education were created as part of the original scheme of their university, or in the very early years of the institution’s existence. An academic council was part of Daniel Coit Gilman’s original plan for Johns Hopkins and it was incorporated into the structure of the university in 1880, shortly the University was founded. The senate at the Catholic University of America was founded shortly after the University opened, as its guiding documents were
drafted. The same is true at Chicago, where the founding president William Rainey Harper did not include a senate in the original plan but soon added it in consultation with faculty who were concerned about their role in the University’s governance. Not coincidentally, Johns Hopkins, Catholic University, and Chicago all embodied from the very beginning attributes of the European universities, with a focus on research and a specialized role for the faculty.

Johns Hopkins

Daniel Coit Gilman, as the first president of Johns Hopkins University, designed a plan for the University, which included some kind of representational system for faculty governance. While visiting Europe to hire faculty and gather information about European models for universities, he wrote a “Draft of a plan for organization of Johns Hopkins University.” This draft delineated his hopes for his own position, that he would sit on the board of trustees and also have the right to review and appeal decisions made by the faculty. He proposed the positions of vice-president, deans, and faculty secretary, each of whom would be selected from the faculty ranks. An academic council, made up of the president, the dean, a trustee, and faculty members, would be constituted to aid in governing the university. He also outlined his plans for students and curricula. Although his fact-finding trip was in Europe, his plan mostly resembled American institutions with one notable exception. “Only the awareness of faculty power represents much of a European stamp,” explains Hugh Hawkins. Although the organization of Johns Hopkins was clearly influenced in certain ways by various European traditions, Gilman declared that it would not follow any single precedent but would “derive from all sources such
experience and recommendations as might be adapted to this country and lead in course of time to an American University.”

Gilman did not immediately incorporate the plan for the academic council into the operation of his new university. Instead, he met frequently and informally with his new appointees to discuss the provisional steps to be taken. However, he did not want to set plans for the university too concretely so as to “preserve for their successors the spontaneity of action which they themselves enjoyed.” They ruled by consensus without even putting most matters up for a vote or creating a specific “program for the government of themselves, their associates, or successors” but instead allowed department heads “utmost freedom” to develop their programs, with minimal interference from the trustees.

This simple plan of administration could not last for long. Only a dozen years after the founding of the University, the faculty had grown from eighteen faculty members to three times that number. The University required modifications to its organizational scheme. The faculty met as a whole but without any specific enabling authority to do so. By 1880 the trustees and Gilman specifically discussed the matter of faculty government and agreed that the traditional faculty meeting found in American colleges was not the appropriate answer for the research-focused Hopkins. They opted for allowing departmental independence and left the “chief responsibility of guiding the internal affairs of the University,” following the German precedent, to the president and professors, to meet in a new body known as the Academic Council.

While Gilman had originally envisioned such a council, it had not been necessary to put it into place. The growth of the university precipitated the decision by the trustees
to bring the Academic Council into existence in 1880. This new Council would have broad powers and authority to name new appointees to the faculty. However, this new body was still oligarchic in nature, excluding the junior faculty, many of whom feared Gilman too much to speak out on their own behalf. Because of this arrangement, another organ of governance was created, presumably with the aid of the senior professors. The Board of Collegiate Advisers was created in 1882, made up of one representative from each department. Yet another board was created in 1883, the Board of University Studies, which had charge of graduate education and was made up of only associate professors. However, the Academic Council still reigned among the faculty. And even with these forums for faculty input, there was still an uneasiness about the rights of faculty to academic freedom, about whether or not trustees subjected appointments to sectarian tests, and about Gilman’s range of power and authority over the institution.\textsuperscript{54}

The Catholic University of America

The first rector of the Catholic University of America, John Joseph Keane (887-96), drafted the original constitution governing the nascent university. This document, \textit{Constitutiones Catholicae Universitatis Americae e Sancta Sede Approbatae cum Documentis Annexis}, was revised and approved by Pope Leo XIII and was in effect from 1889 until 1926. It explicitly called for a collegial form of governance in the University. A university senate, controlled by the faculty, was created as a direct result of this guiding document.\textsuperscript{55}

The founders purposely looked to the ancient European guilds and universities as a model for the organization of the University. There was concern that such emphasis on self-government could lead to conflicts within the ecclesiastical order and that a more
typical American corporate-style governance structure with more power vested in the trustees would be more suitable. However, it was decided that the “essential work of universities could not be administered hierarchically,” but instead faculty should be given the freedom to coordinate their efforts independently.\textsuperscript{56} This did not mean that they did not also create a board of trustees, which was empowered to oversee the University and was made up of bishops, who held the “sacred trust” of the university.\textsuperscript{57} The rector would serve the dual role of an ex officio trustee and chair of the senate. In the case of Keane, this arrangement worked well because the faculty valued his defense of professorial rights and his advocacy to the trustees on their behalf. The administration was relatively simple in the earliest days of the university and was required to report its activities, especially those related to finances, to both the senate and the trustees on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{58} The Senate was in place “long before” such bodies were the norm in American universities. Mixed in membership, it included the rector, deans, heads of the residential colleges, and two professors from each faculty, and although only required to meet monthly, usually met weekly. Its activities were guided by a set of principles laid out by Keane. He focused the senate’s mission on promoting faithful Catholic education, and ensuring that its actions be thoroughly American, and that the education of the University serve the needs of the country. Its work encompassed all areas of university affairs but mostly centered around issues of student admissions, faculty appointments and salaries, confirmation of University officers, and overseeing financial matters.\textsuperscript{59}

The senate, according to institutional historian C. Joseph Nuesse, has played an important role throughout its history. The senate helped choose vice rectors, confirmed deans (which were elected by each college’s faculty), and played a role in organizing
public lectures by faculty members (starting at the turn of the century, a program that last until World War II), in addition to its regular roles supervising the curriculum, the admissions policy and process, and checking on the financial health of the institution. In 1900 the organizers of the Association of American Universities were urged to include Catholic University as a founding member by G. Stanley Hall, president of Clark University. Thomas James Conaty, rector of the University at the time, consulted with the senate before accepting the invitation.60

University of Chicago

William Rainey Harper, one of the giants among the presidents of the era, created a senate at the University of Chicago just after its creation in 1890. It is an example of a powerful yet positive influence on faculty governance by a university president. Harper, an advocate of the departmental structure in the university and of ranks for faculty, was open to the idea of faculty sharing certain powers within the university, no doubt due to his exposure to shared governance at Yale, when he was a professor there.

The way the senate came about at Chicago almost seems to have been spontaneous. J. Laurence Laughlin, recently elected Head Professor of Political Economy and William Gardner Hale, new Head Professor of Latin, asked for a meeting with Harper because they were concerned about how he planned to allow graduate students to do more work out of residence than Hale thought advisable. Laughlin had met with Harper previously at Cornell, where faculty had a strong voice in educational governance, to discuss matters related to the organization of the university and could speak frankly about his concerns. He recounts saying to Harper, “We have been deciding here very large questions of University policy. It is not right that these far-reaching conclusions
should be arrived at on the judgment of two or three professors in consultation with the President. These matters ought to go properly to a body composed of the heads of all the departments of the University, and their opinions should be decisive in forming the University organization with which we should begin work.” Then he recounts, “I remember clearly how the President, sitting at the end of a sofa, looked up at me and in a flash said, ‘That’s right. It should be the Senate.’ And the Senate was born then and there.”61 This is consistent with how other aspects of the organization of the University of Chicago evolved. Hale recalled later that a common saying among the early faculty members at Chicago was that every day they expected to find new instructions in their mail boxes.62

Thus, the senate was incorporated into Harper’s university scheme at Chicago. It was given purview over all matters educational, subject to review by the trustees. It would be composed of the president, the recorder (acting as secretary), all head professors, and the University Librarian.63 The three faculties were under the authority of the senate, while other administrative matters were handled by the president’s cabinet, the University Council, composed of deans and directors.64 This was not as representative as the later, elected senates, and thus was not an egalitarian body, but it nonetheless provided input from the faculty, and from a faculty member who had been elected as head of his department. Yet being a department head may have caused a more conservative view than that of a representative who had been elected from the ranks of the departmental faculty.

Despite his creation of the Senate, Harper was criticized for dominating the governance of the university too heavily. “It is…one of the greatest errors of American
university organization that so much power is exercised by the trustees and by the president, and so little by the corps of professors” opined *The Nation*, referring specifically to the University of Chicago. And, while Harper had witnessed an openness to faculty voice at Yale and Cornell he may not have been as sympathetic as the previous story might suggest, given that he had not included a formal voice for faculty in the original plan of the university.

**Senates born of Growth and Modernization**

The majority of senates created in the University Movement era were born of twin causes: the growth of the university, especially in its number of faculty members, and of a desire to modernize the university, to become a “true” university. The growth of the campus made it a necessity to find a body that could handle the work of the faculty without involving the entire faculty. Representation through a senate or senatorial structure was a rational solution. Additionally, colleges emerging as universities with an increasing emphasis on research and faculty specialization, adopted senates as a means to modernize the campus, either on its face or in actual practice. This section discusses this phenomenon, first briefly at several universities, and then in more depth at Michigan, Vermont, Penn State, Colorado State, and Florida. The senates that were born of growth and modernization are listed in Table 5.2.
At the end of the nineteenth century New York University was undergoing a period of growth, having to find new buildings to house its growing academic enterprise and new programs. New administrative officers appeared and began to assume duties formerly left solely to the chancellor. And in 1896 the growing departments created a representative association, the University Senate, as a means to express their interests; the body’s bylaws were codified in 1899. At the University of Minnesota a senate was created in 1912 to replace the informal faculty assembly and formalize the role of faculty on campus. It was unusual that almost from the beginning (1914) this body included students as members. The California Institute of Technology (Caltech) was founded in 1891 as Throop Institute and changed its name to the California Institute of Technology in 1920. The Faculty Council was founded in 1905 as the institution grew and then changed its name to the Faculty Board in 1921.

The University of California Academic Senate was created in the modern sense in 1920 at Berkeley (discussed in depth later in this chapter) and added divisions at other

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Table 5.2 – Senates Created as a Result of Growth and Modernization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</td>
<td>1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Institute of Technology</td>
<td>1905</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
<td>1906</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Vermont</td>
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<td>University of Minnesota</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colorado State University</td>
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<td>SUNY at Albany</td>
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<td>1923</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill</td>
<td>1925</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Florida</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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camperas, such as UCLA, as the University grew. These divisions became semi-autonomous over time as the senate structure evolved. For example, the “Council of the Southern Branch” of the University of California was created in 1923 as part of the creation of the four-year campus to “supervise all courses of instruction.” It included the president, the director, the local deans, and faculty members. As the Southern Branch, later renamed the University of California at Los Angeles, improved in quality and grew in size, pressures mounted to create graduate programs. These pressures created strains on the governance of the unit. The 1931 statewide reorganization (made effective in 1932) of the University’s senate divided the senates into the Northern and Southern sections of the senate, which replaced the Council. However, in 1936 this plan was modified to allow local committees to govern issues particular to a campus. “Parallel” committees were created to function in the same way, but independently of each other, in the two sections complemented by “combined” (members from both sections that met jointly) and “unified” committees where sectional differences did not matter. The imposition of the committee structure from the north forced the Southern Branch to adapt to pre-existing structures and practices.

The Faculty Council at the University at Albany (later University at Albany Senate) was created in 1915 as an advisory body to the president on campus policy and academic affairs. The day-to-day governance of the University of Illinois was originally (in 1869) entrusted to an appointed Regent and the faculty. In 1901 a faculty senate, later renamed the University Senate, was created, which included the president, vice president, deans, ranking professors, and department heads. By 1908 the functions of the senate were more narrowly defined as to exercise “general legislative functions” over the
The role of faculty in governing the University of Michigan is stipulated by state statute. The Committee on the Organization and Government of the University emphasized in 1838 that, “whatever the number of [professors] be, their respective duties should be independently performed.” The attitude of the Regents during the nineteenth century was based on principles of self-government of the faculty for certain areas of decision-making and advice to the Regents on areas within the Regents’ purview. From Michigan’s founding in 1837 its faculty chose their own presiding officer and worked well with the Regents until 1848, when a dispute arose between the faculty and the Regents over how to deal with the newly established campus fraternities. The result was that the Regents terminated three of the four faculty members of the College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts in 1851, and they hired the University’s first president, Henry P. Tappan, in 1852. Tappan brought with him hopes of creating a “true university,” but tensions between him and Regents grew, he soon lost much of his power as president, and was relieved of the presidency in 1863. By 1859 the faculty were known as the “University Senate,” but it merely meant the collection of the entire faculty.

The first move from a unified governance body to a representative body came in 1906-1907 with the establishment of the Senate Council by the faculty as a whole. The entire faculty could no longer function as effectively with the body of faculty growing in size and the university growing in complexity. Another impetus for changes in faculty governance was the presence of a sort of caste system on campus, in which senior faculty belonged to one “research club,” junior faculty were relegated to another and women faculty to yet another, not being allowed in either of the other two. This Council was a mixed body with the president as chair, all deans, and elected representatives from each of the colleges. It acted on behalf of the faculty as a whole. As Nicholas Steneck explains of this development,

The formation of the Senate Council is the first implicit recognition of an organizational pattern that will come to characterize the university of the twentieth century. For the first time, two organizational groups—administrators and faculty—are identified and balanced, one against the other. The deans, who are appointed by the President and Regents, represented the administration. The faculty members of Senate Council, who were elected by their peers, represented the faculty.

Whereas the distinction between faculty and administration was not pronounced prior to this event, given that the deans and even the president still participated as faculty members in teaching, this marked a point of demarcation between the two groups. This
also marked the end of the era of the “personal presidency” due to the changes in the nature of the university.  

Faculty governance at Michigan would continue to evolve. In 1928 the Senate created the Committee of the Senate on University Affairs (CSUA), which was a precursor in spirit the current Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (SACUA). This was a “pure” faculty committee with no administrative representation. Members were elected from the various colleges and were empowered to “hear and consider suggestions concerning the welfare of the University from any members of the University teaching staff, whether or not a member of the Senate, or from any administrative officer of the University.” This body was created as a means to expand the scope of faculty participation in university governance. Its role was to be advisory to the legislative Senate Council, and it played out this role as the University debated, for example, President Clarence C. Little’s proposal for a University College. This college would be the college for students during their first two years of study who could then either take terminal degree or continue for higher study. The faculty, through the CSUA and a special committee vociferously opposed Little’s plan, because they perceived it as moving the University back instead of forward toward a higher university ideal. Little and the Regents were unimpressed and the Regents approved plans to proceed.  

The faculty reorganized their form of participation in governance yet again with the establishment of the University Council in 1930, a representative body of thirty-four faculty members and deans and other top administrators (twenty-two in all). This new group met monthly to discuss faculty views on major university issues and changes in regulations affecting faculty. By 1937 the CSUA was replaced with the SACUA, made
up of eight faculty elected by the Senate from among its members and four deans elected from the Dean’s Council.

Yet again, in 1948, the faculty reorganized their form of governance, temporarily abandoning the University Council and instead enlarging the SACUA and creating a number of subcommittees on educational policies, physical plant and equipment, and public relations. The dissolution of the Council made the division between faculty and administrators more pronounced, and tensions continued to grow between the two camps. A final reorganization came in 1965 when the University Senate (the entire faculty) created the Senate Assembly, consisting of 65 senators, proportionally representing the schools and colleges, which would be the university’s “legislative arm.” The SACUA continued. So, under the current system of university-wide governance at Michigan, the University Senate, or the faculty as a whole, continues to exist in theory but never meets, and is represented by the Assembly, which is advised by the Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs. Other forms of shared governance exist through the college and departmental structures.  

University of Vermont

The faculty of the University of Vermont originally met as whole to discuss student discipline and other “routine issues” and then later divided its work among committees as the university grew in size and complexity. The president, Guy Benton, then established the senate in 1911 as a means to modernize the university and give it more legitimacy, but he created what might be seen as an imperial senate, stipulating that the president must preside over the body. The faculty lacked true authority and even lost authority between the wars as it was reduced in standing, with power over only specific
student issues, similar to the role the faculty had played before the senate was created. However, after World War II, the president gave the senate greater power and created the Policy Committee, which immediately gave the senate more influence. The AAUP was influential in this process in the post-war era. The senate was reorganized in the 1960s to accommodate the university’s growth and again in the 1970s to assert greater influence over university policy, as it became a more unified body, a more “pure” senate.84

Throughout the nineteenth century faculty at the University of Vermont took responsibility for student issues: the academic calendar (from the length of vacation breaks to the time for breakfast, “7 ½ hours A.M.,” and evening prayers, “five o’clock P.M.”), standards for grading recitations, student discipline, and even physical plant issues insofar as they affected students (reminding them not to place wood in front of their cottages and then deciding to build a woodhouse, for example). They also controlled the admissions process until the issue of admitting women came up in 1871. The faculty not being able to come to a conclusive vote, the corporation took over the matter and admitted women. They were not immune to discussing matters germane to their own self-interest, asking for prompt payment of their salaries in 1831 and asking to increase library subscriptions in 1841. The faculty was small—only five men plus the president in 1827—and could handle matters as a body of the whole throughout the nineteenth century.85

As the faculty grew and as departments were introduced (agriculture, arts and sciences, engineering, and medicine were the first) around the turn of the century, the University began to employ committees to handle the institution’s increasingly specialized business on such matters as the library, the status of students, military issues,
and athletics. The number of areas for faculty consideration soon grew to twelve standing committees. Curricular matters were left primarily to the individual departments. The faculty as a whole—about thirty-five members—would still meet about once per month with the president at the head.\textsuperscript{86}

The University Senate at Vermont was created abruptly by “authoritarian fiat” by newly inaugurated President Guy Benton in September, 1911. In announcing the new senate he declared that it would be the sole legislative body and that he would preside over it. His intention was to administer the university with “credit and efficiency,” but he seemed to deem the faculty underlings in his academic bureaucracy and was not interested in their acting independently. To wit, he wrote:

> It is difficult to conceive of a more painful caricature on the true manhood than that made up of a little professorial group gathered in a darkened corridor or behind a building gesticulating wildly against the administration…planning surreptitiously for the overthrow of their chief…The vulgar swagger assumed by some university and college professors in the latter day would be pitiable if it were not positively mischievous.\textsuperscript{87}

Benton’s aim was to centralize the administration. Faculty committees became subordinate to the senate, which was, in turn, subordinate to the president. So, while in theory the faculty had a role and a body in the university’s governance, in practice their influence was slight. The power rested in the duumvirate of the president and the trustees. Indeed, the only officers for the senate in 1914-15 were Benton and his secretary, and he placed himself as an ex officio member of many of the senate committees and used them as a means to carry out his “Administrative Orders.”\textsuperscript{88}

Matters did not improve under President Bailey (1919-39). During Bailey’s twenty-year term, five of the senate committees were comprised solely of administrators with no faculty presence. Student issues, especially disciplinary matters, again dominated
the faculty senate agenda during this period. By the end of Bailey’s term the faculty had endured two imperial presidencies. They were ready for new leadership. They had formed an AAUP chapter in 1930, but apparently not with the intent of challenging the president or attempting to exert control; they were resigned to their subverted status. Instead they focused on gaining membership and waiting out Bailey. When Bailey died in 1940 the university appointed an interim president and later hired John Millis in 1941. The AAUP chapter seized on the change in leadership to assert a greater role for faculty in governing the university. Millis was also authoritarian (“not giving a damn about anybody” one dean remarked), but the faculty, instead of remaining passive, asserted themselves and reorganized the senate in order to affect greater influence on the university.89

The Pennsylvania State University

When the senate was created at Penn State, the institution was known as the Pennsylvania State College. President John M. Thomas, hired in 1921 from Middlebury College, was ambitious to change the name and status of the college to that of a university. However, this name change would not come until 1953 under President Milton Eisenhower. Thomas created the senate just a year before he created the Graduate School and appointed its first dean in 1922.

The faculty had grown discontent with their station at Penn State during the final years under Edwin Sparks, Thomas’s predecessor. Salaries were inadequate and faculty invoked the motto, “I’ll stay here only as long as I have to stay.” Fred Pattee, professor of literature, complained that the administration would simply point out that there were
“fifty men waiting for your job.” But the trustees and the president were dependent upon biennial appropriations from the Commonwealth.

John Martin Thomas

John Martin Thomas had gained acclaim as a dynamic leader in educational circles for the “near-miracles” he had performed at Middlebury College, where he served as president from 1908 until taking the presidency at Penn State in 1921. He previously had served as a minister in East Orange, New Jersey, and had studied divinity at Union Theological Seminary and pursued post-graduate studies at the University of Marburg in Germany.

While at Middlebury he founded the Bread Loaf School of English and the Summer Language Program (both of which are now world-renowned). He had launched successful fund drives, which had resulted in the erection of several new buildings, including $60,000 for a new chapel, and an increase in the endowment from $400,000 to $1.6 million and he had even convinced the Vermont legislature to appropriate funds to the private school for the first time in its history. The small school grew from 203 students to more than 600 during his tenure. It is curious that the president of a small, liberal arts college should be interested in leading a land-grant college (especially one with financial difficulties), but he had once remarked that “If I am ever attracted away from Middlebury it will be by a state institution of unrealized possibilities.”

For his Penn State inauguration, Thomas invited the presidents of three major public research universities to serve as speakers at the inauguration dinner: William O. Thompson of Ohio State, David Kinley of Illinois, and Robert E. Vinson of Texas. These were certainly not casual choices but rather representatives of the schools he
wished to portray as Penn State’s peers, or potential peers. The other two speakers that night were Governor William C. Sproul (who would introduce him formally at the inauguration ceremony the following day), and the Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas E. Finnegan, certainly chosen to show Penn State’s “publicness,” a trait Thomas would emphasize in his inaugural address and in writings and speeches throughout the following years. He was sworn in by the chief justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Robert Von Moschzisker.

The inauguration itself was a spectacular affair, with parades and fireworks and two days of events. Representatives from 125 colleges and universities, including many of the leading research-focused institutions, attended and more than forty-four learned societies were represented. An academic conference was held as part of the inauguration events, focusing on matters of interest to any land-grant institution such as “Progress in Rural Life,” “The Outlook in Agricultural Research,” “The Relation of the Engineer to Industry,” “The Future of Industrial Chemistry in America,” and “Educational Opportunities for Pennsylvania Women,” each panel featuring Penn State and outside academics and experts. Thomas orchestrated the inauguration and the presence of the representatives of leading universities and professional associations along with the academic conference was a means to show the research focus or potential of Penn State.

Thomas’s inaugural address focused on his plans and goals for Penn State. He expounded on the democratic nature of education—that higher education is an essential element of a democracy—as a lead-in to his main message that Penn State College should become Penn State University. This university should be fully supported by the state, he argued, and as such could best serve the interests of the Commonwealth and its citizens
and best live up to its land-grant ideals. Thomas invoked the name of Penn State’s “second founder” and champion of the land-grant movement, George Atherton, quoting him as saying that he wanted Penn State to become the capstone of a state educational system: the state’s university. Thomas declared, “We have now a state university in all but name” and devoted nearly his entire devotional to his goal of making Penn State the state-owned and supported university, the “crown of the public school system” that would be “worthy” of Pennsylvania. He outlined the needs of a revitalized university—funds for research activity and infrastructure, drastically increased enrollment and access (especially for women), and doing more good for the public through extension. He compared Pennsylvania to other states—Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, in particular—as a means to show that the state was behind the times. He asked,

But instead of asking whether Pennsylvania can afford a state university, we should ask rather, Can the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania afford not to have one? Can we afford to say to the youth of this state, if you had been born in Ohio or Wisconsin, you might have attended a magnificent university provided by the state. If you were a citizen of Utah or Arizona, your own state university doors would swing open to you. But you had the misfortune to be born in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania was too poor to follow the example of twenty-three other states and develop its land-grant college into a real state university. I cannot believe that it is the will of the people of this great Commonwealth that such answer should be returned to its ambitious youth.

Penn State College Reorganization and the University Ideal

The faculty responded favorably to the ambitious plans Thomas put forth, as did many alumni and trustees. Benjamin Andrews of Teachers College reported in American Education that Thomas’s plan had been warmly received, even by Governor Sproul. He reported that the visiting presidents from Ohio, Illinois, and Texas gave the inaugural audience a “vivid impression of the hold which these great democratic universities have upon the people.” Several statewide organizations (the State Chamber
of Commerce, the State Education Association, the Grange) gave unanimous votes of support for Thomas’s plan, and he received favorable reviews from Pittsburgh and Philadelphia newspapers.

No doubt encouraged by the reception he received at his inauguration, Thomas pursued his goal of transforming Penn State into a university with missionary zeal. At an address to alumni living in the Pittsburgh area he explained that in his job as president he must have a bold vision, not to be deterred by minor issues, and “save his strength for the big things;” he then outlined his “big things,” namely changing the college to a university as it was Penn State’s “proper role.” He built on these themes time and again, in an address on the “The Outlook for Education” before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Women; in another on “Democracy and Higher Education,” to the Pennsylvania Editorial and Weekly Newspaper banquet; and in a speech on “The Function of the State University.” In at least two speeches, he employed religious imagery (“In a remote province of the Roman empire two thousand years ago a sower went forth to sow”) combined with patriotic devotional (quoting Washington’s farewell address) to stir his crowd onto his cause. He closed by asking his audience to have “faith in higher education” and declared,

The same mighty and benevolent forces which opened the doors of the elementary schools to the children of all the people, and which have built high schools in every city and town are working resistlessly [sic] for Pennsylvania’s institution of higher learning… The millions must be fed, and their food supply can not be produced unless science be applied to agriculture, and it can not be applied unless leaders are trained to teach it.

Two years after arriving at Penn State his ambition was yet unachieved, but neither was it thwarted. He issued press releases outlining his plans, including one fourteen pages in length, explaining his plan as a “clear-cut, logical and economical
policy for the regulation of higher education under state control in Pennsylvania.” In an issue of the Zeta Beta Tau newsletter devoted to the differences between education in the American West and East, Thomas focused his article on the need for greater public support, especially for land-grant institutions, as it was a “legitimate concern and function of a democracy,” because the state “has a very material interest and asset in the higher education of a large group of outstanding citizens whom it needs for leadership in its agricultural, industrial, and professional life.”

John Thomas made it clear from the time he arrived on campus that he intended to change the name of the college to that of a university. This change in name, he explained, would accurately reflect what the institution was already doing. His plan included turning the institution into a truly state university, in the tradition of the state schools of the Midwest and West, with full financial responsibility resting upon the state.

The period of the 1910s and 1920s was a period of reorganization at Penn State, in part due to the growth in the student body and faculty. New administrative positions were created, such as the Dean of the General Faculty (1912), and a Department of Publicity was created (1914) and a director installed, and then, the department was greatly expanded in 1919. In the budding realm of student affairs, a Dean of Men and a Dean of Women were appointed, student government was expanded, and a new health service was put in place (1915). A College Examiner, responsible for student registration, was appointed in 1920 (part-time, and then full-time in 1923). Additionally, funds for new buildings were acquired and the campus expanded. A wide range of curricular changes were instituted, as a natural part of the institution’s growth, including new pre-law and pre-medical courses, changes in liberal arts, and new schools and departments of
education, commerce and finance, engineering, agriculture, and mining engineering were created.\(^{109}\)

President Thomas’s zeal for improving the College was apparent at every turn. He gave countless speeches and wrote numerous articles on the issue and on higher education in general. In one speech he asked for others to join in his cause:

> I have no cunning political plans in mind for the accomplishment of our purpose. We must appeal to the people, and all the people. Members of the Faculty can help mightily if they will do their own independent thinking as to why we should go forward to a University and then be missionaries of the idea whenever they have opportunity. It must not be a one-man movement. Let us all have part in the work in order that we may all have part in the triumph.\(^{110}\)

The alumni took note of the ambitious president. The May 1921 edition of *The Penn State Alumni News* announced that Thomas was given a “warm welcome” and that “Our new ‘PREX’ is here and very much on the job.”\(^{111}\) On June 11, Thomas met with a group of alumni and outlined his plans for the College, including his plans for the building fund, for a College senate, and to transform the institution to a university. He pleaded with them directly: “I want your support; the college wants, and must have your support. There is no American college that can possibly prosper—whether private or State institution—without the loyal, enthusiastic cooperation of its body of Alumni. One of the promises made to me in coming here was that I could depend on Alumni support.”\(^{112}\) He lamented that students had to live in the “homes of villagers” and warned that the College had a “better faculty” than it deserved, based on the salaries paid.

As part of his plan to modernize Penn State, Thomas inaugurated the “Emergency Building Fund” campaign, the first large-scale capital campaign at Penn State. He formally announced it in his inaugural address but had already started on its work. He proposed that the alumni and friends of the university share in building her up to a great
state university, especially given the dire state of governmental support. He took on the role of director himself. The goal was to raise $2 million, but in the end a net of $1.2 million was raised.

Republican Governor Gifford Pinchot had been elected in 1922 with a plan to cut all state expenses as much as necessary to reduce the $20 million of debt the Commonwealth had incurred since World War I. The legislature approved a $3 million appropriation to Penn State (of the $4.5 million requested), but Pinchot exercised his line-item veto to reduce it to $2.2 million, a sum $200,000 short of its previous appropriation. Thomas could not push for a bond as such a move would confirm that Penn State was a private school.\(^{113}\) Ironically, the building campaign may have cemented Penn State as more of a private institution, the opposite of Thomas’s intention. Indeed, the fund made it seem that Penn State was trying to have it both ways, “enjoying the benefits of both private and public status.”\(^ {114}\)

Another important administrative change during this period was the creation of the Graduate School in 1922, which precipitated the authorization for granting of the Ph.D. degree in 1924. This was a conscious move by Thomas to improve the quality of the faculty, only one-fourth of which held doctorates in 1921, and to move them towards the research function and away from heavy undergraduate teaching loads. He appointed Frank D. Kern, head of botany, in 1922 as the first dean of the Graduate School, who soon found money to create the first graduate assistantships. Thomas also reorganized the sciences and appointed nationally renowned chemist Gerald W. Wendt as dean and created the College of Education with Will G. Chambers, the founding dean of the University of Pittsburgh school of education, as its first dean.\(^ {115}\)
This all happened as a result of President Thomas’s initiative and desire to transform the Pennsylvania State College into the Pennsylvania State University. His vision was thwarted, however, by his own misreading of political culture in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and his lack of preparation of the campus for such a change.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{The Senate Idea}

There seems to have been three motivations behind Thomas’s creating a faculty senate. First, it was as a means to modernize the college, to bring it in line with what he considered to be more university-like. If Thomas were to transform Penn State, he felt he could not do it alone, not as an autocrat over the increasingly complex institution. The second was simply a matter of efficiency. Regardless of whether or not Penn State would become a university (but especially if it did become one), a university-wide body of 375 faculty was simply not efficient. It had little chance to be effective. Only about half of that number attended meetings with any regularity but it may have been even worse if all did attend. Third, creating a senate seemed to be a means for Thomas to recruit the faculty to join him in his quest to turn the college into a university.

John Thomas wasted no time in proposing his senate idea to the Board of Trustees. He assumed duties as president on April 15, 1921, attended a General Faculty meeting on April 21, and proposed the senate structure to the Trustees in their April 29 meeting. He explained his rationale for creating a senate:

I presided at one general Faculty meeting. This body has grown to be too large – some two hundred and fifty members – to act as the general legislative body of the College, as defined by statute. I shall expect to recommend a change looking to a smaller group for this purpose. The problem is to secure wise legislation and at the same time promote the morale and loyal co-operation of the large number of instructors.\textsuperscript{117}
This was only one of many ambitions he laid out in his first meeting with the Trustees. The first item on his report was to note that the administration was too centralized in the president and his cabinet (the Council of Administration) and that he planned to rectify that problem and explained how he had already delegated certain duties to others so that he could focus on larger issues of educational policy. He wanted a careful study of the facilities so that he could assess plans for increasing the student body. He explained that he had assumed responsibilities for the daily and Sunday chapel exercises so that he could maintain close contact with the students, as a means to create a “strong force in the improvement of student ideals.” Thomas showed his interest in running the college democratically, explaining that he had met with “officers, deans, and heads of departments” asking for their suggestions for improvements. He followed up these interviews by sending these same individuals a letter asking that they further solicit feedback as to the “greatest needs of the college” and send their “frank” opinions to him.

Thomas concluded his remarks with his appeal that they work together toward making Penn State a university:

> As I see it now, the goal of our effort should be the development of the college into the Pennsylvania State University, directly owned and controlled by the State, with colleges of Agriculture, Engineering, Mining, Liberal Arts, Education, Home Economics, and a Graduate School, located at State College, and the affiliation of such other professional and technical colleges located elsewhere as will give to the State of Pennsylvania a State University comparable in breadth of program and in direct relation to the State System of education to such universities as Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois.\(^{118}\)

All of the tenets in his plan as outlined to the Trustees culminated in this final goal of making Penn State a state university. He was eager to gather input from the faculty at the College and to work jointly toward his vision. The creation of a senate seemed to fit
within both of these tactics: he wanted a more efficient, *university*-like organization and having an organized body would give him a group to draw on for support of his plan.

The trustees approved his plan on June 13, 1921, declaring that “The present organization of the General Faculty is hereby discontinued and there is created in its place as the legislative body of the College a ‘College Senate.’”¹¹⁹ The new college senate would include elected faculty members and ex officio administrators.¹²⁰ Thomas’s plan for the senate outlined its functions as the sole legislative body on all questions that pertain to the educational interests of the College or that concern more than one faculty, including:

(1) Educational Policy
(2) Courses of study and curricula
(3) Admissions requirements
(4) Graduation requirements
(5) Approving candidates for degrees
(6) Awards of scholarships and honors
(7) College calendar
(8) Regulations affecting students¹²¹

Thomas outlined other aspects of his ambitious agenda: to prepare the campus for a student body of 10,000 students (compared to the 3,000 at the time), by building seven new buildings on campus and reconstructing the crumbling Old Main.¹²² This would be accomplished through alumni contributions to a building fund.

*Early Senate Activity at Penn State*

While the creation of the senate may have seemed a radical act, it did not seem to have any radical effects on the College or the faculty. The newly constituted Senate met for the first time on October 6, 1921, with Thomas presiding.¹²³ The main business of the day was to organize its functions, verify who had been elected from the various schools, organize its agenda, and constitute its committees. The previous General Faculty
meetings sometimes had as many as 200 attending, while this first meeting of the Senate was a leaner body with fifty-seven in attendance. However, the attendance previously could vary in terms of which professors attended each month, whereas the Senate attendees were more regular because it was their “assignment” to attend, having been elected to the Senate. This must have created a greater sense of collegiality and continuity of work among those in attendance.

President Thomas suggested seven standing committees, which were approved: admission, graduate study, athletics, student life, college publications, academic standards, and courses of study. The Senate also continued certain items of business carried over from the last General Faculty meeting, including a discussion of changing the grading system at Penn State. A report was given showing the grading systems at twenty-one other universities (all of them research-focused or future research universities) as a means to benchmark Penn State’s system and performance.

Analysis of the minutes of the General Faculty before 1921 and of the Faculty Senate after its creation in 1921 do not reveal any major differences in issues discussed. Before the Senate was created, the General Faculty had six committees: Graduation Requirements, Graduate Study and Advanced Degrees, Physical Activities, Scholarship and Prizes, and Student Publications and Social Activities. After the Senate was created there were seven, covering similar areas. Of course, in both groups special ad hoc committees were created to address specific or special problems. For example, the Faculty heard a report on October 23, 1919, on the “Rehabilitation of Disabled Servicemen” on which courses might be best for returning veterans of World War I.
Among the major issues discussed by the General Faculty in the two years before the creation of the Senate were the abolition of the Honor System (discussed for three meetings before it was abolished), modifying the grading system, admissions requirements, commencement, whether to participate in the new Carnegie pension system, and changing the daily schedule (to a seven-period schedule). The amount of work accomplished in each meeting varied greatly. At one meeting, April 21, 1921 (the occasion of Thomas’s first visit to a faculty meeting) the body with 175 in attendance took on at least seven major issues (some of those listed above) as well as issuing a “Memorial” to George Gilbert Pond, the dean who had filled in after Sparks stepped down and had died from pneumonia he had contracted while in Connecticut helping with the search for the new president. At another, sixty-eight professors gathered to approve the candidates for graduation and promptly adjourned.

Much of the work of the early senate seems routine, perhaps even mundane. For example, in a letter to Professor A.H. Espenshade, Secretary, College Senate, from the Committee on Publications, January 18, 1922, the committee outlines specifically how the catalogue should list faculty members and specifically how this should be done (“these names shall be set down in the following manner: the initials and name of the department head, with his collegiate title, in full, shall appear at the top of a column in the center of the page, immediately under the name of that department…” and so on), changing such wording choices as “preparation required” to “prerequisite,” and the need to abbreviate “recitation” (“Rec.”), “lecture” (“Lec.”), and “practicum” (“Prac.”).125 Similarly, the Curricular Affairs committee took on any number of administrative tasks related to course numbers, course additions, course deletions, and the like.126
Indeed, in the beginning, it seems that the Faculty Senate carried out more of an administrative function than a policy-oriented or legislative one. Instead of providing broad ideas and leadership, the Senate, and its committees, was mired in minute, quotidian details. The publications committee’s report a year later (May 16, 1923) is only one page, much less detailed, but no less mundane: “The Senate Committee on Publications, during the year 1922-23, generally supervised the editing of the General Catalogue, the Summer Session Catalogue, numerous Summer Session, Agricultural Experiment Station, Agricultural and Engineering Extension departmental bulletins and circulars, and other various college publications coming under the direction of the College Editor.” And so go the annual reports for these early days.127

But the committee soon found purpose beyond banal reporting and took up work that, in their minds, would improve the standing of the college as a research institution, in line with the vision of the president, John M. Thomas. In April 1924 the committee proposed to the senate the creation of a college press.128 It recommended that the senate forward the recommendation to the trustees for approval and for a budget. The purpose of such an enterprise would be to serve as a “good advertisement of the intellectual life of this College among other colleges in the country – places where it is necessary that we should get a secure footing and a high standing if we are ever to develop into a University.” Furthermore, it would serve as an incentive for faculty to conduct their research at Penn State instead of leaving for universities with greater means and it would improve the library’s holdings and standing. By October the committee was meeting to confer with Professor A.H. Espenshade about publishing his book, “Pennsylvania Place Names,” bearing the imprint of the name of the college as publisher.129
Another improvement for faculty was the creation of the “The Pennsylvania State College Bulletin,” a new newsletter, published by D.M. Cresswell, the College’s publicity director. The Senate directed the creation of the Senate Bulletin (at the urging of Thomas) and it was functional soon after the first meeting in October. It was distributed weekly, and in its second issue it reported the business of the Senate to the General Faculty as well as on Thomas’s inauguration. It reported Governor Sproul as saying, “Dr. Thomas didn’t say a single thing that I don’t believe in.” Each of the subsequent half-dozen issues of the “Bulletin” contained at least one notice related to research, either that a “Research Man” was to present on campus or that the Association for the Advancement of Science was seeking members. Professors could not be expected to behave as research scientists without connections to the world of research.

Other matters taken up by publications committee included supervision of the student publications, dealing with requests from the students that faculty serve only as advisors and not supervisors to publications such as “Froth,” the campus humor magazine—approved on a trial basis, giving the dean of men responsibility for this matter, an indication that they were prepared to enable and authorize work instead of handling every minute matter. One of the few contentious issues taken up by the Senate was the creation of a school of education, which the Senate approved in 1923 with Chambers as the first dean.

A decade later, the senate saw fit to reassert its role in the college and to outline, in a revised constitution, its functions as the “sole legislative body on all questions that pertain to the educational interests of the College, subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Trustees” including educational policy, curricula, admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, approval of candidates for degrees, awards of scholarships and honors, the college calendar, and regulations affecting students. It asserted its right to interpret its own legislation but allowed questions of jurisdiction to be handled by the president.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Conclusion}

While Thomas was not able to carry out all of his goals, for reasons not entirely within his control, he was successful at making certain changes within the College, one of which was his creation of the Faculty Senate. Thomas left Penn State in 1925, his dreams of developing a public university unfulfilled, to attempt the same at Rutgers, the state university of New Jersey where he would encounter many of the same political difficulties. Michael Bezilla, Penn State historian, commented that, “It was an unfortunate coincidence The Pennsylvania State College had so ambitious a president as John Martin Thomas take office at just the same time a man so hostile to higher education moved into the governor’s mansion.”\textsuperscript{135} The timing was not right, the window of opportunity not quite open, for Thomas or Penn State to realize their potential.

However, Thomas’s Senate would remain. In 1956 a campus publication noted that the Senate, even though it had added a few committees and many members as the University had grown, its “basic functions are the same.”\textsuperscript{136} The senate had gone from meeting in the foyer of the Schwab Auditorium to meeting in the Auditorium itself but had kept its “stated purpose.” The Senate would reorganize itself again under the presidency of Eric Walker in 1966, when he turned full authority of running the senate over to the body’s elected chairman. The by-laws and constitution had not been updated since the reorganization of 1932. The reorganization reduced the Senate in size from more than 300 to about 200 to make it more efficient but reapportioned the senators so
that more than 85 percent were elected, substantially reducing the percentage and total number of ex officio members, and students were added to certain Senate committees.\textsuperscript{137}

Penn State underwent other changes in 1970 when the Board of Trustees delegated greater powers to the president, then John Oswald, without mention of how this affected the Senate, yet Oswald recognized the Senate as the appropriate faculty body for participation in the governance of the University. In response, the Senate created the Task Force on Faculty Organization, which recommended changing in the relationship of the Senate to the president; gave the Senate broader membership, including ten percent students; increased participation by the branch campuses; and consolidated the number of standing committees.\textsuperscript{138}

\textbf{Colorado State University}

The basis of authority for faculty governance in Colorado is set in state law, which stipulates that “the academic faculty shall pass all needful rules and regulations necessary to the government and discipline of the University.” The faculty, who met as a whole, created, with President Charles Lory, a Faculty Council on September 23, 1915. Previously, Lory had informally worked with faculty for input, and his use of “kitchen cabinet” members had been a key part of his ability to smoothly run the university. The creation of the council was part of an overall plan of reorganization of the University, in which Lory was attempting to bring the institution more in line with its land-grant mission (to rise to the opportunities presented by the Smith-Lever Act) and to its administrative structure. The council was a mixed senate, including the executive officers and department heads of the heavily agriculturally focused institution. The main function was to oversee instruction, but the Council also created committees on such matters as
“general efficiency” and “religious relations.” It soon created a committee on “self-improvement” to give faculty members opportunities to advance their education.\textsuperscript{139}

The Faculty Council rose in stature when the Board of Trustees approved a new Code of Operations in 1933. For the most part, the Council previously had been restricted in membership and scope of powers. This new code reflected the growing maturity of the college. It reorganized the college into five divisions, each with its own dean, and provided for new student-related administrators, deans of men and of women. The Faculty Council was restructured and expanded to include all deans and department heads, the registrar, the president, the librarian, the farm manager, and the secretary of the Board of Agriculture to serve as secretary. Part of the rationale for these changes was that in Lory’s first year the faculty numbered fifty-five but had grown to more than 130 by 1933. It seemed, in theory, to reallocate power from the president to faculty-administrators and the student newspaper declared, “Dr. C.A. Lory Dethroned as Dictator.” But in practice, Lory still wielded great influence over the campus. He had served for twenty-five years (and would serve for six more) and had managed to secure the loyalty of the senior faculty. Nonetheless, conditions had changed enough that there was more latitude to challenge Lory’s authority. There was a growing emphasis on faculty research and the need for higher levels of expertise and qualifications.\textsuperscript{140} The Faculty Council would make more substantive contributions after its reorganization in the 1940s, after Lory’s departure.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{University of Florida}

From the time the University of Florida was founded in 1906, faculty played some role in governance, although this role would vary over time. The entire faculty, consisting
of thirteen members including the president, met as the General Faculty and divided specific tasks among committees. The university’s first constitution, in 1929, called for a University Council, but it was composed entirely of administrators: the president, vice presidents, deans, and other directors. The constitution was amended in 1932 establishing the “University Senate as the supreme legislative body of the University.” The new senate included a host of administrators but also three to ten faculty representatives from each college, depending on the college’s size. The result was a mixed senate with twenty-four faculty members and twenty-six administrators.¹⁴²

The first meeting of the senate was held May 4, 1932, under the direction of President John J. Tigert, and devoted the majority of its agenda to end-of-the year issues such as the final examination schedule and commencement, including a discussion of the “rules and customs governing academic costume.” In the first few years the senate handled a predictable array of issues, mostly related to approval of curricular changes within colleges and departments. In one such case in 1933, lower division courses were eliminated from the colleges of education, pharmacy, engineering, and agriculture. President Tigert remarked that, “He might have to act arbitrarily on the matter” but instead was “glad to have the reactions of the Deans of the Colleges concerned.”¹⁴³

Proof that academe’s perennial and universal concern is not a recent phenomenon is apparent in the May 25, 1933, minutes: “Professor M.D. Anderson stated that he had been requested by a member of the faculty of the College of Commerce and Journalism to raise the question concerning parking space for professors in Language Hall.” Apparently, Tigert had his priorities in place: “President Tigert referred the inquiry to
Registrar Chandler for review so as to not take time in the Senate.\textsuperscript{144} (And the following fall it was the students requesting space for “automobiles on campus”!) \textsuperscript{145}

Several initiatives have been made to make the Florida Senate more viable, including how senators were to be selected. Between 1932 and 2002 there have been nine revisions to the University’s constitution, nearly all of which dealt with this issue. For example, in 1946 all full professors became \textit{de facto} members of the senate, and by then the president and other administrators had become ex officio; by 1964 the number of senators rose to fifty and a senate steering committee was put in place to set the body’s agenda. In 1972 the ratio of full professors was changed (so that all did not have to serve at once) and five students were added to the Senate. The name was changed in 2000 to the Faculty Senate to reflect the dominance of faculty. The most recent change, in 2002, eliminated all ex officio members except the president and provost.\textsuperscript{145}

Many of these changes came about with the turnover in the University’s presidents, either because the faculty seized the chance to make changes during the turnover or because a new president changed his stance on how he would work with the Senate. In recent years state politics in Florida have had an effect on internal campus politics. In 2001 the legislature abolished the state Board of Regents and instituted campus boards of trustees, and in 2002 a voter initiative amended this plan to allow presidents of university senates a full seat on the campus’s board of trustees, along with the campus’s student body president. This meant that a faculty member had a full voting seat on the Board of Trustees because in 1999, when Charles E. Young became president, he explained in his first address to the Senate that he did not want to preside and relinquished the reigns to the chair of the steering committee. In 2002-2003 (his last as
president), Young made it clear that his top priority was to find ways in which faculty could play a larger role in University governance.\textsuperscript{146}

**Summary**

The growth and modernization of these universities necessitated new administrative and bureaucratic forms to handle the university’s business. One of these new agencies was the senate. The creation of these senates made representation of the faculty more efficient as the faculty as a whole became too large to effectively meet and transact business. The creation of senates came about during a period of growth and change in these institutions as they became more focused research, on building the campus infrastructure, and improving the quality of the faculty.

**Faculty Initiative as the Source of a Senate**

Senates created by faculty initiative is a second major theme among senates founded in this era. The creation of such senates may have been spurred in part by the university’s growth but those originating from growth and modernization were more often created (or at least facilitated) by the president. The senates in this section were born directly of faculty initiative to assert their role in governing the university.

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<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill</td>
<td>1925</td>
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<td>University of Virginia</td>
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<td>University of New Hampshire</td>
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<td>University of Washington</td>
<td>1938</td>
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<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>1939</td>
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For example, as Ohio University transitioned from one president to another, the Reverend Isaac Crook, the faculty came together to organize a senate with the purpose of defining faculty status. It was organized to allow all faculty members could discuss academic matters, but only the heads of the fourteen departments could vote. Crook welcomed faculty participation in governing the university, but he never gained their trust or that of the board of trustees and soon had to leave. The faculty senate at Northwestern University was founded in 1939 by a resolution of the general faculty. The remainder of the section discusses the creation of senates at North Carolina, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Washington.

**University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill**

Early in the University of North Carolina’s history the faculty ran the institution, with one among them chosen, in a classic example of *primus inter pares*, as the “Presiding Professor.” They chose who was to be admitted and how the students would be disciplined. The faculty met regularly as a whole and occasionally formed special committees when necessary, such as the special committee formed in 1891 to handle discipline.

A senate-like structure was created in 1925 based in part on a proposal by John M. Booker, a professor of English who previously had served on presidential committees, to delegate some of the powers of the General Faculty to a smaller, representative body. Booker’s senate body would be composed of senior faculty only, who could consider the important issues of the university in a smaller body and without the distraction of younger, less experienced junior faculty. However, the faculty opted for a less radical and more egalitarian organization, and the Advisory Committee, a senate-like body, was
born, allowing for representation from across the university, regardless of rank, with the same goal of discussing important matters of policy and procedure.\textsuperscript{149}

This change took place concomitantly with other transformations put in motion by President Harry W. Chase. He divorced the disciplinary functions from the dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and created the new position of dean of students. He wanted to transform the graduate school to be capable of taking on expanded research capabilities, which he saw as crucial to the lifeblood not only of the university but also of civilization. Chase had studied under G. Stanley Hall at Clark and brought with him a desire to elevate the impact of research. He declared that the South must somewhere “grow up an institution…which typifies and serves and guides this new civilization” and that his dream was “for the University of North Carolina is that she be nothing less than this.”\textsuperscript{150} Chase oversaw one of the university’s greatest periods of growth, in its “transition from a college to a well-rounded university” into membership in the AAU. He vigorously defended the rights of the faculty to teach and publish as they saw fit, even in the atmosphere of the Scopes trial.\textsuperscript{151} While Chase set a course for the University, the faculty set their own course in the University’s internal affairs.

The Advisory Committee was later reorganized and renamed in 1942 as part of the university’s effort to prepare for the increase in student enrollment and in response to the large number of faculty added to the institution. Faculty rallied for a greater level of democracy in campus government. In 1947 a revised “Instrument of Government” was created, which detailed a new structure for faculty government, creating a Faculty Council. The framers attempted to conform to the principles outlined in the 1940 AAUP statement to “present a fairly democratic form of government,” according to one dean
involved in the effort. Democratic changes were made in departments as well. They would be led by elected chairs instead of appointed heads. This new council would not pursue its purposes as vigorously as expected in the face of increasing influence by the trustees and the president. One professor lamented this trend in a report, “More Faculty Influence on Faculty Government?” The tensions over power would continue into the 1960s and 70s, with the most recent reorganization of the senate occurring in 1992.

University of Virginia

The University of Virginia senate was founded, by faculty initiative, in 1925 and held its first meeting in 1926. This development came two decades after the first president, Edwin A. Alderman, was hired. Previous to Alderman’s appointment, faculty had governed the University through a rotating chairmanship since its founding one hundred years earlier.

Prior to examining the circumstances of the founding of Virginia’s faculty senate, it is important to understand the role the University’s founder, Thomas Jefferson, plays in the University (even to the present day) and how faculty organized themselves and the institution before a president was appointed. First, on the matter of Jefferson, Edgar Shannon, president of the University from 1959 to 1974, commented that,

No institution, I believe, owes so much to one man as does the University of Virginia to Thomas Jefferson, for he it was who drafted its constitution, planned the curriculum, picked the site, designed the buildings, supervised their construction, employed the first professors, selected the books for the library, and presided over his handiwork as the first Rector—the chairman of the University’s governing board.

Jefferson is ever present at the University of Virginia; on its grounds, in its history, and in the way decisions are made. This is especially true when matters of governance are discussed, as both sides of an issue will invoke Jefferson’s name in defense of their
decision. Jefferson, in creating the University, designed a truly democratic system with no president but rather a system of rotating faculty chairmen. He expected students to govern and discipline themselves.

Despite Jefferson’s administrative designs, proposals for creating a presidential or chancellor post were made throughout the nineteenth century, even as early as 1824, while Jefferson served as Rector (the head trustee) of the University. Jefferson rejected the idea, arguing instead for his system of distributing functions and a uniform rotation of powers, where the chairman would be elected annually, long enough to learn the job but not so long as to become a tyrant.¹⁵⁴ Jefferson’s antagonism toward a president may have been rooted in the fact that until that time almost all college presidents were clergymen of the various denominations,¹⁵⁵ but Jefferson clearly feared concentrating power in one man’s hands—whether a clergyman or not—and he explicitly quashed any discussions of creating a presidency at Virginia.¹⁵⁶ After Jefferson’s death in 1826 throughout the rest of the century the suggestion came up time and again by different advocates.

By 1896 the attitude of the Board of Visitors began to change. They began to realize that a man dedicated solely to the execution of the University’s plans and ambitions, without professorial distractions, was needed. The Visitors drafted a recommendation that a president, with a four-year term, be appointed and be charged with leadership of the University. The chairmanship of the faculty would be retained but with a more limited role. The faculty opposed the motion, stating that it would hurt their status and the chance of the University to hire qualified faculty.¹⁵⁷ Both sides invoked Jefferson. On the one hand, it should be recognized that the University had changed in the nearly 75 years since Jefferson’s death; in his day there “were no external relations,
no educational societies, no alumni to be taken into consideration.” On the other, the faculty were resentful that the Visitors were proceeding without consulting them, violating Jeffersonian democratic ideals, even in their process of undoing Jeffersonian democratic designs, and doing so against the wishes of the University’s constituent’s, its alumni.

The Visitors moved ahead, finding nominees to fill the new position. They set their sights on Princeton president Woodrow Wilson, who declined their offer, explaining years later that if the faculty were unwilling to have a president, he would rather stay at a place where he was welcomed. The search for a president was delayed or denied its candidate over the next several years.

Finally, in 1904, Edwin Anderson Alderman accepted their offer. Alderman was serving at the time as president of Tulane University and had previously served as chair of history at the State Normal and Industrial College in Greensboro, North Carolina and as president of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. While he sought to create a great university, a “source of power to all,” he was more of an energetic administrative leader than a professor serving primus inter parus. He was a man of learning but not a outstanding scholar. Yet, during his tenure he was able to make several advances for the University, seeking to serve the Commonwealth of Virginia through new academic departments (geology, forestry, education, and finance and commerce), a new addition to the library, creation of an extension service, and improvements to the summer school.

Many of the powers formerly held by the faculty chairman were transferred to the deans of the schools, who were more likely to align with the president, thus weakening the independence of the various faculties. The president would serve as chair of the
General Faculty but also assumed powers beyond those that had been held by the chairman.\(^{162}\) The aim was a more efficient form of government for the University, even if this meant a less democratic one.

When a presidency was ultimately created, it was not due to the failure of the faculty chairman but rather the result of societal trends and the expectations of the Board of Visitors for a leader who could execute the same functions with greater effectiveness and efficiency. The Commonwealth of Virginia had become more industrialized by the turn of the century and the Visitors yielded to practical influences.\(^{163}\) As Philip Bruce explains,

> There can be no question that, both in spirit and in practical operation, the chairmanship of the Faculty, to be held in rotation by each member of that body, was more democratic than the office of the average modern college president, with its more or less autocratic powers and broad personal responsibilities; and yet the period in which this office was established at the University of Virginia was certainly, from some vital points of view, more democratic in its tendencies than the period in which the original chairmanship was erected.\(^{164}\)

Bruce continues that, had Jefferson been alive in 1904, the recognition of new conditions “would quite probably have led him voluntarily to the abolition of the old form of administration.”\(^{165}\) The old, more European model of governance was simply inadequate for the new challenges of the twentieth century and an emerging university. A new spokesman who could give it a “renewed impulse” was needed.\(^{166}\)

During Alderman’s presidency, he used an Administrative Council, a purely administrative body as his advisory board, while the General Faculty continued to function through several committees, each charged with specific areas of responsibility.\(^{167}\) However, after the election of the president, the General Faculty began
to meet less and less frequently. In 1907 they met eleven times; by 1917 they did not meet even once every other month.\textsuperscript{168}

Alderman’s administration was not without its problem. There was the problem of his personal style, which became increasingly pretentious and fastidious over the years and he took on a more imperial style. He took increasingly long vacations, sometimes for months, and left engineering dean John L. Newcomb, whom he had appointed as assistant to the president in 1926, in charge. Newcomb would succeed Alderman when he died suddenly in 1931.\textsuperscript{169}

\textit{The Senate at Virginia}

The faculty senate was generated by a group of faculty who produced the “Report of the Committee on the Formation of the University Senate” in 1925.\textsuperscript{170} In this report the faculty asked that the “President and the General Faculty of the University of Virginia recommend to the Rector and Visitors the formation of the University Senate.” The report stipulated that the president of the university should serve as the presiding officer, albeit as an ex officio member, with the Dean of the University also serving as an ex officio member to preside in the president’s absence. The other deans (seven in all: of graduate studies, engineering, law, medicine, education, summer quarter, and women) also would serve as ex officio members. It outlined specifically how the faculty would be apportioned from these same departments, for a total of ten elected faculty members. Thus, the balance of power in this mixed senate would rest with the ten elected senators over the nine ex officio members. The report detailed specifically how elections would take place and that only those of “professorial rank” would be eligible.
The most important aspect of the report came in its third clause, declaring that the “University Senate shall have all functions and duties now performed by the General Faculty of the University with the exception of conferring degrees.” This power would not be without a check, for the president could “in the exercise of his discretion” call a meeting of the General Faculty for the “purpose of reviewing and passing upon any decision or act of the University Senate.” The senate report, chaired by Albert Lefevre, was approved, and the senate was formed on December 7, 1925.171

We can only speculate as to why the faculty banded together to create a faculty senate. A few possibilities seem plausible. First, Alderman was increasingly unpopular with the faculty. While he had gained their confidence in the beginning, his style had grown increasingly distant from faculty affairs. The faculty was losing influence, evidenced by their waning interest in holding meetings of the General Faculty. Second, the institution was simply growing in size and stature and, if they were to regain any influence, the faculty would need to take a stand. For example, upon Alderman’s taking office in 1904, there were forty-eight faculty but by 1929 there were 290; departments numbered nine instead of five; academic schools were twenty-eight instead of fifteen; and the student body had grown immensely, from 500 to 2,200.172 A third possibility is that the faculty saw that the president had served nearly a quarter century and might be on his way out. He was delegating more and more to his subordinates and was present on the grounds less frequently. They may have seen this period as a window of opportunity to create a voice for the faculty in a time that might prove to be a period of transition.

The report on the creation of the senate came at the same time the university was attempting to improve its standing as a research institution. In 1927-28 entrance
requirements were substantially increased and students who performed poorly were dropped (about two-hundred in all). In this same era, the Department of Graduate Studies introduced requirements for a thesis and comprehensive examinations to receive the M.A. and M.S. degrees. While graduate study had not received top priority previously (despite the University’s entrance into the AAU in 1904), it was suddenly held in higher esteem. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation provided a grant of $27,500 annually for an Institute for Research in the Social Sciences and Philip Francis DuPont gave $6,000,000, half for fellowships and scholarships and the remainder for unrestricted use by the president. Professor Edgar F. Shannon of Washington and Lee (and father of the future president of Virginia) declared that he felt that the University of Virginia was the “natural place” for a first-rate graduate school to develop in the South. That year, 1924, professor of English John C. Metcalf was named as graduate dean. 173

Metcalf would serve later the next year on the organizing committee for the creation of the faculty senate. Ten years later he celebrated that the University had increased its graduate enrollment from 100 to 280, with even more in the summer quarter. He had served on the library’s faculty committee and had worked toward the library’s improvement, a requirement for improving graduate education at the institution. He noted that the number of volumes had risen from 125,000 to 230,000 in those ten years, enough growth that the library’s holdings no longer fit in the Rotunda and plans for a new building were needed. Clearly, these efforts must have been recognized, because the National Academy of Sciences met on the grounds of the University in 1935, the first time it did so in the South. 174
The first meeting of the Senate was held October 20, 1926. The minutes of this inaugural meeting record that the senators set ten duties for the senate, namely:

1. The conferring of all degrees given by the University.
2. The modification of degree requirements, especially for baccalaureate degrees.
3. Legislation affecting athletics.
4. Regulations concerning student clubs of all characters.
5. The creation of holidays.
6. To receive communications and recommendations from the Student Honor Committee.
7. Regulations concerning the conduct of examinations.
8. Any legislation affecting all departments of the University.
9. Any legislation affecting more than one department of the University.
10. As a matter of judgment, the President may call on the General Faculty for its opinion and advice on any matter affecting the welfare of the University.

That athletics should rank as one of its top concerns should come as no surprise, considering that at least two of the founding fathers of the senate had been heavily involved in athletics at the University. The chairman of the organizing committee, Albert Lefevre, and George O. Ferguson had both helped create the Southern Conference, and Lefevre had resigned from the University’s athletics committee over disagreements with how athletics were being managed. The first tenet of the new Senate stands out because it was specifically not included in the organizing report, which stated that the faculty senate would have all powers that the General Faculty had “with the exception of conferring degrees.” What prompted this change is not known.

The new senate went about its business, seemingly with little fanfare or problems. The student newspaper made no mention of the creation of the faculty senate nor did it report on the first meeting. Two decades later the Senate would take a major role in asserting its need to play an active role in the selection of a new president, over the
function of the senate and how to best reorganize it, on their continuing concern over athletics, and in the Senate’s role in creating the College at Wise.

The Senate would take steps to strengthen its role in the 1960s and to reorganize its structure in 1969. This reorganization was caused by a desire, instigated in part by students, to open up the proceedings of the meetings. In October 1969 the *Cavalier Daily*, the student newspaper, decried the Senate’s secretive and “mysterious” ways. It called for the meetings to be opened to students. Student representatives had played a part in a curricular reform and the newspaper editors asked: “If one accepts the logic that students have something to say in the specific reforms suggested, it is difficult to deny students the right to know who is in favor or against those reforms, and if they fail to pass, why they failed.” The “Resolution on the Reform of the University Senate” called for a “revitalization” of its form and purposes. This discussion continued through the 1970s. In 1972 the Senate reorganized again, mainly on the reapportionment of seats and in 1973 the Senate debated whether to join a statewide senate with other colleges. President Edgar Shannon reported in a meeting in 1972 that George Mason College had been separated from the University and renamed as a university and that Mary Washington College would soon be separated as well. Shannon argued that the College at Wise should seek its own independence as well. Curiously, none of these developments had been discussed at all in previous Senate meetings.

University of New Hampshire

As the faculty at the University of New Hampshire grew larger after the turn of the century, they began to use committees more frequently as a means to divide their work. Then, in 1936, the faculty drew up a new constitution “for the purpose of securing
a more democratic government of educational policy and student activities.\textsuperscript{184}

Previously, the faculty had enjoyed the authority of legislating on such matters but it became increasingly cumbersome to do so as the faculty grew to 127 members. The representational, proportionally apportioned senate allowed members from all ranks and outnumbered the administrators on the senate.

The president played a role by sparking the impetus for the creation of the senate as he became frustrated in attempting to work with the growing faculty; interest in attending the meetings fell off because attendance did not guarantee a voice for the attendee. As Edward Blewett reported,

\begin{quote}

The president, conscious of the increasing inability of the Faculty to legislate even the less complex matters with which faculties are concerned, made fewer and fewer attempts to secure desirable changes by legislation, and finally, despite his strong antipathy to an autocratic college government became, in spite of himself, a benevolent executive…\textsuperscript{185}
\end{quote}

Despite this, some members of the faculty “kept the flame of democracy burning” in attempting to secure democratic government in at least some portion of the university. Two “courageous” members of a rules committee acted as champions of a new plan and drafted the new constitution, in just the right moment of opportunity, before the flame was “allowed to fail.”\textsuperscript{186}

Their solution was a senate, a plan that received unanimous approval from the faculty. This new University Senate would have jurisdiction over all matters of student government and educational policy. Initially, terms would be staggered and then each departmental representative would serve a two-year term. Six standing committees were created on admissions, rules, curricula, student organizations, athletics, and graduate study. Duties of former faculty committees were folded into these committees by the “framers” of the new faculty constitution.\textsuperscript{187}
Thirty years later, in 1969, another policy entrepreneur advocated for changes in faculty governance. R. Stephen Jenks, an associate professor of organizational behavior (appropriately enough), wrote a study showing how the senate had grown ineffective and should have student representation. The process of reorganizing the senate involved considerations of alternatives, attention by the campus media to involve an uninformed and largely apathetic “public” in the process, the influence of external events such as campus protests, “redistricting” of seats in the senate, and a final approved solution. 

University of Washington

Because the University of Washington has a history of being particularly politicized, in 1934 Lee Paul Sieg, was wary of accepting the offer to become president. The University sought Sieg because of his success in raising the level of research at the University of Pittsburgh while dean of the graduate school. He proved to be the right choice for Washington, revitalizing the university after the less-than-effective president Matthew Lyle Spencer had resigned. Sieg got to work right away at reorganizing the undergraduate college, consolidating the administrative structure, introducing reforms and educational experiments (some of which were soon abandoned), creating an educational “Bill of Rights” that guaranteed students the right to specialized training along with a broad general culture for articulation with life after college, and benefiting from new buildings on campus that came from state and federal economic recovery funds. Sieg declared upon his arrival on campus that, “I feel absolutely certain that the opportunity to build up a great university exists here today.” 

Another accomplishment of Sieg’s was to improve relations between the president, the regents, and the faculty. The faculty had grown disaffected from the
administration, but under the new regime they felt welcome to improve relations. The Instructor’s Association, founded in 1919, became actively involved with basic faculty concerns and negotiated with the administration, to establish a new and different relationship. Some faculty members joined the local American Federation of Teachers union, but the administration did not recognize it as speaking for the faculty as a whole and would work with the Instructor’s Association only once it was clear that it was independent of the union. The conversations between the faculty and administration proved fruitful on a number of topics—salaries, sabbaticals, tenure, teaching loads, and other budgetary matters. The importance of the effort rested “not so much in the solutions themselves as in a new concept of faculty-administration relations.”

It was these positive interactions that led to the creation of the University Senate. The faculty felt reassured that their voice, even if not always gaining the final say in a matter, nonetheless mattered and was heard. Self-government is always partial, but President Sieg, departing from the habits of his predecessors, welcomed the involvement of faculty. In 1938 he agreed to the creation of a faculty senate because, for him, democracy was an art to be “practiced at all levels of American society.” The disposition of the president and his interest in supporting involvement were crucial elements in the creation of a new representative body. The code clarified the internal workings of the university and gave faculty a greater level of responsibility in governing the university, especially at the department level. Interestingly, it was autocratic department chairmen (many of whom made arbitrary decisions about tenure) and not an autocratic president who stood in the way of meaningful participation of faculty in decision-making. Sieg informed the regents of the new senate but did not seek their
formal approval, meaning the relationship of faculty and administration was more of a “gentlemen’s agreement” (which reflected Sieg’s attitude toward university governance).\(^{192}\)

The process of creating the senate was as crucial as the final result itself. The organizing committee took a broad survey of the problems at the university finding that structural and traditional barriers stood in the way of effective faculty deliberation in university affairs. Another important factor in creating the Senate was the willingness of the Regents to trust in the president, in contrast with the “unpleasant bickering” that had prevailed in the past. They took their cue from the president and trusted his judgment to endorse the senatorial plan.\(^{193}\)

The new senate was the “deliberative and policy-forming nucleus of the general faculty.”\(^{194}\) It was fully democratic, allowing faculty at all ranks to stand for election. It required staggered three-year terms, to never allow for complete turnover in a given year. The senate’s duties were to consider matters relating to university life and study, to consider desirable adjustments of university activities, and to consider the better enforcement of university regulations. The reorganization efforts had effects at other levels of the university. Colleges became more autonomous with more authority over their own appointments, promotions, budgets, and curricula.\(^{195}\)

Over the next few years the Senate became a vital feature of faculty organization as the level of deliberation was notably improved, and a “new sense of faculty responsibility was introduced though the discussion was put under some restraint so long as the president of the University was chair.”\(^{196}\) The Senate took up such matters as admission policy, scholarship requirements, a plan for Saturday classes, a plan for
regulation of faculty contracts with the legislature, and how to best make departments more democratic. In 1940 it created a committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom to suggest principles and procedures to provide safeguards for faculty members. By such measures the University faculty became active, in a responsible manner, not to undermine the authority of the president or regents but to “insure a more democratic government in the internal affairs of the institution.”\textsuperscript{197}

The faculty senate played a visible, albeit ineffective, role at the University of Washington during the crisis of the Cold War and McCarthyism during the 1950s and 1960s. Faculty members who admitted to being members of the Communist party were dismissed by the president from their positions after an investigation by a committee of the state legislature. This took place despite the stance taken by the Faculty Senate Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom that membership in the Communist party was not a violation of the faculty code.\textsuperscript{198}

**Summary**

The senates created by faculty initiative grew out of a desire of faculty to change the conditions of faculty governance on campus. They accomplished this task by forming a committee to investigate the conditions and proposed their senate to the university community. Presidential attitudes were important to the creation of these senates. The function of research was growing in importance on these campuses as their senates were created.
Crisis as Genesis of the Creation of a Senate

A campus crisis can be a powerful impetus for the creation of a faculty governance body. The pressures from within and from outside the university can have a strong influence on the internal politics of the institution. This section describes four such cases.

Table 5.4 – Senates Created in Response to Crisis

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<td>University of Utah</td>
<td>1915</td>
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<td>University of Kentucky</td>
<td>1918</td>
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<td>University of California (Berkeley)</td>
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University of Utah

The Administrative Council at the University of Utah, a representative body that included professors elected by their peers mixed with administrators, was born out of crisis. Before its creation, the faculty met as a whole to discuss matters related to student discipline and the curriculum but had no voice with the president or the university’s governing board, the Board of Regents. Just how little influence the faculty had became plainly obvious in 1915 through the campus and community controversy known as the “Great Debacle.” This controversy gave way to a new faculty voice in a very short time.\(^{199}\) The controversy was the culmination of fears and tensions that had been brewing on the campus for at least a couple of years. The University of Utah was attempting to become a modern and progressive university, but its administration, and some of the faculty, was still politically conservative.\(^{200}\) This tension surfaced in 1913 when professor of economics George Q. Coray, a member of the Progressive Party, testified to the Vreeland Commission about the condition of banking in the state. His testimony upset
banking interests, some of whom called for his dismissal. The faculty had made appeals to the Regents for a greater voice in a petition in 1913, led by Professor Joseph F. Merrill, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{201}

The spark that caused the Great Debacle’s firestorm was the valedictorian speech of 1914, delivered by Milton H. Sevy. He decried the governor, the legislature, the university, and the state’s conservative culture.

In a political way the term “Utah” is synonymous with “conservatism.” The citizenship of Utah is composed of honest, sincere and conscientious voters, men and women who revere their political rights. For years this conservatism has been a matter of pride; it has been the political “ear mark” of our commonwealth and we have been proud of it. But … we are now at the dawn of a new freedom. While other states have been adjusting themselves to this changed condition, Utah, always more or less prone to follow the direction of its leaders, has been content to remain in the vanguard, apparently satisfied with its ultra-conservative leadership. In this way a rock-ribbed conservatism has developed; a conservatism which has an octopus-like grasp upon our political life.\textsuperscript{202}

In his speech, Sevy went on to lament the dangers of an overly conservative government that too tightly controlled the affairs of the state. He pointed out that the legislature had squashed a constitutional amendment that would allow for public initiatives; that they had voted against U.S. constitutional amendments for direct election of senators and for the income tax. He laid out the state’s problems related to a litany of public issues such as taxation, railroads, public utilities, natural resources, and economic development. He called for “a different point of view” and said, “The people must be converted that their political hope lies in the breaking down of ultra-conservatism and in the leadership of young, progressive men.” He declared, “The time is ripe for change; only the proper leadership is needed.”

Sevy railed against church intrusion into public and university affairs (meaning the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly known as the LDS or
Mormon Church) and called on the University administration to become more independent and more progressive, because the University had reached a “crisis” in its development. He advocated the banishment of old vestiges of intrusion into the University’s affairs by “adopting a broad, definite and progressive policy, and then carrying that policy into effect—regardless of the outside criticism of Reverend A., Bishop B., or Taxpayer C.”

Anthon H. Lund, a member of the presiding body of the LDS Church and a member of the Board of Regents, was in attendance with the governor, William Spry. He recorded that same day his impressions of the event in his journal:

I went to the University and attended the Commencement exercises. The Oration by Student Sevy was political clap-trap, with flings at Gov. Spry and the Legislature. The Governor whispered to me: “Is that what we get for all our sacrifices we have made for the education of our youth? I have a good notion to resent this talk.” I told him I would suggest he ignore the talk and not answer it, as it would awaken criticism that might be avoided. The Governor's speech was a gem. He ignored Sevy and praised Oscar Moyle’s address to the students. He said we are paying for education 88 pr cent of the taxes and have only 12 pr. cent for all other expenses. Showing the legislature had been friendly to education and have done more than any other state in that respect. Sevy had insinuated that the Legislature had not been willing to appropriate for the University. He alluded to the Dormitory of the girls which the Legislature had not granted. Sevy said: “That Legislature appropriated money for housing fine cattle, but had nothing to give to house our girls!”

Governor Spry followed Lund’s advice in his speech but could not abide Sevy’s remarks and wrote a letter to the Board of Regents asking that they investigate which faculty members were complicit in writing the speech (not whether any faculty members had helped him, but which ones had been involved).

Sevy was called into the office of University of Utah President Joseph T. Kingsbury and declared that he had written the speech himself. He acknowledged that he had asked Byron Cummings, Dean of Arts and Sciences, and C.W. Snow, an instructor of
English and his debate coach, to give him feedback but affirmed that the content was his own.

“The Great Debacle”

Governor Spry was not satisfied that the faculty were not involved in drafting the speech. Apparently neither was President Kingsbury. On February 26, 1915, Kingsbury fired four professors: Ansel A. Knowlton, associate professor of physics; George Chester Wise, associate professor of modern languages; Phil C. Bing and Charles Wilbert Snow, instructors of English. Within a few days George M. Marshall was demoted as head of the English department and Frederick William Reynolds was removed as director of the Extension Service.

Kingsbury refused to give any explanation or rationale for these actions. He declared vaguely to a Salt Lake newspaper that, “Circumstances have arisen which have made a change necessary” and even the dismissed and demoted faculty members could not excise an answer from Kingsbury. This action caused an immediate controversy. It was reported prominently on the front page of all of the Salt Lake newspapers—the Salt Lake Herald-Republican, the Salt Lake Telegram, the Deseret Evening News, and the Salt Lake Tribune (the Deseret News, owned by the church, and the Herald-Republican supported Kingsbury and the Regents, while the other two did not). Despite requests for an explanation, Kingsbury continued to resist and the Board of Regents stood firmly behind him. W.W. Riter, chairman of the Board of Regents, explained that it was a closed matter and no further discussion was necessary.

The lack of information, and the suspicion that the dismissals were politically or religiously motivated, created the impetus for a flood of investigations. Students, in the
student newspaper, the *Utah Chronicle* and through direct public demonstrations, protested the dismissal of popular faculty. The Alumni Association created the “Committee of 25” to investigate. Donors threatened to withdraw funds for scholarships. The Salt Lake Women’s Club demanded an explanation as civic representatives of the community. State Senator George H. Dern (who would later serve as governor and Secretary of War under FDR) introduced a resolution asking for an investigation. The Salt Lake newspapers demanded answers. Not surprisingly, the faculty also wanted answers.

The Regents refused to cooperate with any of the investigations or requests for information. They expressed absolute confidence in Kingsbury in their “Public Statement,” a pamphlet written for the public. It would be unwise, they declared, to have the president negotiate with faculty who were antagonistic to him. The university could not be run through a “mass meeting.” And Kingsbury personally lobbied against the Senate resolution, which ultimately failed by a vote of 16 to 2. Even four Regents who were willing to investigate were silenced.

In protest, Byron Cummings, professor of ancient languages and dean of arts and sciences, resigned on March 6, not waiting for an explanation from the president or the regents. He viewed the situation as untenable. His letter to Kingsbury read:

Inasmuch as you deem it necessary to make sweeping changes in the work and teaching force of the school of Arts and Sciences and seem to consider it unnecessary to advise me in any way regarding these changes, and inasmuch as your reticent attitude toward me in our recent interview both indicate that you no longer have confidence in my ability and judgment and inasmuch as I am not in harmony with the forces and the policy now guiding the University, I would respectfully tender my resignation as Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Ancient Languages and Literature to take effect with the termination of my contract at the close of the present year.
The four dismissed faculty, two from English, one from modern languages, and one from physics, had all been under Cummings’ charge as dean yet he had received no indication that they were to be dismissed, let alone been allowed a voice in the decision. In the continuum of academic power, this incident highlighted that the power rested solely with the president. Cummings reflected on this event years later in his unpublished memoirs, “Trodden Trails.” After writing a letter to the Regents asking for an explanation he received a reply to “attend to our classes and mind our own business.” He lamented these types of working conditions at a university where, 

the regents were in control of the university legally, although the faculty did not look upon the institution as a business firm or factory. We had hoped the relationship between faculty and regents might continue amicably and above board, so there would be frank discussion on any question of difference. But that now seemed impossible…

Cummings, an eminent archaeologist, quickly secured a position at the University of Arizona and went on to create their archaeological museum (an ambition he had hoped to accomplish at Utah after his sabbatical to the Chicago Field Museum and to Germany for advanced study in 1910-11) and served twice as acting president.

The Board offered a “Public Statement” on March 16, but this document offered no explanation for the President’s actions but rather defended his right to take such action. They affirmed that they (and the President was a member of the Board) had full and complete control for the management of the University’s affairs. This only added fuel to the fire of the controversy.

The next day the faculty met to discuss the matter, and fourteen resigned in protest. The Board did not hesitate to accept their resignations. The same organizations that had pressured the Board for an explanation about the dismissals now pressured them
to not accept the resignations of these men or to allow others to resign, as this would be a serious loss to the university and the community. But three more would resign bringing the total to seventeen or about forty percent of the university’s faculty.

The intractable attitude of the Regents is evident in their discussion of how to respond to the crisis. One Regent, W. Van Cott, read a statement he had written for the public on the issue to fellows Regents, and Anthon H. Lund responded that

It was well written but some thought the more reasons we give the more will be asked. Regent Whittemore was determined that we should hear the men who had been notified that they would not be re-engaged. I held that we had a right to employ who we want and that Dr. Kingsbury had done them a kindness in letting them know in time, so they could get another position. At last it was agreed that we give two of these men a hearing Wednesday evening.²¹⁵

A few days later he wrote that professors Wise and Knowlton, two of the dismissed, had been invited to make a statement, but they refused unless the Regents planned to conduct an investigation. Lund writes simply, “We declined.” The Regents and president were right and not to be questioned. The faculty, if they wanted to remain employed at the University, could submit to their superiors or go their own way.

*The American Association of University Professors Investigates*

It was the story of these resignations that caught the attention of Arthur O. Lovejoy, the Johns Hopkins University philosopher and founding officer of the American Association of University Professors. He decided that the controversy at Utah was just the right setting for his embryonic association to initiate its first investigation. He read about the controversy while traveling to New York City in an editorial in the *Evening Standard*, about the dismissed faculty and about the seventeen who had resigned. He recounted that,
It looked like a grave encroachment on the freedom of American teachers. The editorial went on to say that it was impossible to judge the merits of the case, but that the facts would doubtless be investigated by the newly formed Association of University Professors and would duly be given the public in time. When I read that I thought “it is up to us”… We had no machinery for sending investigating committees to Universities, but I decided then and there to go up and see Professor [John] Dewey who was living near Columbia University….I showed him the editorial and said I would go to Salt Lake City myself if he would put up the money for the railroad fare… He consented to go to the bank the next morning, gave me three hundred dollars and I was off the next evening for Utah.216

Lovejoy looked for two kinds of evidence at the Utah campus: “signs of improper pressure originating outside the university” and signs of “official pusillanimity visible from within.” Kingsbury, Lovejoy found, was more interested in keeping the flow of appropriations from the legislature than protecting academic freedom. Moreover, Kingsbury used to his advantage the fact that no regulations were in place that defined the acceptable reasons or terms for dismissal of a faculty member.

Arthur Lovejoy was given an audience with the Regents and sat in on their April 8 meeting. He explained that he was in Salt Lake City to learn as much as he could about the conditions that led to the dismissal of the four professors and would appreciate the Regents’ cooperation in answering questions he had about the affair, to which the Regents replied that they would do so in writing.218 He took the opportunity to discuss faculty rights and roles at other universities. According the Regents’ minutes, Lovejoy stated that in most institutions with which he is acquainted, it is very difficult to get rid of a full professor or even of an associate professor, except upon charges of immorality or inefficiency, and even then the offences must be of some gravity and well sustained.219

It is not clear if the next line that follows in the Minutes is attributed to Lovejoy or is the commentary of the secretary but it invokes the idea that this could be problematic
because it “often results in the institution’s having several professors who have passed their prime of efficiency.”

Lovejoy went on to explain to the Regents the conditions of the professoriate at other institutions. He explained that at his institution, Johns Hopkins University, there was an academic council of fifteen professors representing the faculty of about sixty. The president would not recommend dismissal of a faculty member without consulting with the council. At Princeton, he explained, there was a special committee of faculty to consider appointments and dismissals.²²⁰

The purpose of the trip to Salt Lake City had been to investigate claims of violations of academic freedom. However, Lovejoy soon found that he would also serve as a “critic of academic management,” something he had not expected.²²¹ He declared that the mismanagement of the University made it unsuitable for a place of learning and would not be acceptable even in a business: “Applied in the government of universities it is the sure beginning of disaster.”²²² Walter Metzger comments that however objectionable to Lovejoy, this type of collegiate management was not unique, as the president and Regents were employing a “formula of control that had long been enshrined in academia.”²²³ The old collegiate way was for a pastor to serve as president with the faculty willingly consenting to their place and role. Yet, as the university emerged and developed, the faculty wanted more a society of equals in the academy than a patriarchal system. Such matters would soon see in-depth discussions through the AAUP’s new “Committee T on Place and Function of Faculties in University Government and Administration,” which would issue its first report in 1920.²²⁴
Lovejoy concluded his investigation and returned to Baltimore and submitted his “Report on the Committee of Inquiry on the Conditions at the University of Utah” to the AAUP’s “Committee of Inquiry,” the first such report for the association that had been founded a few months earlier. The committee unanimously endorsed the findings of the report. The report found that the reasons for dismissal by Kingsbury were groundless or not based in fact, and that the university was more interested in securing “harmony by eliminating from the University those whose services it believes to be relatively less valuable.”

Lovejoy also pointed out in report that the Regents refused to allow an adjudicatory hearing of any kind to the professors and allowed unsubstantiated gossip or rumor to stand as fact. The report stated that,

One of the gravest most regrettable features of the situation at the University of Utah, in this Committee’s opinion, is the attitude which has been from the beginning been consistently maintained by the Board of Regents toward numerous petitions asking for a thorough public investigation of the recent incidents and general university conditions… This position seems to the Committee to show that the Board fails to understand, or at least to act upon, three fundamental facts: namely, that every institution of public education, and especially a state university, requires for its success the confidence and respect of the public; that there can be no sure hold upon the public confidence without an unflinching readiness to face publicity in regard to all official acts and policies; and that the only effective way in which any can meet serious charges brought by responsible persons is by not merely permitting but demanding a searching and open inquiry.

They found that the dismissals were done without “proper grounds for such action;” that the Regents’ attitude that an unfavorable comment by a professor about them was sufficient reason for dismissal; that the Board was more interested in harmony on campus than in knowing “who is right and who is wrong” in a disagreement; that no good faith effort was made by the Regents to properly investigate the causes for termination or to withdraw charges against professors that have been shown to not be based in fact, thus
not allowing even a semblance of due process to the accused; and that the Regents had unduly limited the free speech of the faculty.\textsuperscript{227} In the end, the AAUP issued its report, which was made available to its membership through its \textit{Bulletin}, but took no punitive measures; the idea of sanctioning institutions in violation of academic freedom came later. Indeed, the founders of the Association had hoped not to be mired in investigating such cases but to be able to put their efforts into more positive works to promote the needs and rights of professors. Furthermore, the AAUP is a voluntary association and lacks any “coercive force”\textsuperscript{228} to cause institution’s to act in one way or another; only through persuasion could it convince an institution to behave ethically toward its teaching staff.

Lovejoy and the AAUP basically gave a pass on religious influence, saying they could not find any evidence of intrusion by religious leaders. But this was likely a result of their lack of understanding of the culture of Utah. The University at the time was dominated by LDS students—perhaps as much as eighty or ninety percent. The percentage was probably not quite as high among the faculty but its ranks would certainly have been dominated by church members. None of the four dismissed faculty members and neither of the demoted faculty members were Mormon. And the English department head, George Marshall, was replaced by O.P. Widstoe from outside the university. Widstoe was a Mormon bishop and brother to Kingsbury’s eventual replacement, John A. Widstoe. Also, the Regents—especially those opposed to investigating the matter—were Mormon as were Kingsbury (whose father had been an influential apostle in the church) and Governor Spry. Even if the Church did not act officially or formally in the matter, these individuals carried the Church’s influence with them in their decision-making. The
students certainly thought the Church had undue influence in the University; in that year’s yearbook they affixed an angel Moroni (found on the top steeple of most Mormon temples) atop the Park (administration) Building. Lund’s journals reveal how a high-ranking church official had a great deal of influence in the University’s affairs.

The other factor related to religion is that all parties involved may not have been completely forthcoming on the matters in question. Frank Holman, the law dean who resigned in protest, recalled in his autobiography that he had a chance encounter with Governor Spry ten years later, when he worked as a lawyer in Seattle and Spry held a post with the U.S. Department of the Interior. Spry recounted to Holman that he had received direct pressure from LDS Church president Joseph F. Smith on the matter of reappointing the Regents who had been party to the controversy. Spry had promised the Alumni Association that he would wait, but he received a personal message from Smith asking that he not wait, that he reappoint the Regents to put the matter to rest. Spry declined, only to receive an immediate response from Smith’s secretary with a message that it was “his [Smith’s] wish and desire” that he reappoint the trustees immediately. Holman recounts that Spry said to him,

“Frank, you know enough about the Utah situation to realize that that second message was not the expression of a wish but it was a command and an order by the President of my Church, which I could neither ignore nor disobey.” To this extent, then, ten years after the controversy, I had specific proof that the President of the Mormon Church had taken a definite hand in the affairs of the University of Utah.229

Sevy argued in his graduation speech that if the University could become more independent from outside interests the “taxpayers throughout the state would have infinitely greater confidence in their state institution, and this confidence would be measured in greater appropriations. The University would then become, in a true sense,
the great dynamic force in the state…and the fountain source of leadership in the state.”

But perhaps this is what the powers—the governor, religious leaders, and legislators—feared. An institution that was not under their direct control would be unpredictable, and it was just this that the Regents and President wanted to avoid.

*The Administrative Council*

The AAUP report was not without its positive effects. The public scrutiny, both locally and nationally, seems to have been the catalyst for a change in the course of action by the Regents. By the fall a committee on faculty relations was in place and functioning, and an administrative plan allowing for faculty involvement in university governance (with the President at the head of the University Administrative Council), was put in place. Kingsbury was granted emeritus status in early 1916, and John A. Widstoe, president of the Utah Agricultural College (now Utah State) was appointed president.

At the height of the controversy, a group of faculty had proposed a new “Administrative Council,” a body that would be representative of faculty and administrators, a place for both groups to come together to discuss university problems. Under increasing pressure from the public, the alumni, the students, and the faculty, as a result of the crisis the Regents proposed a committee on faculty relations. This was accomplished in a special meeting on March 27, 1915, the same meeting in which a minority of Regents urged careful consideration of the situation and to reject the resignations of the faculty. Instead, the majority wanted to move on and put the incident behind them, proposing the faculty relations committee as a means for a fresh start. The resolution read:
That the Chairman appoint a committee of five on “Faculty Relations”, whose duty it shall be to keep posted on the views of the Faculty and to report the same to the Board; and the Faculty is hereby invited to constitute such committees as it may see fit with such respective duties and powers as it may give from time to time; and the Faculty may provide how the Board shall be advised of its views.\textsuperscript{232}

This opened a window for the faculty to craft a method for meaningful participation with the governing body of the university. The faculty met on April 5, 1915 (incidentally, the same day that Arthur Lovejoy arrived by train in Salt Lake City), and created their own committee of seven to craft a plan and to be the representatives to meet with the Regents’ committee of five. This faculty committee devised the following plan in a special meeting:

The President of the University, the Deans of the Schools, and five members of the Faculty elected by the Faculty, shall constitute the Administrative Council of the University. This Council shall, subject to approval of the Board of Regents, determine all matters relating to the educational policy and administration of the University; e.g., the apportionment of funds among schools and departments, the division of courses between departments, the removal or the appointment of a head of the department, promotions of Faculty members, departures from the salary schedule, the removal of a member of the Faculty by failure to recommend or otherwise, and such other matters as may be referred to it by the President or the Faculty.\textsuperscript{233}

The proposal was radical in that, if approved, it would give faculty power over more than just the curriculum; they would have the authority to determine the future and nature of their university, recommending those to be hired, fired, and promoted, even as department heads and have a significant say in budgetary matters. The balance of faculty and administrators must have been arrived at in a moment of pragmatism. The faculty proposed that the Council be made up of five faculty members and all of the deans, which were five at the time (the Colleges of Arts and Sciences, Education, Engineering, Law, and Medicine). The president would make a sixth administrator, effectively holding
instant veto power through his vote if the Council were gridlocked in partisan divide. It seems unlikely that, given the tumultuous conditions, the faculty would have dared tip the balance in favor of the faculty. Going from no voice in the administration to having a 5/11th vote must have seemed an enormous improvement.

That the faculty was willing to be pragmatic but without yielding too much is evidenced in the second half of the proposal, which would have created an executive committee of the Administrative Council made up only of the deans and the president. The purpose would have been for this executive committee to carry out the “execution of policies or plans” of the Council. This provision was rejected by the faculty, and only the first half of the proposal was forwarded to the Regents.

In its final form, the faculty committee’s plan appeared with even greater powers enumerated for faculty than the original resolution had called for. Most remarkable is that the faculty were able to propose it in such a form that they dominated the council. There would be eight voting faculty and six administrators (the president and five deans).

**PLAN OF ADMINISTRATION**

1. There shall be established an Administrative Council of the University of Utah. The President and Deans of the Schools shall be ex officio members of the Administrative Council, and the Faculty shall elect from its own body members whose number shall be two more than the number of ex officio members.

2. The President of the University shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council and its executive officer.

3. The Administrative Council shall determine, subject to the approval of the Board of Regents, all matters pertaining to the educational policy and educational administration of the University. Examples of these matters are, - requests for appropriations, apportionment of funds, the appointment, the promotion, demotion, removal, or failure to recommend for re-appointment members of the teaching force, and such other matters as may be referred to the Council by the President, Board of Regents, or the Faculty.
4. All appointments, removals or changes in rank of members of the teaching force shall be made upon recommendation of the President to the Administrative Council after consultation with heads of departments and Deans of Schools concerned.

5. All legislative power shall be vested in the Faculty of the University.

6. The Administrative Council shall hold regular monthly meetings during the school year, and such special meetings as may be found necessary.

7. Of the members of the Administrative Council elected by the Faculty, one-half shall be elected for one year, and the remainder shall be elected for two years. Their successors shall be elected for two years; they shall be elected by secret ballot, and a majority of all votes cast shall be necessary to election.

8. A record shall be kept of all actions of the Administrative Council. The record shall be open to inspection by the Faculty and Board of Regents. All votes on matters of policy or administration shall be by roll call and the names of the votes and the way in which their ballots are cast shall be part of the record.

9. The regular medium of communication with the Regents shall be the Administrative Council, but the Faculty may at any time communicate with the Regents by conference, resolution, special committee or otherwise.\textsuperscript{234}

This document shows a major dispersion of power from the administration to the faculty. The balance of power rests with the faculty, as does all legislative power. It has provisions for sunshine laws, making secretive deliberations all but impossible. And it establishes a direct link between the faculty and the Regents.

This was a sharp departure from the previous stance where, by regulation, the president was the only conduit between the faculty and Regents. The “Faculty By-Laws” approved two decades earlier, in 1895, stipulated that, “The President shall be the chief executive officer of the Faculty and the medium of communication between the Regents and the Faculty.”\textsuperscript{235}

Furthermore, his reach was extensive within the university. He was an automatic member of all faculty committees and was empowered to have “the power of direction in
all matters pertaining to the work of instruction, of discipline, and of all subordinate or secondary organizations not referred to any regular department or chair.” But one of the causes of the controversy was that he had sole discretion over making recommendations regarding the employment and dismissal of faculty members, with no requirement to consult deans, department chairs, or other members of the faculty. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the Regents trusted his judgment without fail, as no case where the Regents refused Kingsbury’s recommendation could be found during his presidency.

*After the Storm*

By 1916, after the “Great Debacle” had ended and Widstoe had taken over as president, the Administrative Council was cemented into the “Laws and Regulations of the University of Utah” and the duties of the president read differently. He was to “promote the efficiency of every department” and was to carry out the regulations enacted by the Board of Regents and “all measures adopted by the Faculty or councils of the University.” While still the normal medium of communication between the university and Regents, his role was not as imperial as before. These changes were adopted as part of Widstoe’s plan of administration as he became president. This also radically changed the regulations regarding students and student speech, removing any restrictions as well as the former restrictions of needing approval from the president to invite guest speakers or to form clubs.

However, intimidation of faculty speech did not end with this episode. While the Regents could apparently tolerate greater freedom within the academy, they were reluctant to tolerate extramural utterances. Virginia Stephens Snow, an instructor of art at the University, was an outspoken advocate for Joe Hill, the socialist labor organizer who
was convicted of murder in Salt Lake City on what many regarded as trumped-up charges. In her zeal to defend Hill she sent a telegraph to the Swedish minister to the United States (Hill was a Swedish immigrant). He, along with President Woodrow Wilson, called upon Governor Spry to commute the sentence, much to Spry’s dismay. Hill was executed in Salt Lake City in October 1915, and Snow was dismissed from her teaching position in December.240

The “Great Debacle” had other consequences. It was a great loss of intellectual capital for the University. A.A. Knowlton, one of the dismissed, went on to a distinguished career at Reed College, winning the American Association of Physics Teachers’ Oersted Award and serving as that association’s president and vice president. The accomplishments of Byron Cummings have been already mentioned. Frank Holman, whom Cummings had visited while in Europe when Holman was studying as a Rhodes Scholar, resigned as dean and professor of the law school, and went on to become president of the American Bar Association.243 William G. Roylance joined the faculty at Harvard. Joseph Peterson, who had resigned from BYU in 1911 over the scandal over the teaching of evolution, left Utah for Peabody College and would serve as president of the American Psychological Association in 1934.

The first year under the new administrative plan seems to have moved along without incident. The faculty minutes for 1916 demonstrate that the faculty got about conducting the business of the university with no controversy apparently worthy of mention in the minutes. They welcomed Widstoe as the new president.244 Widstoe reflected that he felt he had been selected because he would be able to bridge the divide between the faithful Mormon, the increasingly skeptical Mormon, and the non-Mormon
members of the faculty, which had been a source of the 1915 conflict, which he termed the “disgraceful Mormon-Gentile controversy.” He made clear to Board upon his hiring that he would not mingle his religion with his duties as president. “This frank statement saved me much later trouble,” Widstoe recounts. He actively sought out advice from faculty and emphasized that faculty should be chosen for their “scholarship and character” if the University was to achieve its full possibilities. This period marked a new beginning for the University of Utah, a “secularization” and greater level of independence.

The first report of the AAUP is an exposition and analysis of the facts of the events—termed the “Great Debacle” in the community—at the University of Utah in 1915. It indicted the actions of Kingsbury and the Regents by exposing their behavior, their unwillingness to cooperate in the investigation, and it called the dismissal of the four and demotion of the two as being without any basis. However, unlike in later investigations, the AAUP did not officially censure the University, nor did it follow up on the investigation other than to make the report available to AAUP members and the public. However, it was a start. The AAUP made a bold move by investigating powerful members of a community where these individuals had previously refused to cooperate with investigations. One of the main consequences of the “Great Debacle” and the AAUP’s investigation was a new plan of administration; a new voice for faculty in the governance of the university.

**University of Kentucky**

Agricultural and Mechanical College (A&M) of Kentucky, the state’s land-grant institution founded in 1865, changed its name in 1916 to the University of Kentucky,
reflecting changes afoot at the institution. The graduate school was created in 1912, but many faculty were teaching too many courses to have time for original research. A crisis brought on by President Henry Stites Barker’s recommendation that the three engineering colleges be merged into one (which naturally created ill will and animosity among the competing faculties) caused the governor (as chairman of the Board of Trustees) to order an investigation in January 1917. The Investigating Committee of 1917 revealed that the campus was not progressing toward a university ideal and that Barker, who had been an appellate judge before becoming president, was ill-equipped to continue at its head. The Committee issued its report after graduation in June, and Barker immediately resigned (instead of waiting out the year for a successor to be chosen as the report recommended).

\footnotesize{248} A new president, Frank LeRond McVey, president of the University of North Dakota, was in place by September. These nine months proved to be tumultuous yet beneficial to the budding university. McVey oversaw great expansion of the campus and student body during his tenure.

The Committee reported frankly on the conditions of the faculty at the university: that many were unqualified for their positions; that too little original research was being conducted, in part because professors were teaching too many courses and doing too many routine administrative tasks; and that they were given little weight in university affairs.\footnotesize{249} McVey went to work on rectifying the university’s problems and crafted a new constitution, its most important provision being the creation of a Faculty Senate, which would have authority as the university’s legislative body over the curriculum and as all “matters involving general University policy, so far as these are not reserved to the Board of Trustees or the President.\footnotesize{250}
McVey, armed with the Investigating Committee’s recommendations, took aim at hiring more qualified faculty and five years into his tenure the number of faculty with Ph.D.s had risen from six to twenty-two. He reorganized the College of Arts and Sciences and within his first year, had added four new departments, and made several other administrative changes to the University. Most importantly to faculty, they were able to become more active in regional and national scholarly associations, and vast improvements were made to the library. McVey’s attitude was to encourage a more professional spirit on campus. By 1926 the senate had worked with the graduate school to expand and improve offerings, and the University introduced its first Ph.D. program.

A dramatic turn of events took place in 1941 as the Board of Trustees was searching for a new president after McVey’s resignation in 1940. The trustees, in an executive session, rewrote McVey’s constitution and replaced the Faculty Senate with what they called the “University Faculty,” which actually contained no faculty at all but was composed entirely of top administrators. This was a semantic trick; McVey had contemplated reorganizing the senate but maintained that a democratic body of faculty on campus was essential and could not have imagined such a radical change. On that same day they selected Herman L. Donovan, president of Eastern State Teachers’ College, who lacked the experience and stature of his predecessor, as the new president.

Donovan was not informed of the decision to eliminate the senate until three months into his presidency. Donovan recounted in his autobiography that had he known of the decision to abolish the senate before he was offered the position, he probably would not have accepted the presidency. He set out to rectify the problem, declaring that, “I was sure that the University could not be operated successfully” without such
legislative body but decided to proceed carefully as “both professors and trustees had strong feelings on the subject.” After two years he was able to persuade the Board to reconstitute the “University Faculty” with faculty members making up a majority and administrators as ex officio members. The new body had seats distributed proportionally among the university’s departments. This was not accomplished easily. He appointed a “Committee of Fifteen” to make recommendations for reconstituting a democratic body on campus whose recommendations were not well received by the so-called “University Faculty.” He persuaded them that accrediting agencies and other universities would not look favorably upon a university in such an undemocratic state, and they relented. At the first meeting of the new senate on October 11, 1943, Donovan declared that, “This is an historic event…No group of men and women that has ever assembled on our campus had a greater responsibility toward the future development of the University.”

Donovan also led the fight for academic freedom with the state legislature and against politicization of the university.

The senate was reorganized in 1965 under President John Oswald, in the university’s centennial year, changing its name from University Faculty to the University Faculty Senate to reflect an enlargement of the faculty’s role in determining academic policy. Oswald had explained that he did not wish to sit on the senate, even as an ex officio member, because he wished the senate to have greater independence. The senate immediately went to work on a new academic plan and imposed general education requirements for all bachelor’s degrees.
University of California (Berkeley)

The University of California has one of the most, perhaps the most, influential faculty senates on an American campus. It is large and powerful, with divisions at all of its campuses. This section will focus solely on its creation.260

The creation of the academic senate at the University of California in Berkeley in 1919 came from a variety of causes: an autocratic president (and professorial discontent in response), institutional growth, faculty attempts to gain greater independence and status as the University modernized, and general faculty discontent. These factors came together in a crisis, known as the Faculty Revolution of 1919, where order emerged from chaos.

Benjamin Ide Wheeler was a prominent figure on the campus at Berkeley, serving as president from 1899 to 1919, his charismatic and autocratic presidency ended by outspoken pro-German sympathies. His resignation spurred a faculty revolution at Berkeley, which resulted in the creation of the Academic Senate. Wheeler was an advocate of Germanic-styled graduate education, himself an eminent scholar educated at the University of Heidelberg. Wheeler purposely sought to shed the old college pattern and turn California into a research-oriented university. He was a vigorous man who advocated vociferously on behalf of his developing university, bringing stability to a campus where it had been “spectacularly lacking.” While president he was able to recruit top scholars from around the country and expand graduate work. The student body grew from 2,600 at his inauguration to more than 12,000 in 1919. Some of the future campuses of the University of California system, such as the “Southern Branch” (UCLA), were
initiated under his watch. In addition to unrest by the faculty, another factor that led to his resignation was his pro-German views during the First World War.  

Upon Wheeler’s resignation on October 3, 1919, the faculty sent a memorandum to the Regents asking for greater control over matters within their purview and for greater influence over the direction taken by the president and regents. This led to the formalization of powers within the Academic Senate, allowing it to choose its own committees and have greater autonomy over its own affairs.

The number of faculty had grown from 202 to 693 during Wheeler’s twenty-year presidency. The university had outgrown Wheeler’s paternalistic administrative style. Wheeler came to California from Cornell on the condition that the Regents grant him a broad range of presidential powers. He would be the sole conduit between the faculty and the Regents and would have exclusive authority over faculty appointments and promotions. He would have nothing short of full authority, a “dictator,” over the University. Even had he not resigned over the pro-German controversy (officially he resigned for reasons of poor health), his time would have come to a close as president. These increasing numbers of faculty, many of the leading scholars in their fields, became restive because of their lack of power and authority on campus affairs. After years of Wheeler’s autocratic rule over educational policy, which did not tolerate dissent, the faculty were weary but hardly capable of rising up against a man of such prestige and power.

The actual birth of the Senate occurred on June 24, 1920, when the Board of Regents approved a new set of “Standing Orders,” which had been under discussion...
during the previous year. What precipitated its creation was the “Berkeley Revolution.”

Once Wheeler resigned, pent-up faculty dissatisfaction spilled over and soon was virtually “out of control.” Wheeler had skillfully controlled the faculty, but, out from under his reign, the faculty were ready to assert their role in governing the University. They met on October 1, 1919, and proposed a new, reorganized representational senate with greater authority over matters of faculty concern, the right to appoint its own committees, to elect department chairmen, and to be consulted in the selection of a new president. The proposal was debated by the faculty for two hectic days and transmitted to the Regents on October 3. Representatives of the Regents and the faculty met in conference committee and forwarded a revised plan to the Regents’ executive committee in January 1920. The Regents approved the new “Standing Orders” by a vote of eight to two on June 24, 1920, and thus ended the Berkeley Revolution.

The Regents decided to grant the new powers to the faculty, undoubtedly, as a means to quell the “general chaos” on campus and to restore a sense of internal harmony and cooperation. Furthermore, there was a fear of a large-scale exodus of professors if their concerns and grievances were not adequately addressed. The faculty did not receive all they had wanted in proposing the new senate. Appointment of deans would still reside with the president even though consultation with the senate would be required. However, the Senate was granted full authority over its own affairs: to determine its membership, elect its chairman (instead of having the president as the de facto chair), appoint its own committees, and advise the president on budgetary matters. The faculty gained greater
control over appointment and promotion procedures and curricula and subsequently lost interest in controlling student behavior, which they delegated to the dean of students.\textsuperscript{266}

The faculty had to grow into their new role. Newly appointed president David P. Barrows proved to be inept in his relations with the faculty, which caused numerous difficulties as senators attempted to communicate with the Regents. His three years as president proved to be a time of trial and error for the new senate, a time of growing pains when senators and administrators showed lapses in judgment. One incident that highlighted the continuing tensions in their effort to improve shared governance came when the Senate attempted, in 1922, to play a part in the selection of Barrows’s replacement, only to be snubbed by the Regents, who declared that the Senate could submit nominations but not participate in the actual selection.\textsuperscript{267} But this period set the precedent for a strong and autonomous faculty at the University of California, a tradition that continues through today.\textsuperscript{268}

\textbf{University of Oregon}

The University of Oregon has managed to maintain the collegial model of the faculty meeting as a whole while also employing a representative faculty senate. The faculty, despite its size, still meets in a town hall type meeting as the “University Assembly,” while the University Senate meets more frequently. The senate was created by the Assembly in 1932 as the Faculty Senate (renamed as the University Senate in 1937), which acted as a conduit for issues to come before the assembly, organizing committees to take on specific matters.\textsuperscript{269}

The senate was created at a time of great turmoil at the university. While the institution had been rising, adding graduate programs and awarding its first Ph.D. in
1926, the Depression was a major setback, causing more than 1,000 of its 3,536 students to drop out. The Depression exacerbated tensions between the university and the state legislature. Even before the onset of the Depression the legislature had shown hostility toward the university, withdrawing two of the university’s five funding requests in 1927, only to have the governor veto one of the remaining requests and reduce the other two. Then, in 1932, legislation (the Zorn-Macpherson Bill) was introduced that would merge the University of Oregon with Oregon State University but was ultimately defeated in anti-climactic fashion (after a disorderly scuffle that included secret meetings, robberies, and threats of violence). Certainly this time of turmoil, as well as President Arnold Bennett Hall’s (1926-1932) emphasis on graduate education and research, played a role in the faculty decision to create a formal body to address university matters.

Summary

These senates were born directly from crises on campus. Such events exposed the inadequacies of faculty government and an immediate need for changes in the arrangement within the university for participation in governance. These universities were growing. These growing pains helped exacerbate the effects of autocratic presidents on the faculty who felt it necessary to make their voice heard on university affairs, especially in the wake of a controversy.

Conclusion

Senates during the University Movement were created through proactive and reactionary forces: the growth and modernization of an institution, faculty initiative, and in response to crisis. In a way, the growth of the universities was a prerequisite, inasmuch
as even the concept of shared governance with faculty necessarily has to await the emergence of an identifiable group of faculty large enough to necessitate a representative body. Faculty who initiated senates surely must have subscribed to the idea that internal control should rest more with those directly involved with the operation of the institution, especially one as complex as a university. A constant theme that pervades the creation of these senates is the rising level of research activity on the campuses. Senates and graduate schools seem to be created within a matter of years, or, if a graduate school already exists, it seems to be going through a revitalization around the time the senate is created. Senates created in later eras, as discussed in the next two chapters, mirrored these early senates in many ways.

Endnotes

1 Metzger, *Academic Freedom in the Age of the University*, 3.
2 Ibid., 4-5, 10, 12.
3 Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*.
5 Metzger, *Academic Freedom in the Age of the University*.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 2. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*.
10 Ibid., 11-12.
11 Ibid., 12-13.
12 Ibid., 15-16.
15 Ibid., 16-17.
16 Ibid., 17.
21 Ibid., 46.
23 Ibid., 118.
24 Ibid.
25 Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University, 144.
26 Ibid., 145.
27 Ibid., 180.
28 Ibid.
30 Woodrow Wilson, in his essay, “The Study of Administration” (Political Science Quarterly 2, June 1887), noted that “it is getting harder to run a constitution than to frame one.” He argued that bureaucracy is an essential apparatus of good government.
34 Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University, 194.
35 Ibid., 194-205.
36 Ibid., 206-07.
37 Ibid., 216.
39 Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University, 221-26.
41 Ibid., 20-21.
42 Ibid., 21.
45 Ibid., 475.
47 Ibid., 462, 609.
48 Regarding the founding dates of disciplinary associations, Roger Geiger remarks that although these dates have a real importance, they in no way mark the “beginning of the subject.” Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900-1940, 22.
50 Ibid.
52 Ibid. This attitude of cooperation and consensus may have been, in part, due to the Quaker influence upon Johns Hopkins, benefactor of the University.
56 Ibid., 81.
57 Ibid., 82.
58 Ibid., 85-86.
59 Ibid., 87-89.
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60 Ibid., 121-22. Ironically, Clark and Catholic University are the only two universities to ever withdraw from membership in the AAU.
61 Goodspeed, A History of the University of Chicago, Founded by John D. Rockefeller, the First Quarter-Century, 139-40.
62 Daniel Lee Meyer, “The Chicago Faculty and the University Ideal, 1891-1929” (The University of Chicago, 1994), 196.
63 Goodspeed, A History of the University of Chicago, Founded by John D. Rockefeller, the First Quarter-Century, 140.
64 Meyer, “The Chicago Faculty and the University Ideal, 1891-1929”, 197.
65 “The University of Chicago,” The Nation (September 5, 1892): 217, quoted in Ibid., 199.
69 California Institute of Technology. Historical Files: Minutes of the Faculty Council, 1905-1911. The Archives of the California Institute of Technology.
70 Russel H. Fitzgibbon, The Academic Senate of the University of California (Berkeley, California: Office of the President, University of California, 1968), 33.
71 Ibid., 33-35.
73 Winton U. Solberg, The University of Illinois, 1894-1904: The Shaping of the University (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 20-21. The Illinois Plan of Government and senate were mentioned by John A. Widstoe as a model in extolling the virtues of a new plan of administration at the University of Utah in 1916, discussed later in this chapter.
74 Florida State University Faculty Senate., “Faculty Senate,” in Florida State University 2004-05 Fact Book (Tallahassee, Florida: Florida State University, 2004), 14.
79 Ibid., 5-6.
80 Ibid., 6-7.
82 Peckham, The Making of the University of Michigan, 1817-1992, 197, Steneck, “Faculty Governance at the University of Michigan: Principles, History, and Practice,” 8. The faculty played a role in the campus McCarthy hearings against faculty members in the 1940s (Peckham, 250-51).
84 Hyde, “The Faculty Role in University Governance,” 370-85.
85 Ibid., 371.
86 Ibid., 372.
87 Quoted in Ibid., 373.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 374-77.
90 Michael Bezilla, Penn State: An Illustrated History (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1985), 103.
91 Ibid., 105.
92 “The Inauguration of John M. Thomas as President of The Pennsylvania State College” [Event Program], October 13 & 14, 1921, Penn State University Archives.

“Inaugural of John Martin Thomas, President,” The Pennsylvania State College Bulletin XV, no. 12 (1921). Courtesy of Penn State University Archives. The address was also published in John Martin Thomas, “Inaugural of John Martin Thomas,” School and Society XIV, no. 356 (1921).

Atherton is called Penn State’s “Second Founder” because he revived the institution after years of low activity.

“Inaugural of John Martin Thomas, President,” 13.


Bezilla, Penn State: An Illustrated History, 107.

“Successful Educators: John Martin Thomas, D.D., LL.D., President of the Pennsylvania State University,” American Education XXV, no. 8 (1922): 355-56. In that same issue of American Education, Thomas was profiled as a “Successful Educator” with commentary on his plan for a state university in his inaugural address: “he propounded the idea with such force and reason as to receive the hearty support of all students, alumni, and friends of the college.” “Successful Educators: John Martin Thomas, D.D., LL.D., President of the Pennsylvania State University,” 361.


John Martin Thomas. “Higher Education,” n.d. Thomas, John Martin Vertical File. Penn State University Archives. The other speech was titled, “The Spiritual Basis of a State University” (June 11, 1922) delivered as the baccalaureate sermon at Penn State, where he expounded: “We are not laboring for ourselves but for the Commonwealth” and that “The State University is democracy taken in earnest, the doctrine that all men are created equal, applied to education.”


The Penn State charter creates some ambiguity about whether it is a state-owned school or not, a tension that continues even today.


Ibid., 211. The “President’s Report” of January 22, 1920 at the Trustees meeting (presumably given by Dean Pond who was filling in for President Sparks until a replacement could be hired) notes that “there is a growing demand among the students and the more radical elements of the instructors to introduce more elective studies and have less of a required course of study,” which would require an “increase of our faculty of at least ten percent in the School of Liberal Arts.” Trustee Minutes, Board of Trustees, Supporting Papers, Group #6, Box 17, Paterno/GST/AR04.04. Penn State University Archives.


The Penn State Alumni News 7, no. 9 (1921): 1, 2.


Bezilla, Penn State: An Illustrated History, 109-11.

Ibid., 116.


“Statement of the President,” April 29, 1921. Trustee Minutes, Board of Trustees, Supporting Papers, Group #6, Box 17, Paterno/GST/AR04.04. Penn State University Archives.
“Statement of the President,” April 29, 1921. Trustee Minutes, Board of Trustees, Supporting Papers, Group #6, Box 17, Paterno/GST/AR04.04. Penn State University Archives.

Minutes, June 13, 1921. Trustee Minutes, Board of Trustees, Supporting Papers, Group #6, Box 17, Paterno/GST/AR04.04. Penn State University Archives. The prepared “Recommendations of the President” for the same date has almost identical verbiage as the minutes, especially on specific recommendations. It seems the Trustees approved his recommendations in toto without modifying them.

The membership was made up of the President of the College, the Deans of the several schools, the Dean of Men, the Dean of Women, the Director of the Institute of Animal Nutrition, the Director of Health Service, the Librarian, the Registrar (Secretary), the Comptroller, the Director of the Summer Session, the heads of departments of resident instruction or of research, plus three elected representatives from the academic schools.

These included a new school of mines building, residence halls for men and women, including a “varsity hall” for athletes, a recreation building, and a home economics laboratory.

Faculty Senate Minutes, October 6, 1921. Senate Record, 1921-23. University Faculty Senate: Minute Books. Book: Group 32, Box 1, Paterno/GST/ANO5.12, Penn State University Archives.

The General Faculty minutes from 1919 through 1921 were examined. They are catalogued with the Senate records even though they predate the creation of that body. University Faculty Senate: Minute Books. Book: Faculty, September 1919-June 1921, Group 32, Box 1, Paterno/GST/ANO5.12, Penn State University Archives. The Senate minutes reviewed are found in the same collection under “Senate Record, 1921-23.”

Senate, College/Annual Reports, 1921-28, General Vertical File, Penn State University Archives.

University Faculty Senate, Agendas & Reports, Group #32, Box 9. Senate, College/Annual Reports, 1921-28, General Vertical File, Penn State University Archives.

Letter To the Senate of the Pennsylvania State College, from D.M. Cresswell, Chairman Senate, College/Annual Reports, 1921-28, General Vertical File, Penn State University Archives.

“A College Press” Letter to the Senate, April 15, 1924, from the Committee on Publications. Senate, College/Annual Reports, 1921-28, General Vertical File, Penn State University Archives.

Minutes of the Senate Committee on Publications, October 30, 1924. Senate, College/Annual Reports, 1921-28, General Vertical File, Penn State University Archives.

The Pennsylvania State College Bulletin, October 10, 1921.

The Pennsylvania State College Bulletin, October 17, 1921.

Bezilla, Penn State: An Illustrated History, 115.

“Proposed Amended Constitution and By-Laws of the Senate of The Pennsylvania State College,” February 18, 1932. Senate, Univ Faculty/Collge Senate to 1953, Vertical File, Penn State University Archives.

Bezilla, Penn State: An Illustrated History, 119.


Hansen, Democracy's College in the Centennial State: A History of Colorado State University, 306-08.


Ibid., 8-9.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 3-4.
Ibid., 4-5.
Ibid., 7-8.
Boren, “Faculty Government at Chapel Hill, the First Two Hundred Years: A Brief History,” 9-11.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 26-28.
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 2-3.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 4.
These committees were myriad to oversee all manner of issues: publications, athletics, catalogue, the university cemetery, buildings and grounds, libraries, religious exercises, and public celebrations.
Bruce, *History of the University of Virginia, 1819-1919: The Lengthened Shadow of One Man*, 75-77.
“Report of the Committee on the Formation of the University Senate.” (December 7, 1925.) Correspondence and Reports of the University of Virginia Faculty Senate, Acc. RG19/3/1.461, Box 6 (1925, 1927, 1946), Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
Lefevre was a popular philosophy professor whose lecture on Socrates often attracted large audiences from outside the class, including outsiders. He, along with William A. Lambeth, had helped create the Southern Athletic Conference. He had served as editor of the *Philosophical Review*. In 1921, four years before helping create the University Senate, he and Lambeth resigned from the General Athletic Association’s executive committee over differences in how athletics were managed at the University, namely, that he felt others did not share his preference for “clean” athletics and he was disappointed in the football team’s lack of success. See Dabney, *Mr. Jefferson's University: A History*, 110, 24. The other members included William H. Faulkner, professor and head of the Department of Germanic Languages (pp. 400-401); John Calvin Metcalf, professor of English and later dean of the Graduate School and recipient of numerous campus accolades (p. 401) who led a popular Sunday Bible class on campus (p. 67); and George O. Ferguson, professor of educational psychology who was later named Dean of the University (1934), which meant he was the dean over admissions and the registrar, and he also helped create the Southern Conference (pp. 175, 331). The final member of the organizing committee was William H. Echols, professor of mathematics, who was known as the “hero of the Rotunda Fire of 1895” for his efforts to save the Rotunda and the adjoining structures from an early morning fire. He lived on the lawn at the time and
was charged with oversight of the grounds. The Echols Scholar program was named in his honor in 1960 and members of the program were entitled to live in the Echols House. He had annually addressed the first-year men on the honor system for many of his forty-four years on the faculty. (See Dabney, pp. 80, 218, 425.)

172 Ibid., 132.
173 Ibid., 78-84. One beneficiary of the Institute’s funding was Stringfellow Barr for his writing on the life of Mazzini.
174 Ibid., 168-69.
175 “First Meeting of the Senate.” (October 20, 1926.) Correspondence and Reports of the University of Virginia Faculty Senate, Acc. RG19/3/1.461, Box 6 (1925, 1927, 1946), Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
176 “Correspondence of the Secretary; Mainly re: Selection of a President to Succeed Newcomb.” (1946.) Correspondence and Reports of the University of Virginia Faculty Senate, Folder: 1946, Acc. RG-19/3/4.541. Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
177 “General Correspondence of the Secretary, University Senate.” (1946-1952.) Correspondence and Reports of the University of Virginia Faculty Senate, Folder: 1948-1952, Acc. RG-19/3/4.541. Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
178 “Athletic Committee Reports, University Senate.” General Correspondence of the Secretary, University Senate (1946-1952), Folder: 1951-53, Acc. RG-19/3/4.541. Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
179 “Report from the Special Committee, Miscellaneous Reports.” General Correspondence of the Secretary, University Senate, Folder: 1952-54, 1957-60, Acc. RG-19/3/4.541. Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
180 “Minutes of the Senate, 1963-64.” Acc. RG-19/3/2.841. Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
181 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Tuesday, November 18, 1969” Acc. RG-19/2/1.761. Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
182 “Opening Things Up.” Cavalier Daily, October 2, 1969. This editorial was included as an attachment to the agenda for the November 1969 senate meeting.
183 “Minutes of the University Senate, 1973.” Acc. RG 19/3/2.771. Special Collections, University of Virginia. George Mason had served as an extension campus since 1959 and Mary Washington College had served as the University’s women’s college since 1953. See Dabney, Mr. Jefferson’s University: A History, 372, 66.
184 Blewett, “A New Type of Faculty Organization,” 201.
186 Ibid.: 203.
190 Ibid., 188.
191 Ibid., 189.
192 Jane Sanders, Cold War on the Campus: Academic Freedom at the University of Washington, 1946-64 (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1979), 6-7. Incidentally, Sieg had participated in the dismissal of Frederick Woltman, a graduate teaching assistant in philosophy, while a dean at the University of Pittsburgh. Woltman had offended local coal and industry interests (see p. 8).
This narrative for the “Great Debacle” is based on archival materials, including news clippings from all four Salt Lake City newspapers of the time and the student newspaper, Regents minutes, and other documents from the University of Utah Archives and other sources: American Association of University Professors, “Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Conditions at the University of Utah,” (1915), Walter P. Metzger, “The First Investigation,” Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 47, no. 3 (1961), Ralph V. Chamberlin, The University of Utah: A History of Its First Hundred Years, 1850 to 1950 (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1960), 323-41, Daniel H. Pollitt and Jordan E. Kurland, “The AAUP’s First Year: Entering the Academic Freedom Arena Running,” Academe 84, no. 4 (1998).

This tension is apparent in the way early church leaders sent Mormons to Eastern universities and abroad to study in order to return and build up the state. However, many brought back with them new academic values (while still maintaining their faith). John A. Widstoe earned his bachelor’s degree at Harvard and Ph.D. in chemistry at Goettingen in Germany in 1899, George Q. Coray studied at Cornell and earned degrees at Harvard and Columbia (A.M., 1904), and Joseph F. Merrill received his Ph.D. in physics at Johns Hopkins in 1900. George Thomas, who would later serve as president, earned his Ph.D. in Germany in 1903. Brigham Young Academy (later university) president Benjamin Cluff brought nationally prominent educators to Provo such as G. Stanley Hall (1897 summer school) and John Dewey (1901 summer school) and Charles Eliot visited Salt Lake City in 1892. See Thomas Wendell Simpson, “Mormons Study ‘Abroad’: Latter-Day Saints in American Higher Education, 1870–1940” (University of Virginia, 2005). Some of the professors who left for such studies came into direct conflict with church doctrine by bringing back teachings about evolution. Three professors, brothers Ralph and William Chamberlin and Joseph Peterson were dismissed from BYU in 1911 for heretical teachings and joined the University of Utah faculty. See Ralph V. Chamberlin, Life and Philosophy of W.H. Chamberlin (Salt Lake City, Utah: The Deseret News Press, 1925).

Milton H. Sevy, “Class Oration Delivered at the Graduation Exercises at the University of Utah, June 3d, 1914.” MS 403, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah. Sevy died in an automobile accident in 1917 and did not leave behind any writings about his experiences at the University of Utah or of giving this speech.

Milton H. Sevy. “Class Oration Delivered at the Graduation Exercises at the University of Utah, June 3d, 1914,” p. 6. MS 403, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah.

He served as first counselor to Joseph F. Smith in the First Presidency.

Anthon H. Lund. Diaries, Entry for Wednesday, June 3, 1914. Vol. 35 (1914-15). Courtesy of Jennifer L. Lund. Lund’s journal is very revealing as to how he simultaneously navigated life as a top church official and regent. He would often hold meetings for both organizations in the same day and would even mix business between the two. It is interesting to note that he would call some fellow regents as “Brother,” W.W. Riter who was Mormon, for example, but others as “Regent” in his diary. The journal also reveals how closely those in power in the small and young state knew each other. He was personal friends with the governor and with President Kingsbury who he notes meeting with in his own home on several occasions. The journal also reveals the regents’ thinking on several other university matters. For example, Joseph Merrill, a professor of engineering, ran for state senator which Lund objected to saying that it “violated the discipline of the School” and that it would “bring politics into school.” His personal morality comes into conflict with his stand on educational policy in an entry in December 1914 where a fraternity has asked for $400 to gain national recognition. “I am opposed to Fraternity activity,” he writes because he believes “it does interfere with the diligence in study of the students” but he relents because of the national recognition it will bring the university. In another instance, on April 13, 1915, he skips a meeting at the temple to attend a Regents meeting. On Friday, March 18, 1915 Lund wrote, “I answered questions at the Temple. Jos. F. Merrill spoke to me about Dr. Kingsbury. He thought he does draw his faculty to him. Today there are 15 professors who have resigned. Of the student body only 34 voted to return next fall.” It shows how closely the actors might know one another; although faculty did not have a formal voice with the Regents,
here one professor was able to use his acquaintance with a Regent to discuss the controversy. One more example of the intersection of religion and public life is that when Lund died in 1921 he was replaced in the church hierarchy by John A. Widstoe, Kingsbury’s eventual replacement as president of the University of Utah in 1916. And Merrill also later took a seat as an apostle and served as commissioner of LDS schools.

Lund explains why the Regents’ attitude toward the committee: “We formulated an answer to the Alumni Committee of 25, and let them know that we could not recognize them as a committee as we felt that the appointment was done on a lack of confidence in us.” Anthon H. Lund. Diaries, Entry for Tuesday, April 13, 1915, Vol. 36 (1915-16). The minutes for April 13, 1915 contain a lengthy reply, mostly defending their right to take whatever actions they deemed appropriate and that the Committee of 25 had no official standing and thereby could make no demands.

Trivia: Dern is actor Bruce Dern’s grandfather; actress Laura Dern’s great-grandfather. Does anyone read these footnotes?


“Public Statement by the Board of Regents of the University of Utah,” 1915. Board of Regents, University of Utah Archives.

Quoted in Todd W. Bostwick, Byron Cummings: Dean of Southwest Archaeology (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2006), 71.


Bostwick, Byron Cummings: Dean of Southwest Archaeology.

Anthon H. Lund. Diaries, Entry for Sunday, March 17 [14], 1915, Vol. 36 (1915-16). And a few days after that he recounted that, “In the evening Dr. Kingbury came and had a talk with me about the condition at the University. He had written to the professors who had resigned, that their resignations were accepted. He is determined to stand firm.” And again (March 21, 1915) after a Regents meeting Lund wrote that, “W. Van Cott had been asked to meet with the faculty of the U. of U. and the professors who had resigned and he wanted to know how far he could go in case these professors want to withdraw their resignation. We told him we wanted to stand firm. If the[y] admit they have made a mistake I would give them the hand again to keep their positions but otherwise not.”

Metzger, “The First Investigation,” 207.

Ibid.: 208.

Minutes of the Board of Regents, April 8, 1915. Acc. 139, University of Utah Archives.

Minutes of the Board of Regents, April 8, 1915, p. 392. Acc. 139, University of Utah Archives.

Minutes of the Board of Regents, April 8, 1915. Acc. 139, University of Utah Archives.


Quoted in Ibid.

Ibid.

American Association of University Professors., “Report of the Committee T on Place and Function of Faculties in University Government and Administration.”

Damn. Misplaced reference. AAUP Report???

American Association of University Professors, “Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Conditions at the University of Utah,” 81.

Ibid., 40-41.


Frank E. Holman, The Life and Career of a Western Lawyer, 1886-1961 (Baltimore, Maryland: Port City Press, 1963), 163.

Kingsbury resigned of his own accord and was granted a professorship in chemistry. Lund recalls that even before the controversy began that a minority of regents was dissatisfied with Kingsbury and wanted his removal: “I…met with seven of the Regents. Mr. Armstrong charged Dr. Kingsbury with being no businessman and some one else should be put in his place. All the rest spoke in favor of the Doctor. I said I thought he was just the man for the place. Armstrong said he would vote with the rest of us.” Anthon H. Lund. Diaries, Entry for Saturday, February 20, 1915, Vol. 35 (1914-15). After the controversy had erupted
a minority of regents again tried to excuse Kingsbury from service. Lund writes: “I met with the Regents. We voted down E. Bamberger's resolution to make Dr. Kingsbury Emeritus on a years salary without asking his services. We stood 10 to 3, of whom Whitmore was one though he was not present.” (Wednesday, April 7, 1915.) The Minutes of the Regents reveal that instead they asked Kingsbury to proceed with finding replacements for the departing faculty. Minutes of the Board of Regents, April 7, 1915. Acc. 139, University of Utah Archives. Lund’s loyalty to Kingsbury is apparent: “At one o’clock I went down to Waldemar Van Cott's and met with five regents. It seems that the Regents are thinking to not engage Dr. Kingsbury for next year. If possible they want Dr. Widstoe to take the place. I said I would like to retain him as he is safe; but if he is not engaged then I think that Dr. Widstoe is the very man.” (Tuesday, Jan. 18, 1916.)

Lund remarks on the selection of Widstoe as such: “I spent the forenoon in the Office. At noon I went up to the University and met with Regents. Dr. Widstoe met with us. After we got through with our business the Regents were ready to hear his suggestion. In a quiet way he said that he hoped to have the full confidence of all the regents, for otherwise he did not feel he would succeed. He then laid his plans before us, and presented each with a draft of a constitution for the University which he considered would make plain the duties of all connected with the institution it was following the one on which the University of Illinois has worked for 3 years. I felt proud of Bro. Widstoe when I saw him take hold of this task. He showed that he was master of the situation. There was no hesitancy. He knew what ought to be done, and he knew how to do it! When going home Regent Armstrong said: ‘He will suit me for there is push in him and ability to carry through his ideas.’” Anthon H. Lund. Diaries, Entry for Monday, March 13, 1916., Vol. 36 (1915-16).

Minutes of the Board of Regents, March 27, 1915. Acc. 139, University of Utah Archives.

Administrative Council Minutes, October 11, 1915. Acc. 8, Box 1, Book 1, University of Utah Archives.

A copy is also available in the Regents “Faculty Relations” attached to a special meeting notice for a joint meeting between the Regents and faculty on November 1, 1915, which states that “The Faculty is not for official approval or disapproval, as it is merely in accordance with the Regents’ resolution.” Faculty Relations Committee, Acc. 9, Box 2, Folder 30, University of Utah Archives.

“Faculty By-Laws, University of Utah, Salt Lake City,” March 11, 1895. Acc. 24, File 2, Faculty Regulations, p. 2. University of Utah Archives. These bylaws reveal the relative simplicity of organization of a university during this period. The bylaws stipulate the roles that the faculty would share in a given year, as secretary, registrar, librarian, and to oversee the discipline of students and the process of approving graduation. In subsequent decades these types of functions would be relegated to permanent staff members as professional registrars and deans of men and women would be hired.

“Laws and Regulations of the University of Utah,” March, 1916. Acc. 6, Box 1, Binder 1. University of Utah Archives.

“Laws and Regulations of the University of Utah,” March, 1916. Acc. 6, Box 1, Binder 1, p. 15.

University of Utah Archives.

“Radical Changes Made In University Constitution,” March 16, 1916, Utah Chronicle.


Utah Chronicle, December 6, 1915. “Mrs. Stephens to Lose Position In Utah’s Faculty: Board of Regents Refuse At Present To Explain Their Action,” 1, 3. Lund makes no mention of Hill but refers to Snow’s “conduct with men”: “At one o’clock I attended Regent’s meeting. We had a long meeting. Bro. Riter and I would not vote for Virginia S. Stephens to teach at the University on account of her conduct with men; but the board held that as the Executive committee had engaged her we could not refuse our sanction as she would have a case in law.” Anthon H. Lund. Diaries, Entry for Monday, August 2, 1915, Vol. 36 (1915-16).

The physics department at Reed has an endowed chair in Knowlton’s honor and the physics building is named after him.


There was no representation but was a town meeting type organization. Furthermore, it was a subverted "senate" was really stated meetings at regular intervals, and be presided over by the President…"

...
have had consequences forty years later with the student unrest on campus.

267 Ibid., 30-32.


This chapter is concerned with those faculty senates created during and following World War II, between 1940 and 1959. The period after the Second World War was a period of change in American higher education as the United States moved toward higher education for the masses. This shift meant more students would attend part-time, live off-campus, and would have fewer cultural ties to their campus. The proportion of young people attending higher education soared from fifteen to forty-five percent from the end of WWII through the 1960s and educational leaders confronted the issue of “offering qualitatively different kinds of instruction for different levels of student.”¹

This period was marked by large increases in funding for academic research, especially from the federal government. Faculty members in the sciences who could secure grants had special advantage over their peers as they were able to develop programs, build laboratory space, and hire graduate students. However, even by 1940 the powers of faculty, on the whole, were still limited. However, larger universities with graduate schools, where bureaucratization was most complete, tended to be more democratic.² The origins of the senates created during and after World War II varied, but they can be grouped into two main categories: senates created due to campus growth and modernization and senates initiated by faculty.
Table 6.1 – Senates Created 1940 – 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Connecticut</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia Institute of Technology</td>
<td>1953</td>
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<td>Mississippi State University</td>
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<td>Oklahoma State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rutgers University-New Brunswick</td>
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<td>SUNY at Stony Brook</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td>1954</td>
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<td>University of Maryland-College Park</td>
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<td>Michigan State University</td>
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<td>Brandeis University</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanderbilt University</td>
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Senates Created due to Growth and Modernization

Universities changed in numerous ways during the 1940s and 50s, including in how they organized their faculty, both at the department and university level. One result was the creation of faculty senates, discussed in this section. Faculty at most universities...
met as a whole group, in some cases only once or twice per year for meetings with the president. Faculty participated in governance through standing committees but no efficient body existed as a clearinghouse for faculty action.

Several such senates warrant a brief mention. First, the University of Pittsburgh will be presented as a detailed case study, and others will be discussed at greater length. For example, the Academic Council at the University of Texas A&M was created in 1946 as a successor to the General Faculty, which had grown too large. The Dean of the College served as chairman but the president sat on the Council. The majority of the work was done through its seventeen committees, which covered matters from athletics to graduate education to libraries to veterans. At the Georgia Institute of Technology, the faculty met as a whole from its inception in 1888. In 1953, as the faculty had grown to more than 400, the Academic Senate was created as a representative body.

At the University of Maryland the early faculty senate was primarily an “instrument of the president,” even though it had purview over traditional faculty concerns. President Wilson Homer “Bull” Elkins instituted the senate in 1954 as part of his plan to improve the campus. Prior to the creation of the Faculty Senate at Oregon State, the faculty met as a whole. A Faculty Council (changed to Senate in 1956, after Oregon State had assumed university status) was introduced in 1945 by the Administrative Council to include members of the Council plus elected members of the schools and divisions to legislate on educational policy and matters affecting the entire College.

When F.M. Kinard was appointed as the new dean of Clemson College in 1955 he created a Special Committee on Faculty Organization to examine the feasibility of
creating a representative body for the faculty.\textsuperscript{7} The body was approved by the faculty on January 27, 1956 and ratified by the Board of Trustees in April but began meeting a month before its official ratification. Its first item of business was to create a plan for tenure. In its early years the Senate focused on how to better define the faculty’s role in governance, on formalizing the professional responsibilities of faculty, and clarifying the relationship between faculty and administrators. Through the years its role in governance continued to grow, achieving greater visibility on issues pertinent to faculty members. In addition to its work on a tenure policy, during its first years it developed changes in scholarship policies, proposed new policies for appointments and promotions (approved by the Board), and created a council to specifically deal with research issues. The focus on faculty-specific issues is likely a result of its membership, which is purely faculty-based.\textsuperscript{8} Other senates were created at SUNY as part of its creation as a university system,\textsuperscript{9} at American University,\textsuperscript{10} and a new independent senate was created at the University of Illinois at Chicago.\textsuperscript{11}
Table 1.2 – Senates Created due to Growth and Modernization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>University of Connecticut</td>
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<td>University of California-Riverside</td>
<td>1958</td>
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The University of Pittsburgh

The University of Pittsburgh Faculty Senate was created in 1940 and started its work in 1941. It was created after a period of turmoil on the Pittsburgh campus under an autocratic chancellor, John G. Bowman, a period which saw the expulsion of student protesters, a conflict involving a student group known as the “Liberal Club,” and the famous academic freedom case and dismissal of Ralph Turner, described below. It may have been created in part because of this turmoil, but long enough after the fact that it would be difficult to argue that the Senate was born directly out of crisis as was clearly the case at certain institutions discussed in the previous chapter, such as Utah, California, and Kentucky. In fact, the faculty attempted to create a senate in 1935, while still in the eye of this storm, but it was an abortive effort. The conflicts of the late 1920s through the 1930s certainly established the need for a faculty senate on campus, but the process by which it was created was a rational, deliberative one clearly set up to be, or at least
appear to be, one necessary to modernize the university and equip it for its growing faculty, student body, and campus

*Failed Attempt at a Senate, 1935*

A committee of twelve members of the general faculty, chaired by Professor Oswald Blackwood, drafted a document in January 1935, “The Faculty Committee’s Revised Suggestions for a Council.” We can only surmise that the motivation and the eventual failure of this committee’s plan was due to the same causes: the environment on campus was not conducive to receiving and valuing faculty input. Chancellor Bowman freely admitted to dismissing professors at will. However, the committee’s intentions to give faculty a voice are clear.

The proposal was divided in three parts: Powers and Duties, Membership, and Meetings. The section on Powers and Duties began diplomatically, proposing that the committee would “cooperate with the Chancellor” in proposing policy, furthering educational objectives, establishing new “major” projects, and caring for the internal welfare of the University. One tenant was for the council to play a role in “enlarging” or “curtailing” established projects, espousing an ideal of checks and balances on the administration.

The committee’s report further called for the body to “counsel with the University administration” on questions related to retrenchment, expansion and other budgetary matters and to cooperate with the Chancellor in “formulating policies regarding tenure” and on individual dismissals. The rationale for such provision is readily evident by the attitude taken on faculty rights to employment by Bowman. He had voided tenure from the University’s statutes upon assuming the chancellorship in 1921—if he was going to
continue to fire instructors, rationalizing it as a necessary retrenchment, they should want a say in the matter. Faculty also called for hearings and procedures to be put in place to hear grievances from instructors in “rules as the Chancellor and the Council shall prescribe.”

The membership would be a mixture of administrators, including the chancellor, a member of the Board of Trustees, deans, elected members from the College, and the eight schools. An interesting provision in the proposed membership rules was the right of the faculty to recall their representative by a two-thirds vote. No mention was made of the administrative members being “ex-officio,” which meant that all members would have an equal vote. The council would meet twice per semester, or at the special request of the chancellor or of six members of the council.

The Faculty Committee’s suggestion for a council was an attempt to give voice to the faculty and to protect their rights but was also conciliatory in nature. The faculty attempted to take a stand without trying to take too much. It was no coup d'état. The next section will make clear why the would-be senators had to strike such a measured and propitiatory tone, and why the body they proposed likely failed to take hold.

*Chancellor Bowman and the Dissension of the 1930s*

John G. Bowman was the central figure at the University of Pittsburgh for two dozen years. Bowman came to Pitt in 1921, with promises for great control over the University from the Trustees including the abolition of tenure guidelines, and resigned in 1945. He engineered the campaign to raise funds from thousands of alumni and community members to erect the quixotic, forty-two story, “Cathedral of Learning” skyscraper. Not even the Great Depression slowed progress on the monument, begun in
1926 and finished in 1937. But to faculty, he was a tyrant, intolerant of dissent of any kind on campus. He held sway with local businessmen, including magnate Andrew Mellon, and the local newspapers. Four major controversies mark his tenure: the Liberal Club affair, the Ralph Turner academic freedom case, the resignation of the popular (and highly successful) football coach, and investigation of Bowman by the Trustees.

The Liberal Club at the University of Pittsburgh was one of 134 official students groups in 1929 whose purpose was to “conduct open-minded investigations of pressing social problems.” On April 18, 1929 William Albertson, chairman of the Liberal Club, obtained permission from the Registrar’s Office to hold a meeting the following Monday, April 22nd. On Friday, April 19th, the Club placed flyers around campus announcing the meeting and its purpose: to demand the “unconditional release” of Tom Mooney and Warren K. Billings, who had been sentenced to life in prison for throwing a bomb into a San Francisco parade in 1916 on what many regarded as “trumped up charges” and the Pittsburgh Press called it one of the “worst miscarriages of justice in the history of the United States.” When the administration learned of the purpose of the meeting, the permit was withdrawn.

On the day of the meeting Albertson happened to meet up with Harry Elmer Barnes, a famous scholar visiting Pittsburgh to talk to a downtown discussion group known as the Hungry Club, and invited him to speak at that afternoon’s meeting but without informing him that the permit had been withdrawn. The Liberal Club attempted to hold its planned meeting in the room for which its original permit had been issued but was blocked by the assistant dean of men. The local press, who had been notified by Albertson that Barnes would be speaking, was on hand to record the incident. The club
members, others who had come to attend the meeting, and the press moved outside to a parking lot where Barnes addressed the crowd from the running board of a parked car, pleading for the release of Mooney and Billings. Three other speakers, a representative of the International Labor Defense and two students, spoke out as well. One of the students was Frederick Enos Woltman, a Pitt alum and graduate student in psychology and secretary of the Pittsburgh chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union.

The result of the affair was the Liberal Club was dissolved by the administration, Albertson and another club leader were dismissed from the University, and Woltman was dismissed from his teaching position and from the University. Woltman claimed that an article he had written for H.L. Mencken’s *American Mercury*, in which he criticized the state police for their actions against coal strikers had incited Pennsylvania Governor John S. Fisher to threaten Pitt’s appropriation, which was the real reason for his dismissal and the Liberal Club affair was only an excuse to finally release him. Ralph E. Turner, a faculty member at Pitt, delivered a petition signed by twenty-six faculty members to the chancellor asking that he call a faculty meeting to explain his action, but to no avail.

The AAUP dispatched a team to investigate the incident. The team’s report did not concern itself with matters of student discipline, stipulating in its report that the officers of the Liberal Club were “insubordinate.” However, they chastised the administration for not consulting with the faculty before laying down punishment upon the students and for taking such a heavy-handed approach. “In our opinion,” they remarked, “the position of the University authorities displays an unreasonable fear lest the University should be involved by the action of a student organization…We do not believe that any right-thinking person would regard the University as involving itself in
They found that Woltman, although without claim to tenure, did have his rights to academic freedom abridged because he was dismissed, “without a statement of charges and without a hearing, without any allegation of incompetence for his academic duties.”

The main thrust of the AAUP report was to indict Bowman and his administration for its repressive attitude toward faculty, causing faculty to feel intimidated, insecure, and timid. Faculty could not speak freely, lest they risk dismissal or denial of promotion. The AAUP committee accused Bowman of being to concerned with those who provided the University’s endowments, both the Commonwealth and private donors, and with maintaining “harmony” on campus above all else. They admonished Bowman to have “more courage, more willingness to stand public criticism.” Finally, the AAUP investigators called upon the administration to “legalize its relation with the faculty as a body” and to allow for discussion and criticism of University policy by the faculty: “The government of the University should rest upon the recognized right of the faculty to participate and not upon the friendly intentions of the administration.”

Two other incidents are worthy of note. The first took place in June of 1932 when General Douglas MacArthur was the invited commencement speaker. Four men were seen carrying signs protesting the general and the Pittsburgh establishment: “Generals Die in Bed” and “Down with Heinz, Mellon and Dupont.” Two of the men were students (one evaded detainment and the other was an alumnus) and were detained for five hours without any charges until the commencement exercises were over. A judge ruled the arrests unwarranted and “utterly amazing.” The second was that the University began requesting in September of that same year that all students sign “loyalty oaths,” but only
four students felt it necessary to protest the requirement causing the administration to cite this as proof that student body was loyal to the country and the University.\textsuperscript{20}

Ralph E. Turner, associate professor of history, was dismissed from his position in 1934 by Chancellor Bowman.\textsuperscript{21} Bowman was initially vague about the reasons, stating merely that there was “discontent in the community.” Turner was a popular professor who taught courses on American history (using his own textbook) and Western civilization. Outside of class Turner was interested in political reform and served as chairman of the Pennsylvania Security League, an organization dedicated to causes such as unemployment insurance, pensions, government support for the poor, abolition of child labor and sweatshops, and the institution of minimum wages. The last straw, according to Turner, was a speech he delivered (but never published) in April 1934 on “History in the Making in Western Pennsylvania” for the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania in which he attacked the Mellon family, though not by name. He argued that such families dominate society through their acquisition of wealth and that they control government.

John S. Fisher, now ex-governor and president of the Historical Society, was in attendance and, along with many others, expressed his displeasure to Bowman. Dean Sieg and Bowman claimed that they had often received complaints about Turner, especially about his “provocative” teaching style. Turner’s contract was renewed May 9\textsuperscript{th} but he was then dismissed on June 30, 1934. The only answer about why he had his contract renewed and then revoked Turner could get was the vague reference to “discontent” in the community. Much later, Bowman claimed that Turner had attacked churches and students who were religious, which Turner denied. Bowman explained in a
July 9th letter to Congressman Henry Ellenbogen of the Pittsburgh area that a teacher at the University should strive in “illuminating a path toward a happy, useful and good life” for “impressionable boys and girls.”

Ralph Himstead, head of the AAUP, and two other professors visited Pittsburgh to investigate in August and November of that same year. The report was a damnation of Bowman and his autocratic tactics and resulted in the University of Pittsburgh administration being placed on the AAUP’s list of “censured administrations.” However, the AAUP investigators made one crucial error. They included in their report a passage critical of the city of Pittsburgh (regarding its extremes of “riches and poverty, its unrelieved dirtiness and ugliness…”). They offered Bowman an advanced, confidential draft, of the report so that he could respond to any errors in fact. Bowman responded only by deriding the “unrestrained hostility” of the report but without challenging any of the facts. However, Bowman released the report in full to the press, knowing that although it showed him in unfavorable light, the passage regarding Pittsburgh would incite the press and public. His strategy worked and when the report was released, sans the hostile passage, its effects were somewhat muted.

The AAUP’s report spells out the conditions at the University in excruciating detail. It described an institution that had no provisions for tenure and a president who summarily dismissed professors at will, a right he had demanded upon taking the position of chancellor. With no guidelines or rules in place, faculty members could not know for sure what might cause their own dismissal. The report quotes Bowman declaring that, he “had to act autocratically” to run the institution. The trustees had delegated all powers related to the faculty to Bowman and were, from their perspective, “satisfied” with how
the University was run. The AAUP investigators put some of the blame on Bowman’s “devotion” to completing the Cathedral of Learning and his unwillingness to upset any potential donor to the cause.  

Given these conditions it is understandable that faculty members might want to instigate a faculty forum but it is equally understandable why their first effort would be fruitless. The AAUP report concluded by providing evidence that Bowman had ignored opportunities to utilize the faculty in any meaningful way in the governance of the University, treating professors as would a “private employer of labor,” and they offered a prescription for changing the environment. “The Chancellor’s most serious mistake has been that he has played a lone hand in and has not taken the faculty into his confidence,” is a typical statement about their view on Bowman. They laid some blame on the faculty for a “lack of courage” but with some understanding that standing up to Bowman was no easy task. Their charge to the University of Pittsburgh, and probably to any other who should read their report, was that there needed to be some involvement of faculty in its government: “There must be somewhere a happy medium ground between government by faculty and committees and government by an autocrat who never consults the faculty.”

The incident also resulted in a special legislative investigation conducted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly (in Pittsburgh instead of the capital, Harrisburg). The committee’s report came to 1,500 pages after taking testimony for ten days with eighty-one witnesses. The committee’s work revealed others who had been dismissed like Turner but resulting in less fanfare such as Professor Colston E.T. Warne who was let go for stating, “The Pennsylvania Railroad is not well managed.” The committee
recommended that the tenure protections in place before Bowman be returned to the
campus; it decried the University’s dissolution of the Liberal Club; and saw no
justification for the dismissal of Ralph E. Turner.27

These incidents were investigated at length by the Board of Trustees in 1939. The
trustees were upset about the decade’s worth of controversy, most recent of which had
been the resignation of John “Jock” Bain Sutherland, the winningest football coach in the
school’s history.28 The source of conflict was in Bowman instituting a new set of
regulations on athletics (a “thorn in his side”) known as “Code Bowman” that eliminated
all athletic scholarships and financial assistance of any kind to athletes without any prior
consultation of the athletic coaches, alumni, or faculty. Sutherland tried to work out a
compromise but when he saw that negotiating with Bowman would be fruitless, he quit
just two months after Code Bowman had been instituted. Pitt was deluged with negative
press upon Sutherland’s resignation.

The Sutherland incident was apparently the tipping point for Bowman’s
administration.29 Two weeks after Sutherland’s resignation, Bowman instructed his
provost, Rufus Fitzgerald, to conduct that evening’s (March 20th) Trustees meeting and
that he was going to resign; he felt ill (in part from recent travels to China) and tired and
could not go on. Fitzgerald was Bowman’s confidant and friend and although they
differed greatly on certain matters, especially on extending tenure to faculty, but
apparently not to the detriment of their friendship. Fitzgerald talked him out of resigning
and instead Bowman asked that the Trustees create a committee to investigate the
administrative operations of the University.
The resulting report, presented at a Trustees meeting two months later in May, was “painstaking, probing, productive study of the operations of an institution in trouble.” The special committee of the trustees interviewed faculty and staff and found “more than a usual amount of dissatisfaction, discontent, and confusion.” The witnesses explained that Bowman did not consult the faculty in any decisions, that faculty morale was low, and that one of the few times he addressed the faculty as a group he “scolded them.”

The resulting report, known as the Gow Report, gave praise to Bowman for his accomplishments, especially with regard to the improvement in physical facilities, but otherwise it was a searing critique of his leadership. It chastised his autocratic style and inept management. It lamented that the inadequate library had been cause for Phi Beta Kappa to deny a campus chapter, the way the transition to Code Bowman was managed, and the “distinct loss” of Sutherland, and the other recent controversies. But its main critique was saved for the absence of a code regarding faculty rights and responsibilities, especially with regard to tenure. The Gow Committee made several recommendations: that Chancellor Bowman reorganize certain offices to “achieve a better distribution of work and responsibility and promote understanding” among the deans and faculty; that he take better confidence in the head of the news service to improve public relations with the community; that the athletic code be revised to follow that of the Big Ten or other similar conference; that he utilize deans as a cabinet; that a council of faculty members “be established for the expression of faculty advice on educational policies and procedures;” and that a code of tenure be established. Instead of choosing to be compliant with the recommendations or to use them as a means to further his goals for the University,
Bowman was defiant. Fitzgerald took on many of the duties of the chancellor and was selected as Bowman’s successor in 1945 (to which the campus reportedly gave a “collective sigh of relief”). It is in the context of this environment that a faculty senate was created at the University of Pittsburgh in 1940-41.

Establishment of the University of Pittsburgh Faculty Senate, 1940-41

The first step taken by the faculty in the creation of a faculty senate came in the form of a report outlining the features of similar bodies at other institutions, “Summary of Information on University Administrative Councils and Senates,” issued in February 1940. The report does not cite any “enabling” mandate from the Trustees and it is unlikely that it would have been encouraged by Bowman. Although Bowman had been estranged on his own campus, it seems unlikely that the faculty would have banded together so quickly after nearly twenty years of intimidation. The best explanation is that process of creating a senate was Fitzgerald’s doing, instigating the process upon the Gow Report’s recommendation once it was obvious that Bowman was a marginalized chancellor. Indeed, from the time of the Gow Report, Fitzgerald was effectively running the University up through his official appointment as chancellor in 1945. A few incidents support the theory that creating a senate would have been consistent with Fitzgerald’s view of academic administration. In 1941 a situation that could potentially have been a repeat of the Turner affair came up. Fitzgerald, provost at the time, met with the chairman of the English department who wanted to fire a left-leaning professor. Fitzgerald offered an alternative course of action: to take the charge to a department committee for a full hearing and then to a college committee if they felt some action was warranted. Furthermore, Fitzgerald tried unsuccessfully for years to persuade Bowman
to end the practice of offering only one-year contracts and reinstating tenure.\textsuperscript{36} On another occasion, during the Trustees investigation, many came to Fitzgerald asking what they should or should not say about Bowman and the University to which he replied that they should speak exactly what he had in his mind and soul to say.\textsuperscript{37}

The “Summary” report was a systematic analysis of how other institutions utilized senatorial bodies on their campuses. They gathered basic data about thirty-eight institutions and crafted a more detailed analysis of seventeen of those thirty-eight, including a detailed examination of the types of committees they had. Their survey yielded information on the size (usually around thirty members, while their proposed senate would have double that number) and scope (ranging from advisory to legislative, but mostly focused on purely academic matters) of the other senates; that members are usually elected by each division or school; and that standing committees are key to the success of a senate. One observation that holds true today was that it was not feasible to conduct a detailed analysis of all of the meeting minutes to see the complete list of the concrete problems discussed by these bodies, although the report does contain a cursory list. (To date, no such study exists that I am aware of.) The duties of the councils or senates were outlined emphasizing in various points that a senate’s main role is to legislate or advise on educational policy, especially on academic and curricular matters but also on issues related to appointment, promotion, dismissal of instructional staff. On this last point the report cited the 1938 Report of Committee T (on governance) of the AAUP.

The next step for the organizers of the senate at Pittsburgh was to change the “Committee on Organization at Other Institutions,” which had drafted the summary
report, into a “Committee on Committees” to recommend the structure for a future senate and the list of issues to be discussed. This organizational committee was to make its report to the Trustees on the plans for the permanent body’s structure and scope. In the preliminary document it listed a host of “topics for consideration” by the soon-to-be faculty organization, which ranged from improving the library to student problems to improving public relations for the University to improving scholarship and research among the faculty. The list of eighteen ideas demonstrated the faculty’s interest in taking a part in the University’s future direction.

The new senate took shape in the fall of 1940. The main work of the committee that fall was to craft a constitution. The memorandum provides a legislative history of the senate as alternatives were debated over specific articles within the constitution. The main debate was over whether all full-time associate and full professors be members or whether the senate should be representational. The former would yield a large senate of 157 members but could be immediately operational (requiring no elections) but assistant professors would feel “left out,” which would not add to the harmony sought by creating a senate. The latter would yield a smaller senate of eighty-nine total members and assistant professors would have a stake in the new organization and in the University’s affairs.

On the matter of representation, the organizing committee opted for the first option of including all associate and full professors. The senate would include others as well, being a mixed body to include the chancellor, provost, the deans, registrar, librarian, director of athletics and a few other administrators. The president of the senate would be the chancellor or, in his absence, the provost. The minutes of the first meetings of the full
Senate reveal that Fitzgerald presided and that all of the meetings of the executive committee of the Senate were held in the provost’s office until the fall of 1945, after Fitzgerald had assumed the chancellorship, when they moved to the chancellor’s office. It would seem that Bowman had no interaction with the Senate, or if he did, it was minimal.

The Constitution outlined the jurisdiction of the senate over educational matters and, that while subject to the authority of the Trustees, it was self-governing for purposes of its internal operations. It provided for an executive committee, to consist of the Senate president and secretary and six elected faculty members, and eight standing committees: educational policies, athletic policy, tenure and academic freedom, budget policies, library and publications, public relations, student relations, and elections. The Senate in many ways was an extension of the bureaucratic forms of the administration. The new Senate was officially authorized by the Trustees at their meeting of June 17, 1941.41

Early Work of the Faculty Senate

The University of Pittsburgh Senate met for the first time on October 31, 1941.43 This first meeting, presided over by Fitzgerald, was purely organizational, dedicated to the appointment of committees, election of a secretary, and an explanation of how the election of the executive committee would take place.44

The constitution called for the Senate to meet in October, January, and May but the executive committee met more frequently, usually twice per month. It took the nascent organization several of its first executive committee meetings to finalize all of the matters related to its internal administration.45 Once it got its footing, the executive committee tackled summer salaries as overload pay and began to discuss the matter of faculty tenure.46 The committee expressed concern over the image of the University and
discussed how they could help its relations with the public inasmuch as each faculty member was a “trustee of its good name.” The preoccupation with public relations would result in an increased effort to not only improve the University’s image locally but to secure for it a Phi Beta Kappa chapter and removal from the AAUP censured list. As World War II was well underway, the committee took on issues related to students who might enlist in the service and how the University might best comply with the call for help with the war effort. Tenure was a regular concern discussed at the executive committee meetings.

One of the major concerns raised by the Gow Report was the matter of libraries and had been cited as a reason for not receiving a Phi Beta Kappa chapter (which was later granted in 1949). Senate members took this on as a major initiative resulting several discussions and in a detailed nine-page report on the status of the library and how to improve it. “The library is the heart of a university” the report declared, which made the matter more urgent given that the authors of the report concluded the Pitt library was inadequate. They gave statistics showing the growth of the library, from 17,500 holdings in 1912 to 360,000 in 1936, and their position among universities with detailed comparative data about enrollment and library holdings. Pitt’s library, by their calculation, ranked them fortieth among American university and college libraries. Even more important was the quality of the holdings, especially because it could affect faculty members’ ability to do research. “How, then, have we managed to do and direct so much research?” they asked. “Perhaps our achievements, in spite of library and other handicaps, are a tribute to the energy and resourcefulness of our graduate faculty and students. They have certainly done very well with what they have. But there are
indications that many projected studies have never been started or have been abandoned because of inadequate library facilities.” An excellent library was a prerequisite to quality research and an excellent university, they argued.

Academic freedom and tenure secured as much interest as the state of the libraries. And the Senate would continue to concern itself with improving the University’s capacity for research and improving the Graduate School.

Conclusion

The Faculty Senate at the University of Pittsburgh was created just a few years before Bowman’s resignation from the University of Pittsburgh in 1945. It came at a time when Bowman had been largely incapacitated in his role as chancellor due to the controversies and the Trustees’ investigation of his administration. The AAUP removed the University from its list of “censured administrations” in 1947, in part due to the creation of a senate on campus but no doubt also inspired by the resignation of Bowman and inauguration of a new era under Fitzgerald, who reinstituted tenure for faculty. Fitzgerald showed a desire for a more deliberative and democratic process. He commented in 1948 that introduction of democracy on campus had paid off in better spirit and morale.

The Senate at Pittsburgh may have had some roots in the dissension and dissatisfaction of the 1930s but without Rufus Fitzgerald’s calm hand, it certainly would not have been created. His aim was to modernize the University both in substance and style and creation of the Senate was only one of his many accomplishments as provost and chancellor.
The senate at the University of Connecticut was created as part of the University’s overall reorganization. The president, Albert N. Jorgensen, who arrived at Storrs in 1935, transformed the college into a university. He was young (thirty-six) and eager to immediately elevate the college’s status into the state’s land-grant university and to reverse the faculty turmoil that had ensued under the previous president. He appointed an advisory committee to meet with him to discuss the reorganization of the University throughout 1939. The Board of Trustees approved the committee’s plan on February 21, 1940. The reorganization delegated routine administrative tasks out of the president’s office to subordinates, especially to those especially trained for certain tasks allowing for top administrators to focus on larger policy issues. Also, the reorganization created schools and colleges within the University, granting them wide autonomy and power to carry out their individual missions. Under Jorgensen, the Connecticut State College became the University of Connecticut.56

A centerpiece of the reorganization was the creation of the University Senate to replace meetings of the faculty met as a whole. The new body would have the power to legislate for the University and advise the president. Four standing committees—scholastic standards, freshman and sophomore curricula and courses, student scholarships and loans, and regarding freshman week—were created to deal with University-wide issues. Other standing committees were created to deal with issues as they related to the specifically to the new colleges and schools, such as curricular committees. Other student personnel committees were created to be coordinated by student affairs, such as one on dismissals.57 This reorganization shared authority broadly throughout the University.
University of California Campuses (Davis, Santa Barbara, Riverside)

Three senates were created as independent bodies at University of California campuses, which were previously divisions within regional senates. A senate division at the Davis campus was established on October 23, 1950. The Davis members had previously met as part of the Berkeley senate and the change to an autonomous faculty structure was “barely perceptible.” Santa Barbara State College (originally created in 1909 from an existing normal school) became part of the University of California system in 1944. A nine-member Coordinating Academic Council was created especially for the purpose of assisting with and overseeing the transition. This council helped decide whether to raise admissions standards to match the rest of the University, and created rules and procedures on such matters as appointments, promotion, tenure, and graduate study. On July 20, 1956 the Regents amended the Standing Orders and created a Senate division at Santa Barbara.\(^{59}\)

Two years later the senate at California-Riverside opened as an independent entity on April 24, 1958, as that campus expanded and needed a more independent voice for the campus instead of being grouped with the “Southern Division,” which included UCLA. Many of the senate members thus had experience in senate affairs that they brought with them to the new, independent division. The oath controversy had created some restructuring within the Northern and Southern Divisions as it was realized that these had become too unwieldy to be effective, especially in a crisis.\(^{60}\)

Michigan State University

The creation of the Senate at Michigan State came about as part of the organizational and physical growth of the University. Michigan State College, under the
leadership of John A. Hannah (president 1941-69), became Michigan State University in 1955 and as part of that change in name, reflecting its change in purposes and mission already set in motion, a “Michigan State Faculty Organization” was created, setting forth the roles of faculty in governing the university.

Hannah stood at the front of the modernization of Michigan State, overseeing its growth, shepherding it into university status, modernizing its work and developing its colleges and departments into research-focused academic units. He was ambitious and, although he valued faculty input, he did not have the patience to wait for deliberative bodies. For his first decade and a half as president he used, welcomed, and even sought faculty input into decision-making but without creating a formal mechanism or body. Indeed, he was wary of such a body for he feared that he would not be able to carry out the institution’s important work if he needed to work with a deliberative body. Hannah feared that many of the changes required at Michigan State—for a greater emphasis on research, for higher standards for faculty hiring and tenure, to transform the College into a university—would be resisted by many of the faculty, especially those entrenched in the College’s traditional roles. Hannah was too impatient to wait for a deliberative body; he was action-oriented and wanted to move Michigan State forward. An example of his pragmatic approach was that he would use faculty representatives in his “study groups” or “task forces,” which were charged with a specific problem and a specific deadline to offer their solution. And while he did not originally endorse a college-wide faculty body he did want faculty to have a greater voice in their individual departments and colleges. Hannah encouraged organized faculty decision-making within the schools and divisions, much to the chagrin of some of the deans.
Nonetheless, a deliberative body at Michigan State was perhaps inevitable and fourteen years after he assumed the presidency, such bodies were created. In 1955 the State Board of Agriculture, the body enabled by the constitution to govern Michigan State, created a number of faculty governance bodies through its document, “Michigan State University Faculty Organization.” Jeffrey Roth Frumkin has provided a detailed description of the structure of faculty participation in governance at Michigan State University, from the founding of the Senate and Assembly in 1955, through its various reorganizations (five in all from 1961 through 1978). The bodies authorized by this enabling document included the Assembly, made up of the president, other administrative officers, and faculty representatives whose sole responsibility was to serve as a means of communication between the faculty and the administration; the Academic Senate, also a mixed body, charged with legislative duties for the University; and the Academic Council, which was a sort of executive committee of the Senate.

The impetus for this reorganization, according to Frumkin, was quite simply the growth of Michigan State. Between 1941, when Hannah took on the presidency, and 1955, the year of the University’s centennial, the institution had changed from a college to a university, had grown from 503 members of the instructional staff to more nearly 1,400; from 6,195 undergraduate and 367 graduate students to 15,042 undergraduates and 1,363 graduates. With these major changes, came a need for a “change in the method of faculty and administration interaction.”

Prior to the creation of the Assembly and Senate, two of the key decision-making bodies on campus did not involve faculty members. The Administrative Group, made up of deans and principal administrative officials, met weekly as did the so-called “Breakfast
Group” made up of the president, vice-presidents, the University’s attorney and a few other administrators, met every Monday at 7:00 a.m. The third body was the all-college faculty, which met about once per month. These meeting were primarily for the president to give a report, usually of decisions already set in motion by the Administrative Group, a time to “speak to the troops.” The all-college faculty meeting was not a decision-making body.  

The matter of creating formal bodies for faculty participation in decision-making on campus came up at the March faculty meeting in 1952. Hannah announced a plan for the creation of a formal faculty organization, but ironically it came in the same meeting that he announced significant changes to the Basic College (the home of general education courses), to which the faculty were quite resistant. These changes were resisted primarily by newer faculty members who were less prepared to offer “general education” courses as they were more focused on their disciplinary traditions. During this same time, Hannah had begun to indicate that it was time that all faculty members have a doctorate to be eligible for tenure or employment, a matter that would cause greater strain on instructors with heavy course loads who would then have to engage in additional studies themselves.

The issue of changes to the Basic College was almost beside the point. The problem was that the time had come for faculty to take a larger role in decision-making at the College, especially in relation to curricular matters. After the confrontation over the Basic College came to a head, Hannah invited the AAUP chapter officers to discuss what kind of organization was warranted. The discussion that ensued centered around the idea that the college had grown too large and complex for faculty and administration
interaction to be “effective or efficient” through a plenary forum. A more formalized structure was needed. A faculty group created the “Kimber Committee” report in May 1953 but it was not discussed or acted upon until December 1954 because Hannah had accepted a temporary post as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Needs in the Pentagon. Once Hannah returned to campus, the faculty was able to present its plan, which was then considered by and adopted by the State Board of Agriculture through its document “Michigan State University Faculty Organization” in 1955.69

What made Hannah change his mind about creating a formal faculty body is unclear. Although the discussion over its creation grew out of the controversy over changes to the Basic College, Hannah had already proposed some sort of body at that meeting. He had shown a clear preference for informal contact with professors as a means for receiving input into important institutional matters. He welcomed input, and in fact, he had specifically asked for constructive criticism for improving the College at a 1944 faculty meeting: “Compliments are nice to receive but they don’t really help us improve. Constructive suggestions are never resented and even constructive criticism is more valuable than commendation.”70 Perhaps it was this attitude that allowed for the creation of a faculty body to come about. Another explanation is that early in his presidency Hannah had worried that faculty would stand as an impediment to his ambitious agenda for Michigan State. By 1955, most of his plans were in place or underway and many of the new faculty hired would have come in understanding Hannah’s vision for the institution. Finally, at this stage Hannah had likely realized that informal ad-hoc interactions would no longer be sufficient if faculty were to buy into his vision and plans for Michigan State’s future.
Summary

Universities began to grow at a rapid pace in the 1940s and 50s, many of them attempting to move to true “university” status from their collegiate forms. In many cases ambitious presidents took advantage of conditions to transform their campus from teaching-focused colleges into research-focused universities. Along with these changes in size of the campuses came a need to change the nature of their organization, a crucial part of which was the organization of the faculty. Creation of a senate was a signal that the faculty voice was more highly regarded and was useful for recruiting high quality faculty. In these senates, faculty may have played a role in their creation but the impetus was with the president’s reorganization of the institution. However, in the next section we see that it is the faculty who take advantage of changes on campus to modify their role in institutional governance.

The Faculty Initiated Senate in the Post-War Era

A number of senates were created as a result of faculty enthusiasm to have an official role in university-wide governance (see Table 6.3). The creation of these senates was not sparked by a particular crisis. These senates also came about due to the growth and modernization—especially as the general faculty became too cumbersome to function as an advisory or legislative body—but are set apart for the added impetus of faculty activism for a more formalized voice in their university’s affairs. After briefly discussing a few senates, a detailed case study of the University of Pennsylvania is presented, followed by a discussion of the other senates created during this period. The Faculty Senate at the University of Arizona grew out of the efforts of a group of
interested faculty who wanted a greater voice for faculty in the governance of the University. They drafted a constitution and urged the Arizona Board of Regents to ratify it, which they did, allowing the first senate meeting to take place on November 4, 1947. Originally the senate was mixed with members elected from each college along and fifteen elected at-large with the president, the vice president, deans and registrar as members as well. The creation of the Senate came at a time of great change of the University; in one year’s time (1946 to 1947) the University added 89 faculty members and 1,617 students. The faculty took advantage of a window of opportunity to propose their plan; President Alfred Atkinson resigned as president, effective in April 1947, and J. Byron McCormick took over later that year. Further north, Arizona State created their senate in 1949 amidst its own growing pains and reorganization.

At the University of Maine, a senate was created in 1948 (and met for the first time in 1949). The faculty, beginning in 1947, had attempted to create a senate. President Hauck the previous year agreed that a democratically organized faculty body should take up legislative issues for the University. The new Council had general legislative and advisory powers and made up of the president, other administrators, and elected faculty representatives of the colleges of education, arts and sciences, technology, and agriculture. Faculty members of any rank were eligible for election. The early work of the Council (later renamed the Senate) focused on curricular issues, especially the introduction and elimination of general service courses, student standards, standards for teaching, and faculty-student relations. The senate was “creating difficulties” by 1952 as senators discussed the body’s purposes and uses and attempted to remove many of the ex-officio members, but without complete success.
At some institutions these senates, although driven by a faculty desire to make a difference, were not successful or influential. For example, the creation of the Faculty Senate at Rutgers University was created as a result of a recommendation by a faculty committee. Created in 1953, it was to consist of thirty-one elected faculty members and seventeen administrators. It was initially ineffective, only meeting twice per year and only occasionally taking up matters of importance, such as academic freedom and tenure. Often the administration would bypass the senate in matters related to academic policy such as the reorganization of the colleges and faculties.74

Table 6.3 – The Faculty Initiated Senate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Oklahoma</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Texas at Austin</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
<td>1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Maine</td>
<td>1948</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona State University</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas State University</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rutgers University-New Brunswick</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Massachusetts-Amherst</td>
<td>1957</td>
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The University of Pennsylvania

The University Senate at the University of Pennsylvania was created as a direct result of faculty interest in such a body, and was especially due to the efforts of one professor, Clarence N. Callender and his group of organizers. Callender and his organizing group studied and discussed their plan and then took the senate idea to the Trustees who ratified it in 1952. The idea for a senate was born out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the level of faculty influence in University affairs.
In 1950, the year the senate idea took hold at the University of Pennsylvania, Harold Stassen served as president. Stassen was a Republican politician who had served three terms as governor of Minnesota, first elected in 1938 at the age of 31 (the youngest in state history) and re-elected in 1940 and 1942. He was a strong contender for the presidency in 1948 but was defeated by Thomas Dewey at the G.O.P. convention in Philadelphia. It was at this convention that he caught the eye of the University Trustees who tapped him to serve as president. Stassen could not resist the pull of politics and requested a leave from the Trustees in 1952 to again run for the presidency and staged another strong run eventually losing out against Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and General Dwight Eisenhower, who was serving as president of Columbia University.

Stassen left much of the academic administration to his provost, who did not have much standing with the faculty. Stassen’s main concern while president was to make Penn a football powerhouse, an ambition that was thwarted. His absence from campus to attend to political affairs, his attention to football, and his delegation to an unpopular provost must have all played a role in creating a sense of dissatisfaction among the faculty. Stassen left the University in 1953 and was replaced by Gaylord Harnwell.

*Faculty Dissatisfaction*

The impetus for the senate was this sense of dissatisfaction among the faculty. Clarence N. Callender, professor of business law at the Wharton School, in recounting the origins of the Senate, said that the faculty had lost status in the University whereas they should have been at its “heart and soul.” Faculty members had discussed informally the need for some kind of organization for the faculty to give them a more “dignified and influential position in the affairs of the University” to overcome the
“notable absence of faculty influence.” Faculty lamented that they had no say in the
selection of the top administrative officers, a task left solely to the Trustees, and no say in
the selection of department chairs, a task for deans with no requirement to consult the
faculty. Callender remarked that, “administrative handling of educational matters has
frequently resulted in educational policies which many members of the faculty consider
unsound.” Callender argued that if faculty held an inferior position in the University, the
institution itself would suffer.

There was a body with some representation in place, the Educational Council, but the
faculty felt it was it was too dominated by the administration and had too limited of
powers. Callender did not place all of the blame on the administration. He conceded that,

It is doubtless only fair to say that the subordinate position of the faculties at the
University is not entirely the result of University organization but is due in part to
the lack of spirit and initiative of the faculties and professors themselves. This
condition is not peculiar to the University of Pennsylvania; it seems to be rather
general among American educational institutions and this in spite of a strong
English and European tradition of faculty independence and power. This general sentiment of faculty discontent had been known for many years but recent
trends had caused Callender to feel that new action was needed; that the faculty needed to
be stirred and drawn together.

Organizing a Senate

Callender sent a letter on October 18, 1950 to thirty-one senior professors asking
them to attend an informal meeting to discuss the idea of a forming a “University group
composed of professors from the different faculties to serve as a forum of University
opinion on important public questions.” He declared in his letter that,

There is no faculty representing the whole University and the that the educational
staff has no other opportunity to express its collective opinion on important issues
is considered to be a defect in our educational scheme which impairs the
University’s usefulness as an effective force in educational circles and in the community at large.\textsuperscript{80}

He gave examples of what “might” be considered of the “important issues” to discuss in this new body: “Academic freedom – Important educational policies – Municipal scandals – Constitutional revision – City charter – Social security – National and international issues.” He saw the new senate as having the potential to influence not only the University but the city and nation it served. The agenda for this first informational meeting was as follows:

1. Is a “University group” desirable?
2. If so, what type of questions should it consider?
3. If formed, how should it be organized? – Type of organization? – Size? – Open membership or by invitation?
4. Next step? Temporary committee with temporary chairman and secretary?

Of the thirty-one professors he sent the letter to, ten accepted and attended (another twelve indicated an interest but could not attend and nine did not reply).\textsuperscript{81} The sentiment was unanimous that some type of “all-University group” was needed. The group also agreed that a voluntary organization would be ineffective and would soon disintegrate. Those in attendance suggested that Callender confer with the provost to make him aware of the group’s efforts. These organizers began to investigate faculty organizations at eleven other universities as a guide in their decision-making process.\textsuperscript{82}

The group met again, this time with a total of thirty-two adherents, in November. The group drafted a resolution, which they sent to each faculty and school for their endorsement.\textsuperscript{83} At a third meeting, on November 31, 1950, the founders of the new Faculty Senate unanimously approved the following resolution:
Resolution for Establishment of a University Senate

Whereas questions arise from time to time which are of concern to the University as a whole and which are appropriate for Faculty discussion and expression of views, and

Whereas it is believed that the best interests of the University are served by the promotion of such discussion and expression of views, and

Whereas it is believed that this objective can be accomplished most effectively by the creation of a University Senate composed of all members of the various Faculties who hold tenure appointments,

Therefore, be it resolved: That this Faculty recommends the amendment of the Statutes of the University to include provisions substantially as follows…

Included with the resolution was a draft statute for inclusion in the University’s laws. It provided for membership (only tenured, full-time faculty members would be eligible), the body’s authority (over any matter of “general University interest”), and for powers for the Senate to be self-sustaining and regulating.

The petition was sent to the various faculties for their consideration, all of whom approved the resolution except the Medical School, which tabled the measure for future consideration. Each faculty sent the resolution to the Trustees and it was on their agenda for January, 1951 but it was not approved until January 1952. The senate structure was approved by the Trustees with almost no modification from the proposal presented by the faculty.

The First Meeting

The first meeting was held on March 5, 1952 in the University Museum Auditorium. While most senates use their first meeting for organizational purposes, the first meeting at Penn was more celebratory and ceremonial. The only formal business items were to elect permanent officers and the rest of the meeting was dedicated to
hearing from three speakers: Dr. Alfred H. Williams, a trustee, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and a former Wharton faculty member; Edwin D. Dickinson, professor of law; and Dr. Reavis Cox, professor of marketing in the Wharton School. 88

Each speaker extolled the virtues of the new senate. 89 Dickinson spoke first and explained his experiences with faculty governance at Illinois, Michigan, and California, making special note of the “vigorous” system of faculty government at California. Cox gave credit to Callender for founding the Senate. He said that there needed to be a “reaffirmation of the doctrine of free speech” and declared that, “We at Penn have great problems ahead and one our great resources is this body of the University—the faculty.” He explained that faculty members needed to connect these two ideas and speak out on matters of importance to the University. Williams said that the Trustees supported the idea of the Senate, that it was an appropriate response to a period of “great change.” He hoped that the Senate would create “greater cohesion” and “morale” among the faculty.

Alexander H. Frey, professor of law, was elected as the first chair. The senate’s champion, Clarence Callender, was nominated but withdrew his name in favor of Frey, possibly because he was on the verge of retirement from the University in 1955, or perhaps because he had sheparded the Senate into existence over a two-year period and felt he had fulfilled his role. The members gave a consensus vote for the sole nominee. Frey, in addition to serving as professor of law, was socially active on behalf of civil rights. 90 He frequently taught law at other campuses around the country during the summer. 91
Frey spoke to the group upon his election. He acknowledged the work that had gone into creating the Senate and expressed his hope that it would “open an avenue of communication between the administration and the faculty heretofore not present.”

After these four speeches, the group turned to business of organizing the Senate: preparing by-laws, finding a regular meeting time, organizing the committees, figuring a budget, and setting an agenda of issues to discuss along the lines of the “problems of the University” by polling the members for their ideas.

The campus magazine, The Pennsylvania Gazette, reported on the first meeting and expressed the hope that the new Senate would be influential “for the crystallizing of faculty opinion” so that there would no longer be any question of its position on matters relating to educational matters that come before the Trustees. And the student newspaper, The Daily Pennsylvanian, gave creation of the Senate and its first meeting front page coverage.

By June the Advisory Committee (an executive committee of the Senate) had created the Senate’s six standing committees and staffed each with a chairman and faculty members. The committees were on academic tenure and privilege, on university appointments above the rank of dean of a faculty, physical plans and development of the University, financial problems and procedures, athletic policies and practices, and educational programs.

Stassen immediately showed an interest in cooperating with the new senate. Upon the start of the new academic year, he sent a letter to Frey stating that he would welcome “advice and suggestions” from the Senate “on any questions whatsoever.” He specifically asked Frey and to have the Senate look into two matters: “the ways and
means the financial support and income of the University can be strengthened and enlarged” and a procedure to be followed “when a question arises in a substantial manner regarding the incompetence, subversion or wrong-doing of a member of the faculty with tenure or without tenure.” This second matter must have weighed heavily on him, tied into Republican politics as he was and having gained the favor of Joseph McCarthy and others in the establishment.

Frey had invited President Stassen to address the Senate at the first meeting of the fall term. Stassen declined stating that he wanted that the Senate not be dominated by the administration, that it be “distinctly faculty in its nature.” To this Frey replied that he would be welcome whenever he should choose to attend a Senate meeting and he would not be an intruder “to be regarded with suspicion.”

Early Work

In its first year the Senate set about an ambitious agenda. Each of the committees became engrossed in its charge right away. The committee on academic freedom and responsibilities followed through on the request of President Stassen to investigate the best way to deal with a faculty member accused of subversiveness, creating a detailed procedure to safeguard the professor’s and the University’s best interests. The committee on educational programs had undertaken a study of how to best position the Senate and the Educational Council and had instituted a newsletter to facilitate communication among the faculty. The athletic policy committee set its sights on completing an evaluation of the “modern athletics problem,” discovering why the new Department of Intercollegiate Athletics was separated from the Department of Physical Education, and to study the admission of “athletically proficient applicants.”
The Senate’s influence was apparent as early as November, 1952 when Stassen issued a directive to the provost and other administrators that when an administrative appointment is open, the affected faculties should be contacted and allowed to nominate individuals for the open position. He also made clear that the “appointing authority will make the final decision.”

Upon Stassen’s announcement that he would resign in 1953 the Senate activated its committee on administrative appointments. A group of senators petitioned this committee to exert whatever influence it could upon the Trustees to select the strongest candidates possible for the presidency, in particular one with an academic background instead of another public figure.

One of the Senate’s early tasks was to work on a handbook to clarify rules and regulations related to faculty, what came to be the Manual of Policies and Procedures. They carried out this task in cooperation with representatives from the administration. Just two years after its creation, an effort was underway to reorganize the Senate. The Senate officers drafted a plan to strengthen the Senate and bring under its influence the Educational Policy Committee, a move opposed by Harnwell. In 1963 another effort was made to expand the types of forums for faculty input on campus but the senate opposed the creation of “competing organizations.”

Conclusion

Upon Gaylord Harnwell’s election as president in 1953, the new chair of the Senate, Reavis Cox sent him a note that was at once warm and congratulatory but that also acquainted Harnwell with the purposes of the Senate. To this Harnwell replied that he was a “firm believer in the objectives of the Senate and wish to support it in.”
A decade after its inception, the Senate still enjoyed support of the administration and influence on policy. The administration continued to consult with Senate leaders, both formally and informally over regular luncheon conferences. This was an example of the administration welcoming the efforts of the senate creators.

University of Oklahoma

The plan for the senate had been under study by a group of faculty headed by the dean of the Graduate School, Homer Dodge, to replace the general faculty, which rarely met. The group worked with President Joseph Brandt on the creation of the senate. The general faculty approved the plan in 1941 and it was passed along to the Regents in 1942 for final approval. However, the creation of the Senate was overshadowed by Brandt’s decision to create a new college at the University, without any faculty consultation. It is a curious juxtaposition that in the same meeting of the Board of Regents in January 1942, they approved a plan for a democratic faculty organization while at the same time approving a new entity on campus, directly affecting faculty, that came about with no faculty input. In fact, the faculty and deans learned of the creation of the University College, a new home for freshmen and sophomores before they declared a major, in the newspaper. Not even the deans had been consulted nor, for that matter, the English professor, Joseph P. Blickensderfer, who was approved as dean. The faculty was indignant because they had not been consulted and the deans were frustrated that their control over incoming students was removed without any warning. The deans lost clout as the Academic Council of Deans was eliminated in the reorganization plan that instituted the Senate and introduced changes to the Graduate School. When Brandt abruptly resigned in 1943, the Senate was asked to elect the selection committee.
University of Texas at Austin

The faculty council at the University of Texas at Austin was created in 1944 after the University had undergone a reorganization. The faculty had met as a whole but in 1936 they realized that its body had become too cumbersome to be effective. They submitted a proposal to the president asking that he create a special committee on reorganizing the University. The resulting report in 1937 created new administrative positions, new regulations on tenure and promotion, and other improvements, but not a representative body for the faculty. Instead, five faculty members were elected to the administrative council, the president’s cabinet. By 1944 the debate over the proper role for faculty in the governance of the University continued and several professors criticized having faculty on the administrative council as not properly representing faculty interests. A special committee was created and recommended the creation of a representative, proportional legislative body. The result was the Faculty Council, made up of representatives of the schools along with members elected at-large, and the president and deans, which proponents argued were rightful members of the faculty. This arrangement worked until the 1960s when student unrest on campus prompted a reorganization of the Council, and students were added to a new University Council, and faculty created a separate faculty senate (while maintaining representation on the University-wide council).\textsuperscript{108}

Kansas State

Kansas State University was emerging as an increasingly research-focused institution in the 1950s and, along with large increases in student enrollment, evolved as an increasingly complex institution. In 1950 James Allen McCain replaced president
Milton Eisenhower, who had raised the University’s stature considerably from that of a “provincial college” and then left for the presidency at Penn State. At his inauguration McCain extolled the virtues of using land-grant colleges as a means to serve the nation’s democratic ends. However, there was no formal mechanism within Kansas State for faculty and students to formally participate in its affairs or discuss controversial issues.\textsuperscript{109}

In this context of an increasingly complex institution with “sharp growing pains” in faculty-administrative relations, the faculty members joined forces and created the Faculty Senate in 1951. At first, the faculty demonstrated only a desire to be consulted more actively on “faculty prerogatives,” and few showed an interest in unionization. Instead, the faculty focused on creating and then strengthening the Faculty Senate while also building up the campus AAUP chapter. The faculty did not attempt to create a direct line of communication with the Regents or to oversee purely administrative matters such as managing the endowment.\textsuperscript{110}

The Senate played a role in several faculty controversies since its creation but had to do so at times alongside a strong and vociferous AAUP chapter. The faculty at Kansas State had created the Faculty Senate, not out of protest against any particular practice or policy, but as a means to assert their right to have a voice in discussing important university matters.\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{Iowa State University}

At Iowa State the General Faculty, having grown too large, voted on February 14, 1954 to establish the Faculty Council as a representative body for the colleges and departments. They shied away from calling it a senate, even though it had many characteristics of one, because it was more advisory than legislative. However, it had as
much influence through its early years as bodies known as senates in other institutions. The impetus for the Council was a 1951 report by the campus AAUP chapter on “Faculty Participation in College Administration,” which recommended that various councils at the university, college, and department levels be instituted. The report lay fallow until 1953, when James Hilton took over as president. The AAUP chapter officers took advantage of the change in leadership and informed that there was growing momentum for the establishment of a faculty governing body, and with his support the Faculty Council was established in 1954.112

The Faculty Council played an important role in several key decisions at Iowa State. From the beginning the body took up matters related to improving research productivity, such as instituting a sabbatical policy, standardizing availability of travel funds for faculty, and improving the library. It played a crucial role in determining the name change from that of a college to a university in 1959; Hilton, in fact, decided not to approach the regents or legislators about changing the name until he had secured the support of the Faculty Council. The Council’s agenda was ambitious, if not always successful, as it attempted several times to establish a faculty club (in 1969 and 1971-72) and to secure a full-time university psychiatrist (1956). But on other fronts—creation of a budgetary advisory committee, broadening the definition of “general faculty” to include assistant professors, and the creation of a codified faculty handbook in 1958—the Council was more successful.113 After a succession of attempts in the 1950s through the 1970s, the Faculty Council was renamed as the Faculty Senate in 1988, making its legislative functions official,114 even though the Council had wielded influence equal
with other faculty senates in unifying the faculty and providing an avenue for faculty
participation in governance.

**University of Massachusetts—Amherst**

The Faculty Senate at the University of Massachusetts—Amherst (UMass) was
introduced in 1957 to replace general meetings of the faculty. The impetus for its creation
was the denial of a charter by Phi Beta Kappa in 1955. The national officers of Phi Beta
Kappa reported that faculty had not “participated in the planning of the University’s
growth or the government of its affairs.” This report prompted the UMass AAUP chapter
to draft a constitution for a faculty senate to replace the various committees used by the
General Faculty and administrators. This mixed senate, dominated by faculty members,
was approved by the University Trustees on February 28, 1957 and the Senate met in
April for the first time. The introduction of the Senate came at a time when the University trying to grow and
develop and define its mission, while also seeking greater independence from the state to
be better able to compete with its elite, private counterparts in the Commonwealth.

**Summary**

The senates created through faculty activism in the 1940s and 50s were not born
out of major crises, though that is not to say there were not adversarial issues between
faculty and administrators, but often out of a need to make the faculty organ more
efficient and useful. Hundreds of professors cannot come together to reason over a
curricular proposal or a change to the tenure policy as effectively as a smaller,
representative group can. There was more of an influence of the AAUP, especially the local campus chapters, on the creation of these senates than in previous years, no doubt due to the organization’s increasing size and influence.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has detailed the factors that influenced the creation of faculty senates during and following World War II. Faculty reacted to conditions in a proactive fashion to create senate structures to provide a means for participation in university governance. The growth and other changes on campus spurred both presidents and faculty members to create senates as the deliberative structure for faculty to participate in governance on campus. The AAUP began to play an increasingly visible role in influencing the nature of governance at universities.

**Endnotes**

2 Metzger, *Academic Freedom in the Age of the University*, 182.
5 Denny Gulick, “The College Park Senate,” (College Park, Maryland: University of Maryland at College Park, 1996). Elkins’s other accomplishments included drastically raising academic standards, including dismissing fourteen percent of the student body in 1957 as part of his Academic Probation Plan, and gaining a Phi Beta Chapter.
6 Oregon State University Faculty Senate., “History of the Faculty Senate,” in *Handbook* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, 2003), Oregon State University Faculty Senate., “Roots of the Faculty Senate,” in *Handbook* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, 1980).
7 Joyce Barrett, “Clemson's Faculty Senate Has Definitely Come of Age,” *Clemson University News*, March 1986. Herman Felder, a charter remembers the first meeting on March 13, 1956 as “rather somber occasion—although we may have been too impressed, I guess, with our own importance.”
8 Clemson Faculty Senate., “The Faculty Senate of Clemson University: A Brief History and Description,” (Clemson, South Carolina: Clemson University, 1986).
9 State University of New York, “University Faculty Senate,”
The faculty senate at the State University of New York is made up of representatives of all thirty-three SUNY colleges. The Board of Trustees as part of the new SUNY system created the senate October 8, 1953.

The Faculty Senate at American University was created in 1957 by President Hurst Anderson who commissioned a study on the problem of faculty reorganization; the result was a representative senate vested with the powers of the general faculty.

Diane Rudall, “The Senate of the University of Illinois at Chicago,” (Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois at Chicago Faculty Senate, 2004). The senate at the University of Illinois at Chicago was at first a division of the entire University’s Senate and then became an independent senate in 1957 as part of a University reorganization.

In addition to the College, the schools at the time included engineering, mines, business administration, dentistry, education, law, medicine, and pharmacy.


Mooney was condemned to death but President Woodrow Wilson intervened and his sentence was changed to life in prison. Both men were set free in 1939. Alberts, Pitt: The Story of the University of Pittsburgh, 1787-1987, 144.

Dean L.P. Sieg played a central role in the dismissal of Woltman. He soon left the University to become president of the University of Washington (see Chapter 5). Woltman went on to become an investigative reporter for the New York World (later renamed World-Telegram), winning the Pulitzer Prize in 1931 and 1946 and an honorable mention in 1933.

American Association of University Professors, “Academic Freedom at the University of Pittsburgh,” 581.

Quoted in Alberts, Pitt: The Story of the University of Pittsburgh, 1787-1987, 150.

One passage from the report reads: “Very few members of the faculty would say that they really know the Chancellor. To them he is an enigmatical but powerful figure behind the screen of deans and other administrative officers who carry out his decisions and policies, frequently in opposition to their own considered judgment and in violation of their senses of fitness and fairness. He is regarded as erratic, constant in regard only to the one interest which his nearest his heart—the completion of the Cathedral—and with a great blind spot to every other interest in the University.” American Association of University Professors, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of Pittsburgh,” 263.

Turner, as it turns out, went onto a prolific career as a professor at Minnesota, as a government official during WWII for various agencies, and finally as Durfree Professor of History at Yale, where he helped found the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Sutherland went 111-20-12 in fifteen years with seven regional and six national championships and never a losing season, beating Penn State in twelve straight contests, and he coached a number of All-Americans. The controversy is outlined in detail in Chapter 10, “Code Bowman and ‘The Most Discussed Controversy’” in Alberts, Pitt: The Story of the University of Pittsburgh, 1787-1987, 157-68.
Ibid., 172.
Ibid., 175-76.
Ibid., 177-83.
Albers, Pitt: The Story of the University of Pittsburgh, 1787-1987, 193.
Ibid., 156.
Ibid., 170.
Ibid.
“Memorandum of Meetings of the Committee on Permanent University Senate held October 23, 1940 and November 6, 1940.” Proceedings of the Senate of the University of Pittsburgh, January, 1935 through June 30, 1950. University of Pittsburgh Senate Office. The committee of ten included only one member from the 1935 committee, W.T. Root. The head of the committee appears to be Elmer Hutchisson who was head of the physics and left Pitt in 1953 for Case Western where he served as dean of the graduate school and of the faculty. He was an eminent physicist who was founder of the Center for the History of Physics and a founding editor of The Journal of Applied Physics.
To use Birnbaum’s typology of senate functions, the Pitt senate would fall under the category of “bureaucratic” instead of political or collegial.
Fitzgerald appointed S.P. Franklin as temporary secretary who was then elected permanently against his own wishes. After a motion to elect him was introduced he protested saying that he did not know shorthand or have any other qualifications for the position. But apparently he did not protest loudly enough; he was elected and his signature is affixed to the minutes.
Ibid: 8.
Executive Committee Minutes for September 13, 1945; Senate Minutes for October 12, 1945.
“Resolutions of the Educational Policies Committee Pertaining to Organization and Administration of the Graduate School.” December 12, 1945. Proceedings of the Senate of the University of Pittsburgh, January,

Pitt last appears on the censured list in American Association of University Professors, “Censured Administrations,” Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 32, no. 4 (1946): 763. Alberts explains that Fitzgerald petitioned the AAUP to remove Pitt from the censured list upon becoming chancellor (pp. 193-194).

Alberts, Pitt: The Story of the University of Pittsburgh, 1787-1987, 196.


Jorgensen, “Reorganization of the University [Connecticut],” 2-4.

Fitzgibbon, The Academic Senate of the University of California, 35.

Ibid., 39.

Ibid., 43-44.

Paul Leroy Dressel, College to University: The Hannah Years at Michigan State, 1935-1969 (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University, University Publications, 1987). Ralph H. Smuckler, A University Turns to the World: A Personal History of the Michigan State University International Story (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 2003), 27-28, 53-55. Hannah’s personal and professional accomplishments and contributions to Michigan State were myriad. Dressel (pp. 5-15) summarizes them: he greatly expanded the campus with new buildings, got the institution into the Big Ten Conference, was active on ACE committees, expanded extension services to the rural poor, expanded Michigan State’s service reach into Third World countries, built a new library, took a leave to serve in the Pentagon under Eisenhower and later as chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, removed race considerations from admissions applications (to eliminate “Negro Quotas”) and refused to allow his teams to compete against schools that discriminated against Blacks, opened an honors college, defended academic freedom, and got himself elected to the state constitutional convention in 1961 so he could protect the autonomy of the University. In contrast to the speaker debacle at Pitt, he ended all controversies (especially of speakers and student groups making “martyrs” of themselves) by simply insisting that groups advertise who their speaker would be. He was regularly asked to run for political office, both state and federal.

Dressel, College to University: The Hannah Years at Michigan State, 1935-1969, 338-40. In his memoir he commented that, “administration by faculty is bad...It is a mistake to encourage employees of an institution to think that they have an inherent right to manage it.” John A. Hannah, A Memoir ([East Lansing]: Michigan State University Press, 1980), 104-05. See also Dressel, pp. 361-63.


Jeffery Roth Frumkin, “A Study of the Development of the Structure of Faculty Participation in University-Level Governance at Michigan State University” (Michigan State University, 1983).

Ibid., 23-29.

Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 30-33.

The Basic College had been endorsed unanimously by the college’s faculty in 1944 as the home of general education. For a discussion of its origins and the controversy over changes to its scope and substance, see Dressel, College to University: The Hannah Years at Michigan State, 1935-1969, 120-32.

Frumkin, “A Study of the Development of the Structure of Faculty Participation in University-Level Governance at Michigan State University”, 34-37.

Dressel, College to University: The Hannah Years at Michigan State, 1935-1969, 337.

University of Arizona., “Faculty Senate Handbook,” (Tuscon, Arizona: The University of Arizona, 2001), 2-3. Student members were added in 1975 and the senate was further streamlined in 1991 by reducing its size, especially in terms of the ex-officio members. Originally, the president presided over the senate but in 1980 he was replaced with an elected chairman. The functions of the Senate—mainly over educational, curricular, and student issues—have not drastically changed since the Senate’s inception.

Douglas D. Martin, The Lamp in the Desert: The Story of the University of Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1960), 279. The students on campus went through their own administrative reorganization at this time. Morris Udall, student president and future Arizona congressman, proposed a new plan of student government to accommodate the needs of the growing student body, especially in regard to the high cost of attendance and the lack of on-campus housing (See Martin, pp. 222-224).

Rutgers University, “Handbook of the Rutgers University Senate,” (Rutgers University, 2005), 3. The Senate would gain in stature in later years. In 1968 the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools recommended, as part of their accreditation evaluation, that faculty take a more meaningful role in University governance. A year earlier students had sought membership on the Senate. By 1969 the president recognized the Senate as an important part of the decision-making process at the University, likening himself to the British prime minister and the Senate to Parliament, and it took on “all academic matters pertaining to the University” (pp. 3-4).


Stassen is perhaps the most famous “perennial candidate” running for the presidency every year from 1948 through 1992 except 1956, 1960, and 1972. He ran (unsuccessfully) to be governor of Pennsylvania (1958 and 1966), mayor of Philadelphia (1959), and returned to Minnesota to run for senator, congressman, and governor. He served in the Eisenhower administration as director of the Mutual Security Agency and in the Foreign Operations Administration.

In the wealth of information left behind by the founders of the senate are numerous general statements about “faculty dissatisfaction” but these same individuals are circumspect about their specific complaints.

Clarence N. Callender, “The Origin of the University Senate at the University of Pennsylvania,” University of Pennsylvania Archives. Faculty Senate Records (UPB 25), Faculty Senate Records, History of Faculty Senate, 1952-1986. It is unclear when Callender wrote this five-page historical sketch. A note attached to it indicates it was given to a secretary of the Senate in 1956 but that Callender had given a copy to Frey years earlier. Glen Morrow, a professor of philosophy, reported it this way: “There had been a rather widespread feeling that, in the organization and operation of the University, faculty influence had been noticeably absent.” Glenn R. Morrow, “The University of Pennsylvania: Faculty Participation in the Government of the University,” AAUP Bulletin 49, no. 2 (1963): 118.

Clarence N. Callender, “The Origin of the University Senate at the University of Pennsylvania,” University of Pennsylvania Archives. Faculty Senate Records (UPB 25), Faculty Senate Records, History of Faculty Senate, 1952-1986.

Clarence N. Callender, “The Origin of the University Senate at the University of Pennsylvania,” University of Pennsylvania Archives. Faculty Senate Records (UPB 25), Faculty Senate Records, History of Faculty Senate, 1952-1986.

The first chairman of the Senate, Alexander H. Frey, and the second Reavis Cox were among the ten in attendance.

They corresponded with Harvard, Columbia, Michigan, Pittsburgh, Ohio State, Chicago, Northeastern, Illinois, Texas, Nebraska, and California.

The process seems analogous to another constitutional convention in Philadelphia with ratification necessary from the various states.


The sentiment at the Medical School was that it “definitely wants to participate in any University-wide activity and we do not want to hamper any division of the University by appearing non-cooperative.” However, they felt the matter needed more study before they could ratify it. Letter from Batson to Jonathan E. Rhoads, M.D., February 7, 1951. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate I, 1950-1955.


It is not clear why the item stayed on the agenda for a year, however, on October 17, 1951 a Trustees committee met and requested that the librarian prepare some materials on “pertaining to university senates at other institutions.” The resulting report by a trustee was a series of clippings from a number of articles on the matter. The minutes to that meeting show plans to have a dinner on November 21, 1951 with the Senate
organizers to discuss the matter and it was approved two months later at the full Trustees meeting. Apparently nothing in the materials or the dinner meeting dissuaded the Trustees for they approved the Senate almost exactly as the organizers had planned it in the full Trustees meeting in January 1952.


“Faculty Senate [Minutes],” March 5, 1952. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate II, 1950-1955. These minutes are hand-written on legal size paper.

Frey served as chairman of the Philadelphia Civil Liberties Committee in 1936, a group formed to work with the ACLU; he helped form the Philadelphia Citizens’ Council on Democratic Rights in 1948; and then founded the Pennsylvania branch of the ACLU, serving on the national board. He publicly defended teachers who were accused of communist sympathies. He was known by his students as “Mr. Civil Rights.” In 1959 he resigned from the American Bar Association over an ABA resolution urging Congress to legislate against liberal decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The ABA reversed its position on the strength of Frey’s arguments. Based on obituaries from the Philadelphia Inquirer (September 1, 1981) and a publication of the Law School. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Biographical File, Alexander H. Frey.

He taught at Columbia, Yale, North Carolina, Colorado, Kansas, and Texas. In fact, when Stassen wrote his congratulations to Frey on being elected chair of the new Senate in August 1952 (after he had lost the G.O.P. nomination and had returned to campus), he sent the letter to Frey, “c/o University of Utah Law School.” Letter from Harold E. Stassen to Dr. Alexander Frey, August 8, 1952, University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate II, 1950-1955.


“New University Senate Stages First Meeting At Museum, March 5,” February 27, 1952 and “Dr. Frey Elected to Top Senate Post,” March 7, 1952. The Daily Pennsylvanian.


Letter from Alexander H. Frey to President Harold S. Stassen, October 10, 1952. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate III.

Frey outlined the first year’s work in a letter to Alfred Williams (the trustee who had served on the Trustees committee on the creation of a Senate and had spoken at the first meeting). Letter from Alexander H. Frey to Mr. Alfred H. Williams, March 24, 1953. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate IV.


Memorandum from H.E.S. [Harold E. Stassen] to Provost E.B. William, Mr. William H. DuBarry, Dr. Charles W. MacGregor, and Dr. Normand H. Topping, November 14, 1952. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate III.


History of Faculty Senate, 1952-1986.

104 Letter from Gaylord P. Harnwell to Dr. Reavis Cox, June 30, 1953. University of Pennsylvania Archives. Office of the President Records (UPA 4), Box 62, Folder title: Senate V. Cox had sent a letter to Harnwell on June 26th with a two page report on the Senate, summarizing its history and purposes.

105 Morrow, “The University of Pennsylvania: Faculty Participation in the Government of the University,” 120.


107 Ibid., 49. The senate committee selected acting graduate school dean George Cross who was then selected as acting president and then took on the post permanently, serving from 1943 until 1968. He utilized the Senate to settle faculty matters, for example, when a proposal of rotating department chairmen was proposed, he referred the matter to the Senate. The University confirmed its commitment to faculty governance in its book-length report in 1969 on the future of the university stating, “The faculty as a whole should take an active role in determining the future direction of the University of Oklahoma...The legislative function of the faculty should be retained by the University Senate, the faculty legislative body.” University of Oklahoma. Executive Planning Committee. and Gordon A. Christenson, The Future of the University: A Report to the People (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 124.

108 Millett, New Structures of Campus Power, 71-80.


110 Ibid., 208.

111 Ibid., 208-31. The senate was a forum for discussion of current social events such as desegregation of schools and student unrest on campus. For example, in 1960 students blocked campus after a basketball game, effectively closing campus. It was the AAUP chapter president who pressured McCain to work towards a resolution and the Senate joined in. In 1964 the dean of engineering, more experienced in administration in industry than academe, dissolved the Department of Applied Mechanics without consulting the affected faculty. The AAUP chapter created an investigative committee, which reported on the need for colleges and departments to maintain an open atmosphere for discussion of such matters and highlighted the lack of faculty participation in governance at the college level. The result was a greater dialogue between the Senate and the administration. At other times the Senate took the lead on such controversies; in 1961 when the Department of General Studies was eliminated by fiat (which was procedurally improper since the Senate was not consulted but not as consequential as it might seem since the general studies curriculum had changed hands largely outside of that department), and when the School of Commerce was created without any consultation with the Senate. The continuing importance that the Senate had established for faculty participation was evident in 1964 when new procedures for selection of department heads and deans were announced by the vice-president for academic affairs, allowing for greater faculty involvement. (Carey, pp. 208, 219, 231).


113 Ibid., 3-8.

114 Before this final reorganization, Iowa State’s council was not officially legislative even though it was able to exert influence. Ibid., 8-17.

115 Joseph S. Larson, “Background Information on the Faculty Senate (University of Massachusetts-Amherst),” (Amherst: University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 2000).

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Creation Faculty Senates in the Long ‘60s, 1960-1975

The 1960s was a time of tumult and change on the American university campus. Students became increasingly vocal as they staged protests across the country. The professoriate grew as graduates of doctoral programs found academic jobs with relative ease in the 1960s, creating an abnormally large cohort of new academics. The “Academic Revolution,” as described in the expansive and polemical book by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, was a time of rising power of the professoriate, which was becoming increasingly specialized in their research and teaching. The 1960s also proved to be highly politicized on campus, creating rifts on campus, which faculty governance structures were not always able to mend. More part-time or temporary instructors would be needed to fill gaps in courses for a growing student body.

The senates of this era—how and why they were created—are better documented in the literature than those from past eras. It was, in fact, this surge in interest and output that led several scholars to conclude that the creation of faculty senates was a new phenomenon, ignoring their historical roots, but focusing primarily on the tumultuous events that led to their creation. This chapter, then, takes a slightly different approach from the previous two. It presents two case studies—a detailed analysis of the creation of the Faculty Senate at Carnegie Mellon University and a shorter one of the University Senate at Columbia—followed by thematic analysis of how and why senates were created during this era.
First, it is useful to review the discussion of faculty senates from this period and how scholars from this period explained the creation of faculty senates. The most common answer for why senates were created in the “Long 60s” (defined as 1960 through the mid-1970s) was that there was a desire to make the campus more democratic and to have greater input into policy issues. Harold Hodgkinson concluded, based on a nationwide survey, that the main impetus was to democratize the campus and was not due to campus unrest, as he had assumed it would be. However, I do not see how these two possible explanations would be mutually exclusive—it seems reasonable that the drive to democratize the campus was at least in part due to the campus unrest or to the changing values and expectations. Perhaps administrators answering the survey did not want to admit that it was a direct response to the unrest. Of those senates discussed in Hodgkinson’s survey, the body was generally organized by a special committee with representation of the various campus constituencies (administrators, faculty, students). Most were ratified by trustees or by the trustees as part of a revision of the university’s charter; many were ratified by the faculty acting as a whole or by the president, and in a few cases no ratification was required. In two cases the state legislature actually ratified the new faculty senate. In some cases, other similar bodies, such as administrative councils, were eliminated to make way for the new senate. But this could be interpreted as a “reorganization” of faculty power, not a completely new manifestation of it.

Hodgkinson notes that the expansion (or reorganization, as I would call it) is more common among larger schools. Others “started from scratch” to create a senate body. Most American universities had general councils of entire faculty before senates were created. The conventional wisdom has been that, “As the size of the faculty grew, and
campus disturbances of the 1960s increased, it became evident that there was a need for a new form of governance.\textsuperscript{6}

In 1971, T.R. McConnell explained that, “Profound changes in patterns of authority and influence are occurring throughout higher education.”\textsuperscript{7} He noted that external influences such as increased legislative attention toward higher education (especially in light of the recent violence on campuses) and system offices of higher education are all impinging on the autonomy of colleges and universities, leaving institutions “frustrated” as they attempt to determine their own destinies. These external influences, coupled with internal battles (among students, faculty, administration, and trustees) create an uncertainty in the academy, meaning that the distribution of authority and responsibility in the academy is in “question as it has not been for generations.”\textsuperscript{8}

A key reason often cited for starting a senate is for faculty to exert greater influence in the governance of the academic community is the development of an academic senate or the strengthening of an existing senate. As a representative body of the faculty this forum can be a means to “escape from the snares of the corporative, the military, or the freewheeling institutional models, and to devise a democratically based mode of institutional governance which will fulfill the vision of a sense of community.”\textsuperscript{9}

This type of representative governance, given time, will be seriously received, Marvin Laser argued in 1967, because it is a rational system that will have worked through problems via debate. However, the success of a senate depends also on its ability to attract able members and not just those who seek office out of boredom or in search of status. The creation of a senate, instead of diminishing the power and responsibilities of a central administration, can increase them. A president must work thoughtfully with a
senate to be involved but not intrusive, and to act on senate decisions but not in a
capricious way. Out of these tensions Laser hoped for a more collegial community on the
university campus with a respect for the need and legitimacy of campus senates and the
roles of faculty members in formulating institutional policy.\textsuperscript{10} “The sheer exercise of
naked power, the clash of pressure groups and vested interests, the chaos of anarchy, the
rule of expediency, the cynicism of passive withdrawal—these are alternatives, but they
will not command the support of reasonable men.”\textsuperscript{11} As Joseph Garabino commented in
1971: “The notion that the exercise of any form of institutional authority must be with the
consent of the governed—all the governed—means that either a single heterogeneous
legislative body must be established or the administration must embark on a tedious
round of consecutive consultation with separate bodies in order to legitimize its
decisions.”\textsuperscript{12}

The AAUP Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities (1966)
demonstrated the crystallization of attitudes on university governance.\textsuperscript{13} The AAUP
Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities has its roots in some of the
association’s earliest work. Only a year after its creation the AAUP created the
Committee on the Place and Function of Faculties in University Government and
Administration, now know as the Committee on College and University Governance or
“Committee T.” It issued its first report in 1920. The 1966 statement, written with the
American Council on Education (ACE) and the Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges (AGB), outlines the reasons why faculty should play a role in
institutional governance and what role each group (faculty, administrators, and trustees)
should play in governance.
The Statement does not advocate a single method or style for interaction between the key players in the shared governance of a university but rather offers two general principles: 1) that important issues be considered by all relevant parties, and 2) “differences in the weight of each voice, from one point to the next, should be determined by reference to the responsibility of each component for the particular matter at hand.” The AAUP had a demonstrably larger influence on the creation of senates in the 1960s and 70s.

**The Senates of the Long ‘60s**

The senates created at American research universities during this era are listed in Table 7.1. A discussion of two senates, at Carnegie Mellon and Columbia, follows, concluding with a general discussion of faculty senates created during this period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Senate Founded</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Rhode Island</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of California-San Diego</td>
<td>1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Washington University</td>
<td>1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Houston</td>
<td>1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duke University</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kent State University</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Miami</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico State University</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Methodist University</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Rochester</td>
<td>1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Toledo</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of California-Irvine</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of California-Santa Cruz</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fordham University</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old Dominion University</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Illinois University</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Colorado at Boulder</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas Tech University</td>
<td>1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auburn University</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown University</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carnegie Mellon University</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Idaho</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Commonwealth University</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington University in St. Louis</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wyoming, University of</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case Western Reserve University</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of North Texas</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ.</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell University</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of South Carolina</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNY at Binghamton</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Mississippi</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Nebraska at Lincoln</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington State University</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida International University</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of South Florida</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin-Madison</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of New Mexico</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee</td>
<td>1975</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The trend to constitute new senates has continued. Senates created after 1975 are listed in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 – Senates Created 1976 – Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Senate Founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CUNY Graduate School and University Ctr.</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia State University</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claremont Graduate University</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama at Birmingham</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Arkansas</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carnegie Mellon University

The late 1960s were a period of great change for the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). Carnegie Institute of Technology and the Mellon Institute merged in 1967 to form Carnegie Mellon University. The merger alone was a trying event for the faculty and added upon this change were pressures to increase the University’s research capacity and to adapt to the burgeoning student body.

In 1968 the size of the graduating class had outgrown the capacity of any building on campus to house a campus commencement ceremony. In the twenty years since WWII, the number of graduates had risen dramatically for a relatively small institution (725 to 1112) and the number of degree offerings doubled (from 42 to 82). In 1967-68 there were nearly 7,000 students. The most dramatic shift, however, was at the graduate level. In 1948 sixty-five students received master’s degrees and twenty-seven received terminal degrees (thirteen of which were MFA degrees); in 1968 the number of master’s rose to 294 and terminal degrees numbered 137 (111 of which were Ph.D.’s).

The University was taking a conscious path towards research and graduate education instead of professional and technical training, under President H. Guy Stever
(1965-72) and especially under Richard M. Cyert (1972-90). Acquisition of the Mellon Institute added a number of distinguished researchers, top-grade facilities, as well as an endowment of $60 million. Soon after the merger, CMU added new academic units, a college of humanities and social sciences and a school of urban and public affairs. The vestiges of the old Carnegie Technical Schools faded and a new, modern university emerged in its place. An important factor in the adjustment towards a research focus was the disparity among the faculties at CMU, where some divisions such as fine arts lacked faculty with terminal degrees (only one-third in fine arts held a Ph.D. or MFA) and in others where faculty members held doctorates but very few had been promoted to full professor.  

Other changes were afoot on campus. The Division of Student Affairs was reorganized that same year to provide a more “flexible” and “personal” student program and the Campus Code was revised.  

**The Faculty Unite**

The faculty was dissatisfied about its lack of influence at the University, especially given that they had taken no part in the decisions to merge the Mellon Institute into the institution and to become a university. Carnegie Institute’s faculty handbook from 1965 (before the merger and the creation of the Senate) reveals the institution’s organization to be very top-heavy. The only non-administrative faculty voice on the president’s Administrative Council was the chairman of the faculty; the remainder was vice presidents, deans, and other administrative officers. An Academic Affairs Committee existed, with six senior professors outnumbered by eight administrators. All instructional staff and administrators (who held a rank at instructor or above) were
members of the General Faculty; its only outlined powers were to forward suggestions to the president.

A group of faculty came together and drafted a constitution in 1968 to define the role of the faculty on campus and to create a faculty senate. The senate would meet seven times per year and be led by an executive committee and would have five standing committees: educational policy, research policy and services, faculty affairs, student affairs, and campus planning.

The process for crafting the new constitution and creating the new senate was a typical one. A committee was formed to study the problem and make recommendations. The committee began by looking at practices at other institutions, including many of the same schools that Pitt and Penn had looked at in previous decades in forming their senates. They also used materials from the AAUP in their study. The constitutional committee set out to examine structures of faculty organizations, their prerogatives, responsibilities, and scope of authority, especially as it related to the administration and trustees. “Those members of the faculty who are outstanding in their professional areas are similarly active in contributing to the development and growth of their institution,” the committee concluded. They attributed the existence of a senate as a means to attract top faculty. The final question raised in the constitutional committee’s report was whether the “current arrangement” of low involvement in academic affairs “ought to carry over to Carnegie University.”

A.H. Meltzer and P.G. Shewmon, chairmen of the General Faculty and the Engineering and Science Faculty, along with their respective chairmen-elect, rallied faculty to the cause of creating an environment of “a more democratic faculty
involvement in academic affairs.” They started with their grievance about the lack of influence of the faculty:

In the furor that accompanied the initial announcements of the Mellon merger, the lack of a tradition of faculty representation or influence in academic policy on the C.I.T. campus was made quite clear. In considering what happened then it occurred to some of us that one could argue: (1) Tech differs from most schools with which like to compare ourselves in the amount of faculty government. (2) Tech would be a better school if it had a better organized and more influential faculty government.23

They cited the report on faculty government at other institutions as evidence that their suspicion that these two points were true. These organizers met with members of the administration and found sympathy for their position. They determined that a change to a more democratic system would have the do the following:

- Produce a feeling of identification and involvement with the problems and goals of the institution on the part of the faculty.
- Establish the tradition of faculty responsibility in the consideration and formulation of educational policy.
- Utilize more of the available talent in the identification and resolution of problems affecting Carnegie University.

Given the level of accord on the “problem” the next question was what the next step should be. “This is a large task which has a great number of ‘solutions’” they explained and asked for the “involvement of all faculties.”

A “Committee on Faculty Government” began its work at once and issued a report only three months later detailing the work that had been done and what future direction the faculty at CMU should take.24 It began by acknowledging the continued misgivings about the merger, especially among the Mellon faculty, but that the hope was that the creation of a faculty body would alleviate some of the problems presented by the
merger. The report revealed two ideas to the General Faculty: the idea for a Senate and the plan to draft a constitution.

The proposed constitution was unveiled in December 1967. The framers vetted the proposed document extensively on campus and with Philip Denenfeld, who had written a report on the Constitution of the Faculty at Western Michigan University for the AAUP’s Bulletin in 1966. In a memorandum to General Faculty announcing the new Constitution and Senate, the process to “effect an orderly transition” was outlined: creation of an Elections Committee and elections to be held in the colleges for representation in the Senate and elections in the new body for officers. The most pressing vote, however, would be on the Constitution itself, to be voted upon by the entire faculty. If endorsed the Senate would proceed as outlined in that document. The administration cooperated with the General Faculty’s effort, offering the service of a full-time secretary to serve the officers of the new senate.

The new constitution gave the Faculty Senate significant powers. The Senate was empowered to “consider any and all issues relevant to the interests of the University and to make known its views and recommendations either to the Faculty or to the President.” The Senate had the “responsibility” to initiate, consider, and make recommendations on questions of educational policy. The faculty used the document to declare principles important to them in a sort of declaration of independence. “It is appropriate in a University that each individual Member of the Faculty has maximum freedom and autonomy to carry out his responsibilities as a teacher and scholar,” the Constitution read. The same type of autonomy should be offered “to each Department and College” to carry out their responsibilities.
While the faculty set out their unique role in the University in the new Constitution, they also showed a willingness and interest in working with the administration. The Senate would be faculty-dominated (twenty-five to thirty-five elected faculty members), where the membership elected its own officers, but ex-officio administrators were also included.\textsuperscript{28} It would meet monthly and carry out much of its work through standing councils: on educational policy, research policy, faculty status, faculty welfare, educational and research services, student life, and campus planning.\textsuperscript{29} The idea was for administrators to serve on the committees, sometimes as chair where appropriate, to facilitate the sharing of information on the particular issues. The new Constitution mixed a political model for senates with necessary bureaucracy.

A meeting of the General Faculty was held on January 9, 1968 to discuss the new Constitution and a number of changes, mostly minor in nature, were suggested.\textsuperscript{30} One change was to allow the president to request a special meeting of the Senate instead of waiting for the next regularly scheduled meeting (much like a governor can call up a special legislative session). Another was to extend membership to senior fellows of the Mellon Institute. The revised constitution was sent out to all faculty for a vote so that it could be presented to the Trustees at their February 19 meeting.

The first chair was Sergio DeBenedetti, a professor of physics, elected in the spring at an organizational meeting to allow time to prepare for the Senate’s inauguration in the fall.\textsuperscript{31} He immediately set out to organize the Office of the Senate over the summer, preparing it to begin its work in the fall of 1968.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{The First Meeting}
The first meeting of the Senate was held on September 25, 1968. While many senates spend their first meeting (or few meetings) organizing themselves, having the summer for the officers to work on such organizational tasks paid off. The first meeting was robust, with a full array of issues discussed. The only tasks on the new Senate’s agenda included drafting of by-laws, election of new faculty members, agenda suggestions for the councils, and “new business.” However, the executive committee of the Senate and an ad hoc by-laws committee had both met and gave reports of their work.

Senators gave their suggestions for work to be carried out by the councils. The Council on Educational Policy should attempt to measure “what is meant by ‘teaching excellence’” and what rewards should accrue from teaching and from research. Faculty Affairs should examine the desirability of publishing the faculty salary scale, whether campus mail should be used for advertisement of non-campus events, whether funds could be supplied for faculty to entertain groups of students in their homes, and whether campus security officers should be armed. Student Affairs was encouraged to explore means for improving faculty-student communication, perhaps through luncheons or forums on current events. The Council on Research Policy was asked to look into the implications of the cut-back in funds from the National Science Foundation and the Council on Planning was to look into how the faculty could consult with the administration on effecting improvements to the physical plant.

A substantial discussion ensued on “Student Participation in the work of the Senate” as the “new business” of the day. A number of questions were raised: Should the Faculty Senate become a “University Senate”? Should each Council determine student
membership for themselves or should a general policy applying to all councils be implemented? Could faculty effectively identify students as potential members or should the Student Government select the members? In the end it was resolved to conference with the Student Government to discover the best avenue for student participation.

President Stever expressed his support for the new Senate at the fall faculty meeting. He was encouraged by the creation of the new body, that it signaled an opportunity for “increased cooperation between Faculty and Administration concerning the affairs of the University.” Stever persuaded faculty members to actively participate in its affairs. A year later in his annual report, he acknowledged the work of the Senate, that it dealt with “important matters” through its “own initiative and through indicating the faculty point of view of administrative proposals, it made valued contributions to university affairs.”

*Early Work of the Carnegie Mellon Senate*

Among the issues the nascent Senate tackled included student housing, student discipline, especially as it related to campus disruptions, the need to recruit more black faculty, ways to improve teaching, and the state of the library. As Edwin Fenton notes, through the creation of the Senate, “the faculty had become a participating partner in setting University policy.”

Communication with students was a major concern of the Senate. One of their first items of business was to mandate that all faculty members post office hours so students could meet with them (and they even distributed standardized office hour cards around campus). DeBenedetti posted a letter in the *Tartan*, the student newspaper on December 11, 1968, lamenting the lack of faculty-student contact:
The poor faculty have tried all possible things in order to overcome this lack of personal contact with students’ frustration. We have posted office hours and no one comes to see us; we have organized public lectures and very few students ever come to listen to us; we have held open meetings on the question of student participation in the affairs of the Faculty Councils, and only a few students came to testify.

What is wrong with us? Nobody loves us—or do we suffer from halitosis? Now…we propose a program of free lunches which will be offered to any group of students who want to talk with the faculty…

But even this offer of a free lunch did not seem to change student attitudes about faculty.

Members of the Senate continued to debate what role, if any, students should play in the Senate. The Student Government responded to the Senate with a proposal that students should make up one-third of the total membership of the Councils on Faculty Affairs, Student Affairs, and Educational Policy and at least two students should be seated on the Councils on Research and Planning. All students, they suggested, should have full voting privileges on the Councils and would be appointed by the Student Government. At the second meeting of the Senate, the Councils on Educational Policy and Student Affairs reported they had already decided that student participation in their meetings would be appropriate. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to student participation, with at least four different motions on the matter introduced and discussed, in the end resulting in a decision that the chairman of the Senate would appoint an ad hoc committee to study the matter and hold open hearings to solicit the opinions of faculty and students.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Student Participation issues an extensive report on January 6, 1969. The committee had examined the practice elsewhere, looking at student participation at nineteen “leading universities.” They met with leaders of the Student Senate, issued a general invitation for statements of opinion, and held open
hearings for all members of the University. They concluded that “student interest in participating in the faculty organization is relatively slight” but that valid reasons nonetheless existed for involving students such as improving communication, especially so that students had a better means to air their grievances. Faculty sentiment was mixed. On the one hand, the Faculty Senate was a new, “untried” institution and should be given time to mature before expanding its scope or membership and student membership could dilute faculty influence. On the other, it was acknowledged that students everywhere were demanding a greater role in trying to shape the quality of university life and that the “ideal of participatory democracy can best be explored on a university campus.” Some suggested that membership on the councils would be valuable and, if students were not included in the general Senate membership, it would not affect the overall influence of the Senate.

The solution offered by the committee was to institute Student Advisory Committees (SACs) in each department or college, a practice instituted at several institutions around this time.\(^4\) These SACs would be made up of undergraduate and graduate students who would meet to discuss university issues of importance and then transmit their recommendations to their respective senator. Students could take an ungraded course, “University Management,” as part of their participation in SACs. The committee further recommended that individual councils decide on whether to include students. All of these recommendations should be given a one-year trial starting in February 1969. Carnegie Mellon continues to use these Student Advisory Councils today.

Senate officers were able to play a crucial role in the student disturbances. When a group of students occupied Warner Hall on the night of May 4, 1970, James Langer, the
Senate chair, worked with Dean Earle Swank in a night-long negation with the students, convincing them to leave by morning without injury or incident. They also joined with students in their protests on occasion. That same month Langer and Dean Richard Cyert (future president) along with a group of faculty marched with students at the federal building in Pittsburgh to protest the Vietnam War and the killings at Kent State. Edwin Fenton concludes that, “The new Faculty Senate gave faculty members a forum from which they helped both the administration and students to avoid the tragic violence that marked so many disturbances on other campuses.”

Conclusion

A year after the creation of the Carnegie Mellon Faculty Senate, the Senate sponsored a forum to discuss the future of the University, as part of its end-of-the-year General Faculty meeting. The professors chosen to speak each addressed the issues they found most critical to CMU’s future, offering insightful analyses of the current college student, calling upon the University to enlarge and improve graduate education and to improve support for research, and inviting members of the faculty to evaluate their attitudes on teaching. A. Fred Sochatoff urged the audience to not lose personal contact with students or each other in “a day when cybernation, close-circuit television, and other technological media are being urged as replacements for ‘communication between man and man.’”

More than the specifics of their remarks, what is striking is the idea behind the conference itself. Organized by the Senate, it was means for faculty members to express their views and philosophies on education and on the role of the University. The faculty had organized themselves for a specific purpose in creating the Faculty Senate and this
event seems to be a culmination and crystallization of the ideals they were attempting to accomplish with their senate: to increase communication within the University and to raise the voice and influence of the faculty.

Columbia University

The Columbia University Senate was born directly of a crisis on campus, which itself epitomized the crises of the 1960s. The crisis revealed that there was no formal mechanism on campus to deal with such emergencies and exposed faculty dissatisfaction about their lack of participation in University governance under an autocratic president.

The Crisis

The spring of 1968 was a tumultuous time on the Columbia campus, spawning the crises that would lead the creation of the University Senate. Three events led to an eventual standoff between students and University officials: the proposal to build a gymnasium in Morningside Park, the demands of the Columbia chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) for the University to stop conducting defense-related research for the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and disciplinary action taken against SDS protesters. Three activist student groups—Students Afro-American Society (SAS), the Columbia Citizenship Council (CCC) and SDS—worked together to protest. They organized a protest attended by about 500 on April 23, 1968. After attempting to occupy Low Library and a clash with police in Morningside Park, they decided to occupy a building. A sit-in was organized at Hamilton Hall, and four other buildings were later occupied, and the leaders issued their demands: that construction of the gymnasium be stopped, that all ties to the IDA be cut off, that the ban on indoor demonstrations be reversed, that criminal charges against protesters be dropped, and that amnesty be granted
to the current slate of protesters. The intent of the protesters seemed to be to radicalize, not reform the university.

In response, the faculty formed the Ad Hoc Faculty Group (AHFG) in an effort to mediate possible solutions. The faculty consulted with President Kirk who asked for their suggestions without being bound by them. The faculty committee adopted a resolution that the University cease construction in Morningside Park; that the administration delegate disciplinary powers to a tripartite committee made up of students, faculty, and administrators; that students leave the buildings in good faith that the faculty would work toward a solution with them. About 150 professors signed the resolution. A group of professors, known as the Joint Faculties, met in an attempt to resolve the crisis.

Possible solutions, known as the “Bitter Pill Resolutions,” were turned down by the students. On April 30, 1968 police confronted and removed the students from four of the five buildings.

*Creation of the Columbia University Senate*

In the aftermath of the confrontations, a Faculty Executive Committee was established to consider alternatives for faculty involvement in University governance. The administration was concerned that presidential authority not be compromised. On September 12, 1968 the Joint Faculties proposed a “policy-making and legislative body with full jurisdiction and power to deal with all matters of University-wide concern.”49 The proposal garnered considerable attention by the student newspaper, which published a special “Restructuring Supplement” that included the faculty proposal as well as one by the group, Students for a Restructured University (SRU). A university-wide debate ensued involving all Columbia constituencies: administrators, trustees, faculty, students,
staff, and alumni. Student representation was increased as a result of lobbying by the SRU. A survey sent to students by SRU garnered 3,440 responses.

The Senate was formally established in April 1969, consisting of 101 members—forty-two tenured faculty, seventeen non-tenured, twenty students, seven administrators, six representatives from the affiliated institutions, six staff members, and two alumni, with the University president as presiding officer. The Senate would have the power to nominate six seats on the Board of Trustees. It would conduct its work through thirteen standing committees. The Columbia senate was empowered to set policy for all matters of University-wide concern and all matters which affect more than one Faculty or School. The Senate met for the first time on May 29, 1969.

One of the potential problems of this new senate, Joseph Garbarino notes, was the divergence of interests among the various types of senators. Indeed, soon after the senate was created, a group of faculty created the “Council of Tenured Faculty” outside the formal structure of the senate to further the interests of their own group. Also, colleges and departments had a strong tradition of autonomy at Columbia. Indeed, Columbia could be described as a federation of schools loosely joined together as a university.

Logan Wilson commented on the choice of structure at Columbia: “Considering alternatives in governance, the Columbia group rejected both the town meeting type of body, with everybody eligible to vote, and the bicameral type, with a separate student government.” Its size, Logan concluded, was small enough to allow for free debate but large enough to ensure all constituencies were adequately represented.

This choice was a conscious one. William Theodore de Bary recalls being elected to the executive committee in 1968, the main work of which was to create a plan for a
university senate. He had just declined an offer to serve as dean of the College so he could focus on his scholarship. Professor de Bary recalls that,

A main feature of the plan, and one which I strongly backed, was that this senate would represent not just faculty but all the main constituencies of the university: administration, faculty (tenured and nontenured), students, staff, and alumni. This plan was adopted and the University Senate came into being in 1969. I was elected to it as a faculty member and then chosen as chairman of the executive committee—in effect the responsible leader of the senate.\textsuperscript{52}

The main task for this new body while he was chairman (1969-71) was to “restore order to the university and act on demands for reform put forward during the crisis.”\textsuperscript{53} The new rules and regulations laid down by the senate would have more legitimacy because they were backed by representative participants from the university and not just a “repressive” administration, which he notes had lost credibility from all persuasions on campus by this time.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Early Work of the Senate}

Other matters handled in the early years of the senate were seemingly routine (changing the academic calendar so that fall semester ended before Christmas instead of the end of January) and more profound, namely, adopting new rules and procedures for tenuring faculty. Another issue the senate took up was to address what role campus chaplains should play on campus. The chaplain had resigned during the crisis due to his chapel being occupied by student protesters. The senate concluded that a nondenominational director should be appointed to serve at Earl Hall but he should be nondenominational with a policy-making board made up of various religious representatives. The debate over what to do at St. Paul’s Chapel—to restore its religious functions or let it go on as the political headquarters of the protesters—was contentious
but ultimately resolved when the noted anthropologist and senate member Margaret Mead “made the decisive statement: ‘Every community needs a sacred place’”\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{Conclusion}

Professor de Bary helps put these events in context. He explains that,

The significance of these “peace-keeping” efforts on the campus may be lost on anyone who did not live through those violent days—a violence inflicted on Columbia not only by a small minority of its own students but by revolutionaries from other campuses who converged on Morningside Heights to occupy buildings and disrupt all normal academic functions. Because I continued to meet with my classes during a strike that was euphemistically called “a moratorium on classes,” I was attacked as a “liberal Fascist” and my office in Kent Hall was ransacked. My daughter Catherine, a student at Barnard, was roughed up by bullies (often referred to more benignly as “picketers”) when she tried to come and see me. Other faculty, both senior and junior, were subject to similar intimidation… Often we were lucky just to complete a meeting of the University Senate without disruption. One who has not witnessed the fragility of academic institutions—the soft underbelly of democracy so dependent on the restraints of ordinary civility and rational discourse—would have difficulty understanding what it took to survive all this. But eventually, by the patient, unspectacular work of committed faculty, students, and staff, order was restored.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Senates in the Long ‘60s}

The previous case studies exemplify the types of actors and issues that influence why and how senates were created in the Long ‘60s. Each constituency of a university influenced their creation—faculty, presidents, and students—as did the AAUP. Institutional factors—such as size and organization—also influenced why a senate was created. The process of creating a senate almost universally follows a typical pattern: a committee is formed, a study is conducted, a report is written, and, in the end, the senate is authorized. The discussion that follows is based on an examination of the senates at twenty universities: Rhode Island,\textsuperscript{57} California-San Diego,\textsuperscript{58} George Washington,\textsuperscript{59} Duke,\textsuperscript{60} California-Santa Cruz,\textsuperscript{61} California-Irvine,\textsuperscript{62} Old Dominion,\textsuperscript{63} Colorado,\textsuperscript{64} Texas
SUNY at Binghamton, Washington State, Wisconsin, Alabama, and New Mexico. (There was insufficient data available on the other senates founded in this era to include them in this analysis.)

Why Were Senates Created?

There is not always a single explanation for why a senate was created. As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, there are often multiple influences on why a senate is created. For example, at a particular institution, it is not that faculty members simply decide they need a greater voice in decision-making but that such a movement comes about as a result of the actions of an autocratic president. Faculty, presidents, students, and institutional factors each had some influence on the creation of senates.

Faculty Influence on the Creation of Senates

Four interrelated reasons are given for why faculty become involved in creating a senate: a sense of discontent over the lack of participation in governance, the size of the faculty becomes too large for it to work effectively in the shared governance of the university and a representative body is needed, the effect of student activism on faculty, and the influence of the AAUP. The activities of the AAUP had isolated and minimal influence on the creation of senates in previous periods but its influence was more apparent in the 1960s and 70s.

Faculty discontent over their lack of participation in institutional governance is pervasive. In some cases, professors had enjoyed little influence but came to conclusion that they should have a greater role. In others, there was a strong tradition of faculty influence but this influence was waning as the faculty became larger and too unwieldy to
function as a body or as external factors threatened campus autonomy. At Wisconsin, faculty had a long history of influence on governance, but the state mandate for a state-wide reorganization of higher education in 1971 caused the University to reevaluate its internal governance structure. Faculty insisted on creating a new structure to formalize their role in the governance process. The size of the faculty at Colorado became too cumbersome to be effective as a body and the faculty created a representative body. The effect of student activism on faculty was clearly evident at Columbia; the University community became aware that it lacked the ability to respond effectively to a crisis but similar influences were felt at several other institutions.

The influence of the AAUP was more pronounced in this period than in the past. At Duke, the faculty used their AAUP chapter as their voice on university governance and used the chapter as a launching point for creating a senate. Similarly, faculty involvement in their AAUP chapter at George Washington influenced the formation of a senate. At Alabama, an institution with a union, it was the AAUP chapter the institution dealt with (instead of the union) in formulating a plan for a senate.

*The Influence of Presidents on the Creation of Senates*

Presidents can convey a range of views on senates. Some embrace and welcome their creation while others, particularly those characterized as “autocratic,” are more skeptical. It is possible that presidents who are sympathetic to faculty governance have experienced such traditions themselves, probably even as faculty members.

At Virginia Commonwealth the president openly welcomed the creation of the senate as an important component of the emerging university and at Washington State the president was an advocate of creating a senate. On the other hand, at Rhode Island faculty
buckled under an ambitious president, resulting in a campus “mutiny” (and later a “truce” through the creation of the senate). The autocratic president and provost at Stanford were one cause behind the faculty creating a representative senate for the burgeoning faculty. Presidential turnover could also play a role, creating a window of opportunity for the creation of the senate at George Washington. Similarly, the turnover resulting from a governance crisis at Duke, where the president resigned and the provost was fired, led directly to the creation of its senate.

**Student Influence on the Creation of Senates**

Campus activism over social and political issues was widespread throughout American campuses. At some campuses, their protests against the Vietnam War grew into protests against university involvement in defense-related research. This was particularly true at Stanford and Cornell. The Civil Rights protests progressed into a realization that campuses were not racially representative and were not offering a curriculum attractive to minorities, especially courses in Black studies. Ferment over Black studies played a role in the creation of senates at Cornell, Wisconsin, and New Mexico.

**Institutional Factors in the Creation of Senates**

The development of a campus into a research-focused university and its concomitant growth in the number of students and faculty influenced the need for representative bodies. Faculty may have played a role in institutional governance, and may have been influential in such affairs, but there is a wide difference in how a president can interact with a faculty of ten or even one hundred versus a faculty that begins to number in the hundreds or even thousands. This growth was a factor, even if
not the primary influence, at nearly all institutions where a senate was created in this period. Similarly, the transition to university status or to a higher level of research activity played a role at a number of schools (e.g., Rhode Island, Houston, Colorado, Stanford, Virginia Commonwealth, and Virginia Tech).

How Were Senates Created?

A similar process for creating senates was followed in almost all universities: a committee was formed to study the question of governance and a report was issued. The senate was authorized either by a vote of the general faculty or by the trustees.

The commission or committee charged with investigating the question of faculty governance was generally created in response to a specific issue. At Washington State, the faculty created the “Summer Discussion Group” in 1970 in response to the student unrest on campus, with the encouragement of the president. They drafted a constitution, which the Regents approved a year later. As has been seen in past eras, these studies of faculty governance often reference the systems and practices at other institutions, benchmarking their own proposals against them. More often than in the past, this process involved utilizing studies of governance available in the AAUP’s publication, the Bulletin. In some cases (e.g., Rhode Island, Wisconsin), the faculty as a whole voted on the matter and in most others the trustees or regents authorized the creation of the senate, usually through the ratification of a constitution, which created the senate in its provisions.

Conclusion

The “Long ‘60s” was a period of great change at American universities. Changes within the professoriate and among students had effects upon the governance of these
universities, as they attempted to become more “democratic.” The creation of senates was one manifestation of this democratization on campus, mainly as a reaction to events that caused faculty to recognize the need for greater participation in governance. Students had an important effect on the creation of senates. Through their activism, faculty and administrators realized that governance structures were ill equipped to deal with student crises and reacted, in part, through the creation of senates.

Endnotes

3 Jacobs, “Using Part-Time Faculty More Effectively.”
4 Hodgkinson’s survey included 364 institutions, thus not only research universities, which his the focus of the present study. Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy.
5 Ibid., 19-27.
7 McConnell, “Faculty Government,” 98.
8 Ibid., 98-99.
9 Laser, “Toward a Sense of Community: The Role of the Faculty Member in the Formulation of Institutional Policy “: 67-68.
10 Ibid.: 68-69.
11 Ibid.: 69.
15 Herbert Simon, a faculty member at CMU for fifty-two years, believed that the merger and transforming the Carnegie Institute were two separate issues but were merged as one opportunistically by the University administration.
17 One particularly distinguished group of faculty was found in the School of Business Administration
which included Cyert, Herbert A. Simon, and James March among others. The tensions between the different faculties are apparent in a memorandum from the chairman of the General Faculty to President Stever summarizing recommendations and suggestions for the Carnegie University (February 3, 1967). Many did not want to see “any substantial change in the size or general focus of Carnegie Tech” nor did they want to see it increase in size or in breadth of programs. Yet some did want to see an increase in quality and in graduate offerings. One of the suggestions was for “increased participation by the faculty qua faculty in the setting of educational goals and in providing leadership for the educational program.” Carnegie Mellon University Archives. Box: Faculty Senate Minutes. Folder: 1965-1968.


20 Herbert Simon was not aware as a faculty member of the origin of the merger idea came from; just that it was suddenly on campus. Herbert Simon, “Constructing a University,” in *The Innovative University*, ed. Daniel P. Resnick and Dana S. Scott (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University Press, 2004), 7.


23 The ex officio members included the president, vice presidents of academic affairs and research, the deans, and the secretary of the University.


26 Denenfeld’s study was mentioned as influential or useful by others involved in creating senates on their campus. Philip Denenfeld, “Western Michigan University, Faculty Participation in the Government of the University: The Faculty Senate,” *AAUP Bulletin* 52, no. 4 (1966): 390-97.


28 The “to-do” list for the Senate included such seemingly banal but necessary tasks as physically setting up the office. The task list includes the necessary elements: “stenographer, desks, filing cabinets, stationary,
typewriter.” The first officers also set out to establish a record-keeping system to record the work of the Senate, to have the Constitution professionally printed for distribution, to establish the meeting schedule for upcoming year, and organize the councils and committees. Three ad hoc committees were suggested: one on bylaws, one to take up issues carried over from the General Faculty, and, of course, one on parking!


“Faculty Senate: Minutes of the first meeting of the Faculty Senate held on September 25, 1968, at 3:30 P.M. in the GSIA Auditorium” and “By-Laws to the Constitution of the Faculty: Adopted by the Senate on September 25, 1968.” Carnegie Mellon University Archives. Box: Faculty Senate Minutes. Folder: 1968-69.

The by-laws committee sent the proposed by-laws to all senators in advance of the meeting. The only change from the proposed by-laws to those adopted by the Senate at the meeting was to reduce faculty dues in the Faculty Organization from $2.00 to $1.00 annually. Memorandum from The Ad Hoc By-Laws Committee to The Members of the Senate, re: Proposed By-Laws to the Constitution, September 19, 1968. Carnegie Mellon University Archives. Box: Faculty Senate Minutes. Folder: 1968-69.

Stever’s support of the Senate is apparent by the fact that permanent office space was immediately allocated to the nascent organization (in 150 and 152 Baker Hall). The faculty continued to meet as a whole at the start of the fall semester and the end of spring semester, but it seems primarily for the purpose of making announcements and not for transacting business. “Summary of the President’s Report to the Fall Faculty Meeting,” September 18, 1968. Carnegie Mellon University Archives. Box: Faculty Senate Minutes. Folder: 1968-69.


“Faculty Senate: Minutes of the first meeting of the Faculty Senate held on September 25, 1968, at 3:30 P.M. in the GSIA Auditorium” and “By-Laws to the Constitution of the Faculty: Adopted by the Senate on September 25, 1968.” Carnegie Mellon University Archives. Box: Faculty Senate Minutes. Folder: 1968-69.


Memorandum from Ad Hoc Committee on Student Participation to Professor S. DeBenedetti, Chairman of the Faculty, January 6, 1969. Carnegie Mellon University Archives. Box: Faculty Senate Minutes. Folder: 1968-69.

The report states that the schools were chosen “with a view toward selecting institutions of high quality whose experiences might have some relevance to our own situation” and included Yale, Cal Tech, Harvard, Illinois (at Urbana and Chicago), Kansas, Brown, Duke, Stanford, Purdue, California-Berkeley, Rice, Case Western, Oberlin, California-San Diego, Princeton, Illinois Institute of Technology, M.I.T., and Michigan.


The story of the creation of the Columbia University Senate is recounted in McCaughey’s Stand Columbia, Millé’s 1978 study of campus governance, David Dill’s 1971 study, by former Columbia administrator Wm Theodore de Bary, and by other commentators. Robert A. McCaughey, Stand, Columbia: A History of Columbia University in the City of New York, 1754-2004 (New York: Columbia


50 Garbarino, “Precarious Professors: New Patterns of Representation.”

51 Wilson, “Changing University Governance,” 401.

52 Wm Theodore de Bary, “A Communitarian at Large,” in Living Legacies at Columbia, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary de Bary, Jerry Kisslinger, and Tom Mathewson (New York: Columbia University, 2006), 643. Professor de Bary went on to serve the university as vice president and provost in 1971, at the end of his term of leadership in the Senate.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., 644-45.

56 Ibid., 645.


58 Fitzgibbon, The Academic Senate of the University of California, 45.


61 Fitzgibbon, The Academic Senate of the University of California, 47.

62 Ibid., 45-46.


67 Millett, New Structures of Campus Power, 80-88, Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II, 132-35.


70 Millett, New Structures of Campus Power, 55-63.


73 Millett, New Structures of Campus Power, 48-55.

74 Wythe Holt, “The First Twenty-Five Years of the Faculty Senate at the University of Alabama,” (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2000).

75 Millett, New Structures of Campus Power, 105-12.

76 In terms of assigning credit, Hodgkinson’s survey found that it was primarily administrators (39%), faculty (31%), and students (15%) playing a role while a small minority reported trustees (5%), alumni (1%), and state legislatures (less than 1%). However, most of the respondents to their survey were administrators, some, Hodgkinson comments “perhaps not excessively modest.” Hodgkinson, The Campus Senate: Experiment in Democracy, 18-19.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Universities Without a Senate

Some research universities have yet to create a senate or similar body, instead relying still on the collegial model of the faculty as a whole, or committees, to govern faculty affairs. Also, faculty influence over governance is often centered within the colleges or schools. It is not that faculty play no role in shared governance, only that these universities have not chosen to created a university-wide senate. Professors have considerable say in governance but through department and college forums and through university-wide faculty meetings but not through a representational system. If the idea that some “spark” (however tumultuous or benign) is needed to ignite the creation of a senate, it is possible that such a spark has not yet struck on these few campuses. It is not to say that they have not been without controversies (the same controversies, that on another campus, might indeed spark radical change) but these universities have been able to weather these storms without inducing radical change. The universities without senates are among the oldest in American higher education. Harvard (founded 1636) has a faculty senate in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences but not a university-wide senate as are the cases at Yale (founded 1701) and Princeton (1747), Boston College (1863) and Lehigh (1865).

Harvard University

The traditions of Harvard have been discussed earlier but more recent developments are worth exploring. Harvard University does not have a university-wide
faculty senate.¹ Most of its ten faculty colleges (“faculties”) do have some sort of internal governance structure, that is either representative or that is a collective of the whole.

The most noticed such faculty body is the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, although it only makes up about one-third of the entire faculty at Harvard University. In 1969 it convened a committee to study the matter of a representative body for that college.² They organized in that year a Faculty Council to serve as a representational legislative body for the Faculty, to be chaired by the Dean of the Faculty, charged with overseeing educational policy. Its creation shared many of the characteristics of university-wide senates created in the 1960s (see Chapter 7) as its members were especially attuned to the desires of students to be informed participants in university governance. Their report acknowledged their “vital stake in the life of the university” but limited their role in favor of faculty who must “live with their decisions over many student generations.”³

This body created a stir at Harvard in March 2005 as they expressed dissatisfaction with the University’s president, Lawrence Summers, giving him a vote of no confidence, which, along with other factors, led him to announce his resignation a year later in February of 2006. One part of the aftermath of this affair was that many on campus began to call for a university-wide faculty body, expressing disdain that the Faculty of Arts and Sciences had exercised a disproportionate amount of influence over these events. The short-lived movement to create a university senate was reported on by The Boston Globe and debated in the student newspaper, The Harvard Crimson. This represented a “punctuation” in the equilibrium in the news coverage of university governance, as no reports on faculty governance were filed in the immediate months before or after this incident.
The arguments made at Harvard in 2006 could have been made one hundred or fifty or twenty-five years earlier. They echoed sentiments registered on other campuses in previous decades as will be evident in the subsequent chapters. There was widespread sentiment that the time had come for greater openness on campus with greater input by faculty in the selection of deans or in the management of the curriculum. Some professors expressed dissatisfaction with the “mysterious” Corporation which governs the University. As law professor Alan Dershowitz remarked, “We’re entitled to know the secret handshake…Universities should be transparent institutions.” Gary Orfield, professor of education, described the University’s system of governance as “pre-democratic” and that there needed to be a “university-wide faculty…a voice not just for the arts and sciences, but for the entire university.”

The student newspaper’s editorial board, weighing in on the issue, asked, “When the University faculty needs to speak, who speaks for it?” They claimed that the influence of the Arts and Sciences on Summers’ resignation was disproportionate, which did not allow systematic input from other faculties. They made the common claims in favor of senates, that it would improve communication on campus, among faculty and between faculty and the administration and would bring Harvard up-to-date with democratic practice.

Detractors spoke out against a senate. Graham Allison, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government, said, “I just don’t quite see what an interfaculty parliament would do, other than be a talk fest.” He advised that instead faculty should work within their college to advise the deans. Three undergraduate students offered a measured argument against the senate idea saying that it was an overreaction to the
problem at hand that would make Harvard more political than it was already with a symbolic body that would be an “impediment to progress.”\(^{10}\) In the end, nothing happened. No university-wide senate was created and as of a year later it has fallen off the university’s agenda as an issue.

Harvard

**Yale University**

Similarly, Yale’s faculty does not have a university-wide representational body but governance centers primarily in the departments and colleges. The University has experimented with university-wide bodies without success; the control rested with the College faculty as a whole in an “uneven but unmistakable role.”\(^{11}\) In the institution’s management and since a reorganization in 1919, the locus of control has remained within the subunits. Also, the University has had its share of controversies between the faculty and the administration but none has precipitated the creation of a permanent faculty senate. As George Pierson, Yale chronicler, explains,

> For in this Yale republic the town meeting ruled. Other colleges might be autocratic, be run by their presidents, or administered by deans. Some of the larger universities might compromise autocracy with the forms of representative government by allowing their faculties to elect temporary representatives to a so-called university senate. In Yale College representation was direct; the republic still operated in the persons of the participants.\(^{12}\)

Arthur Hadley (president, 1899-1921) realized that Yale’s lack of organization began to threaten its position as one of the great national institutions. While other universities had developed complex administrative structures, Yale had “resisted this movement longer than most institutions” doing so “to its own damage” by allowing a “policy of drift.”\(^{13}\) Yale would eventually emerge with organizational traits similar to other universities but “the difficulty of achieving that form was a typically Yale
experience.” The problem resided with the strength of the faculty. “Nowhere else, perhaps, was faculty rule so strong,” explains historian Brooks Kelley.

Hadley, upon his inauguration as president in 1899, recognized the problem and was warned not to tamper with it. While faculty held power, it was uncoordinated and Hadley felt the efforts of the faculty could be more concentrated. He recognized the truth in Edwin Slosson’s assertion that departments at Yale were isolated from one another lacking “coordination and cooperation.”

Hadley proposed a university council to be made up of representatives from several faculties. This represented his philosophy of democratic involvement and participatory decision-making (sometimes interpreted as indecisiveness), but the proposal was not a success despite his popularity and disarming wit among students, alumni, and faculty. While the faculty, cautious and conservative, enjoyed a strong voice in their respective domains they did not take to the idea of a university-wide council; it seemed to hold no real legislative power, only the right to discuss problems but not act on them.

Timothy Dwight (president, 1886-1899) had introduced a similar idea as part of his other reforms—changing the name of the institution to “University,” reorganizing the law and divinity schools, creating the position of dean over each school, changing the management of the graduate school, revising the curriculum, and improving of the University’s finances.

The University underwent a reorganization, in 1919, recommended by the Corporation and alumni through a Committee on Educational Policy after several years of “investigation.” The plan reorganized the University’s under the president, created a new administrative position to Yale, the provost, gave more powers to individual faculties
under an elected dean, and the creation of departments and appointed department
chairmen. A common freshman year was established and other curricular changes were
introduced that affected both the College and Sheffield School, weakening the latter’s
independence. Oversight of student activities was transferred to a dean of men. The
faculty, although approving of some of the ideas of the report, were upset that Hadley had
not consulted them directly, and issued a resolution asking that the Corporation cooperate
with the faculty to avoid and “deleterious influence upon the life of the institution,”
which the Corporation did but not without chastising them for holding a meeting without
properly notifying the president. Implementation of the report had the immediate effect of
centralizing the university and removing some of the powers of the general faculty.²¹

Hadley continued the Yale tradition of consulting faculty for nominations on
appointments and to work as best he could. But this resistance made change at Yale
difficult for Hadley and for his successor, James Angell, who found the faculty
demoralized and angered by the reorganizations. They also resented Angell, an outsider
to Yale, who had succeeded in gaining additional powers from the Corporation. He, in
turn, found the faculty to be a fractious and difficult body. They differed with Angell on
the direction the University should take, and he consolidated power within his office and
that of the provost. The creation of individual departments had eroded the unity of the
faculty as a whole.²²

What is surprising, in retrospect, is that these conditions did not lead to a greater
unification of the faculty. The division into departments was recent and certainly faculty
remembered the unity the institution enjoyed just years before. The University Council
existed on paper and though weak in constitution, it could have provided the springboard
for greater faculty unity, a chance to band together. The faculty emerged from the reorganization “shaken and querulous”\(^{23}\) but it never took hold or had any effect. In fact, the faculty ceded the name to the alumni who created a body with the same name in the 1940s as an advisory council to the president.\(^{24}\) Yale continues to allow faculty participation through departments and colleges and university-wide committees but no university-wide senate exists.\(^{25}\)

**Princeton University**

Professors at Princeton have a voice in university governance but as a unified faculty, not through a representational body.\(^{26}\) Throughout its history, a “persistent influence in the evolution of Princeton University has been the concept of a single, integrated faculty” unlike other universities where the faculty have become more fractured as they become increasingly specialized.\(^{27}\) The president at Princeton oversees the faculty which oversees “a wide range of educational functions including admissions, curriculum, instruction, research, discipline, examinations” and so on but they do it through standing committees of the faculty of a whole, not through a representational senate.\(^{28}\) This integrated structure has survived because of University’s commitment to “limit size in order to sustain the quality of both its faculty and students.”\(^{29}\) The work of faculty in governing the university is done through committees, which report to the faculty as a whole.

This system of the faculty sharing in institutional governance at Princeton has not always worked smoothly. Woodrow Wilson often acted autocratically as president, failing to consult with faculty on several key decisions. He abruptly (and acrimoniously) left the presidency in 1910 to run for the governorship of New Jersey. His close friend
and advisor, philosophy professor John Grier Hibben, had spoken up against Wilson in faculty meetings. He lost Wilson as a friend but became the next president of the University in 1912. At his first faculty meeting as president Hibben gave over power on the appointment of committees to the faculty (even though many of Wilson’s former friends and allies would staff these committees). He also appointed a faculty-elected advisory board to conference with the trustees’ curriculum committee; created the Faculty Advisory Committee on Appointments and Advancement, a committee of three full professors who would meet with the president to decide on nominations for tenure, retention, and promotion; and put safeguards in place to protect against arbitrary dismissals from the faculty.30

When Hibben retired in 1932 he was praised by the faculty as guiding the University to new levels of distinction, but more importantly to the faculty was that “from the first he chose to be primus inter pares, taking the faculty into his confidence, entrusting to it a full measure of responsibility, steadily safeguarding its privileges and dignity.”31 He had laid the foundation of the modern Princeton faculty. Although no university-wide senate had been in place, nor exists to this day at Princeton, it is clear the faculty have a strong and reliable voice in the governance of the University, in no small part due to Hibben’s contributions. Princeton University continues to rely on a system of general meetings of the faculty as a whole.32

Boston College

The case of Boston College is one where a senate once existed but faculty lost interest and it eventually dissolved. The senate was an elected, representative body and then became an open forum for all faculty, but that move did not result in greater
attendance, and the senate faded away, around 1980. Faculty regarded it irrelevant at a
campus where the locus of control over issues key faculty issues resides within the
colleges and departments and university-wide coordination, when necessary, can be
handled informally for certain issues. Major decisions that most affect faculty members—
hiring, the promotion and tenure process, and the curriculum—are handled within the
departments and without oversight by the president or provost, while other university-
wide issues are handled in a very “top-down” manner with little input from faculty.33 A
recent movement is underfoot to (re)create the senate at BC, where faculty indicate they
are in favor by a margin of 81%, while at the same time fearing that such a body would
merely be “ceremonial” rather than “influential.” Some feel that having a senate is
important because it indicates that the institution has a certain level of prestige, perceived
as necessary for recruitment of top faculty. The administration has approved a plan to
create a senate but it is unclear when or if it will actually be put in place.34

Lehigh University

Similarly, faculty at Lehigh University have recently considered creating a senate.
The campus chapter of the AAUP proposed the creation of a senate in 2006 to replace the
current system in which all faculty participate as a whole, which is seen as too inefficient
by proponents of the senate plan. The new senate would be serve as a means to better
serve the needs of the faculty and to be more representative than the current town
meetings in which few of the university’s 400 faculty participate. However, the proposal
was voted down in April 2006.35
Conclusion

Some universities (primarily old, traditional schools) have yet to create a senatorial structure because neither institutional culture nor transformational events have yet required it. This is not to say that faculty at most of these universities have not enjoyed professorial autonomy or a voice in the governance of the university; only that tradition has not necessitated the creation of a senate. In 1940 as the University of Pittsburgh faculty committee investigating how to create their own faculty senate, they noted in their report that, “traditional practice rather than specific assignment of powers and duties seems to account for power wielded by faculties and committees in such schools as Harvard, Yale, Stanford, California, etc.” In other words, in these schools, senate structure does not matter as much as the inherent power yielded by faculty.

Endnotes

1 Technically, a “University Council” exists but Keller and Keller, in their recent history of Harvard, note that it has not been activated since 1950 when it met for a single meeting to discuss pensions, the same matter it was brought together to discuss in a single meeting, in 1919. Morton Keller and Phyllis Keller, Making Harvard Modern: The Rise of America’s University (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 138. As the subsequent discussion will show, the Council may exist in name but it is so long-forgotten and unknown that it holds no power whatsoever. When a student newspaper reporter unearthed the existence of the Council in a 2006 Harvard Crimson article she reported it as an “obscure provision” that “longtime Harvard administrators said they had no recollection of” and many professors remarked they had never even heard of it. Claire M. Guehenno, “U. Senate Already on the Books,” The Harvard Crimson, March 1, 2006. Morison explains at the end of his history of Harvard that, “There have also been administrative changes. The Faculty of Arts and Sciences, which had long since become too large for deliberation, and whose functions in practice had been reduced to ratifying the decisions of committees, delegated its powers to a Faculty Council, consisting of one-fifth of the membership of each rank, elected by the whole Faculty. A similar delegation has taken place in the large Faculty of Medicine.” It is unclear exactly what year Morison is referring to. He speaks of “Mr. Conant’s third academic year” (p. 487; Conant took office September 1, 1933) and then in the next paragraph talks of an event in 1935-36. Samuel Eliot Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936).

2 Harvard University News Office., “Press Release on the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences Faculty Council,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1969). Curiously, Samuel Eliot Morison reports in the penultimate page of his history of Harvard that the “Faculty of Arts and Sciences, which had long since become too large for deliberation...delegated its powers to a Faculty Council, consisting of one-fifth of the membership of each rank, elected by the whole Faculty.” Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard, 488. But he was reporting a development the same year it was underway and it may not have taken hold as the above-cited
press release from 1969 seems to indicate.


5 Ibid.

6 Guehenno, “U. Senate Already on the Books.”

7 Sacchetti and Burge, “At Harvard, Faculty Push for Openness.”


12 Ibid., 270-71.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


18 Holden, Profiles and Portraits of Yale University Presidents, 97-105.


20 Holden, Profiles and Portraits of Yale University Presidents, 92-93. See also Kelley, Yale: A History, 322.


23 Pierson, Yale: The University College, 1921-1937, 268.

24 Ibid., 605 n.10.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 “A Tribute from the Faculty” May 6, 1932, quoted in Ibid., 77.

32 Office of the Dean of the Faculty., “Rules and Procedures of the Faculty of Princeton University and Other Provisions of Concern to the Faculty.”

33 Boston College, a Catholic university, is subject to the ecclesiastical order. Similarly, Brigham Young University, owned by and subject to the LDS Church authorities, is managed in top-down fashion. Unlike the cases in this chapter, where faculty have some degree of influence in the governance of their university even without a senate-like structure, BYU has a body that, on the surface, might seem to be senatorial in nature, but the faculty, in fact, have little influence on university-wide affairs. Brigham Young University created a Faculty Advisory Council in 1978 but it is not a senate in any traditional sense. Members are elected, but to represent the faculty as a whole, not their individual college or department. (Theoretically, one college could dominate the Council since seats are not distributed among the colleges.) The administration may seek the Council’s recommendations and feedback on certain administrative decisions, but the administration and the trustees (made up of general authorities of the sponsoring LDS Church) are under no obligation to heed any advice given by the Council. This fits within BYU’s academic culture of top-down administrative control and lack of true academic freedom. However, it is also a paradox in a church with a lay clergy and a strong belief that each member can fulfill important ecclesiastical callings
such as bishop) on a rotating basis. The institution’s administration has been under censure by the AAUP since 1998 for violations to faculty rights to academic freedom. For information about the Council, see Brigham Young University, “About the Faculty Advisory Council,” http://fac.byu.edu/about.aspx. The AAUP report on BYU’s censure is available at American Association of University Professors, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: Brigham Young University,” Academe (1997): 52-71.

35 Alison Stravitz, “Faculty Senate Vote Fails to Pass,” The Brown and the White, April 24 2006.
CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

Understanding the Creation of Faculty Senates in American Research Universities

In order to understand faculty senates in American research universities it is important to understand how these bodies came into existence. Institutions of higher education cannot solve their institutional problems or improve their current situation without some understanding of how they reached their present condition. This dissertation has examined the origins of the faculty senate in American research universities with the hope that such a study would illuminate our understanding of their present functions as a part of the system of shared governance.

Senates were created out of a reaction to events or conditions on campus or in a proactive effort to improve the institution. Senates born out of crisis are reactive and those created to modernize the university are proactive. Those senates created by faculty initiative are generally reactive although the conditions being reacted to may not be as serious as the conditions present during a crisis.

Summary

In shared governance, no one group holds absolute power though the balance of power may tilt toward one group or another. Faculty senates are one way in which faculty share responsibility for the governance of a university. The duties of senates usually revolve around the “faculty prerogatives,” such as curriculum and student issues. Often the scope of authority for faculty senates is defined as being limited to “educational
policy,” which can be interpreted to include issues related to promotion and tenure in addition to the above mentioned areas. Some faculty members in senates interpret “educational policy” to extend to all facets of the university given that it is an educational institution but most senates do not have purview over budgets, physical plant, planning and operations, and long-range or strategic planning.

In their ideal state, senates are a check and balance on the administration, or serve as useful collaborators in institutional management. However, senates have been criticized as ineffectual, as mere “symbolic” and inefficient relics. Critics contend that senates are not capable of dealing with complex institutional issues. However, some senates have been shown to be effective. Effective senates improve communication on campus and build consensus around university goals. They can participate in carrying out specific policy objectives (e.g., revision of promotion and tenure guidelines, curricular changes to the general education program, program discontinuation). Regardless of their effectiveness, their symbolic value is important.

Senates, as has been explained by Robert Birnbaum, can be classified by their manifest functions: bureaucratic (a rational part of the hierarchy), political (a forum for articulation of interests), and collegial (a forum for achieving consensus). They also have a number of latent functions (e.g., symbolic, deep freeze, attention cue, ritual, scapegoat), which may often be as important as their manifest, intended functions. Senates can be classified as either “pure” (only or primarily faculty) or “mixed” (including a combination of faculty and administrators).

Similarly, as James Minor has explained, senates can be classified into types: functional, influential, ceremonial, and subverted. Functional senates represent and
protect faculty interests but often in response to the administration’s agenda. Influential senates create and frame their own agenda and have a greater level of power in governing the university. Ceremonial senates are relatively inactive symbolic artifacts and subverted senates are equally ineffective because they have been subverted by other venues for faculty participation and/or are dominated over by the president. Based on the evidence from this study, senates, upon their creation have manifest functions—they are created for a purpose, e.g., to play a role in the hierarchy—and are almost always set up to be functional or influential. While the criticisms of current senates, after years of entrenched tradition and practice, may be valid, it does not appear that they were created as subverted or merely ceremonial bodies. Nor, does this study find, were some of the latent functions, such as to be a scapegoat or a ritual, part of their original intent. Further study might reveal how quickly senates may switch to these other roles and functions after their creation—and what prompts such changes.

Findings

The questions guiding this study were: Why and how were faculty senates created? It would be difficult to answer one without the other. Walter Metzger suggested that the best forms of the history of governance are ones that look for “gestalts” or “patterns of academic power relationships” as a means to improve the social science of governance.

The creation of a senate can be categorized in one of two ways: as reactive or proactive. Reactive senates are those created in reaction to events or conditions on campus that make the existing situation unworkable or intolerable to the affected parties,
namely, the faculty. Senates created in response to a crisis, such as those at Utah, Kentucky, and Columbia, are reactive senates.

Proactive senates are those created by a president to improve the stature or functioning of the university. John Thomas created the senate at Penn State for this very purpose. Senates created out of faculty initiative are generally reactive, though the conditions leading to their creation are not as severe as those present during a crisis. They may seem more proactive, advocating for the creation of a senate before “crisis conditions” are in place. For example, the faculty at Virginia created a senate in response to the conditions at the University where they had little influence, especially compared to the days before the presidency was instituted. However, their proactive initiative was not precipitated by a particular crisis but rather a general set of conditions. Similarly, senates at Pitt, Penn, and Carnegie Mellon were created in response to conditions but in a proactive manner. As such, faculty-initiated senates can be regarded as reactive-proactive.

This study shows that the relationships between the main actors in the governance of higher education—presidents, trustees, and faculty—can be complex. Looking at the creation of a senate provides a point at which to examine how these groups interact and to evaluate what role each group plays in the creation of senates.

The Role of Faculty in the Creation of Senates

Faculty members, as professionals, seek autonomy and a role in governing the institution in which they have a large stake, and often take a react to conditions that negatively affect their influence on campus. There are four interrelated reasons why faculty become involved in creating a senate: a sense of discontent over the lack of
participation in governance, the size of the faculty becomes too large for it to work effectively in the shared governance of the university, student demands and activism (in the 1960s), and the influence of the AAUP. The influence of the AAUP on faculty governance was apparent from its very beginnings and became more pronounced in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Faculty discontent over their lack of participation in institutional governance is pervasive. In some cases, professors had enjoyed little influence but concluded that they should have a greater role. In others, there was a strong tradition of faculty influence but this influence waned as the faculty became larger and too unwieldy to function as a body, or as external factors threatened campus autonomy. This happened during all periods.

The Role of Presidents in the Creation of Senates

Presidents have a range of views on senates. Some embrace and welcome their creation while others, particularly those characterized as “autocratic,” are more skeptical. It is possible that presidents who are sympathetic to faculty governance have experienced such traditions themselves, probably even as faculty members. Presidents are crucial actors in the creation of senates. The autocratic president may be the impetus for faculty to band together, reacting in such a way to create a senate. Alternatively, the president may take a proactive approach to changing the university and create a senate as a useful component of the institutional bureaucracy and as an important symbol of the role of faculty.

The Role of Students in the Creation of Senates

Students had no influence on the creation of senates until the 1960s when their influence became profound on a number of campuses. Their protests against the Vietnam
War and university involvement in defense-related research and their demands for a relevant curriculum affected the governance of many universities. Faculty and presidents reacted directly to student request for a greater voice in university affairs and to the fact that the institutions were not prepared to deal with student unrest.

Institutional Factors in the Creation of Senates

The development of a campus into a research-focused university and its concomitant growth in the number of students and faculty influenced the need for representative bodies. Institutional factors influenced how faculty and presidents—the key actors in the creation of senates—behaved. Faculty may have played a role in institutional governance, and may have been influential in such affairs, but there is a wide difference in how a president can interact with a faculty of ten or even one hundred versus a faculty that begins to number in the hundreds or even thousands.

How Were Senates Created?

Regardless of the period, a similar process for creating senates was followed in almost all universities: a committee was formed to study the question of governance and a report was issued. The senate was authorized either by a vote of the general faculty or by the trustees. The commission or committee charged with investigating the question of faculty governance was generally created in response to a specific issue. These studies of faculty governance often reference the systems and practices at other institutions, benchmarking their own proposals against them. More often than in the past, this process involved utilizing studies of governance available in the AAUP’s publication, the Bulletin. In some cases the faculty as a whole voted on the matter and in most others the
trustees or regents authorized the creation of the senate, usually through the ratification of a constitution, which created the senate in its provisions.

**Setting the Agenda for the Creation of a Senate**

Agenda setting is about determining when an idea’s “time has come.” The agenda is the list of subjects to which people inside an organization are paying attention to at a given time. As described by John Kingdon, this agenda is affected by how problems are defined, how alternative solutions to those problems are proposed, and the political interplay of actors.

Within universities, governance is an issue that comes and goes. Much of the time, certain items (e.g., admissions standards, enrollments, budget cutbacks, curricular changes, promotion and tenure policies) are on the agenda of those within the system of governance (presidents, faculty, trustees) but the governance system itself is usually not on the agenda. That is, until some event focuses attention on the system of governance. The focusing event could be a crisis such as those experienced at Utah or Columbia, which exposed the inadequacy of the governance system. Governance can be elevated to the status of a problem when someone decides that the conditions of governance require increased attention. This is the sequence that took place at Penn when faculty members decided that the *conditions* of faculty governance were no longer tolerable; something needed to be done and they reacting by proposing a senate. Sometimes a solution to a problem fades such as was the case at Pitt where the crises of the 1930s caused dissatisfaction among the faculty but the proposed solution—a senate—was shelved for five years until the conditions were right.
These examples highlight that there are multiple participants in the agenda-setting process. In the case of universities, these participants include presidents and other administrators, trustees, faculty, students and even sometimes state government (governors and legislatures), alumni, staff, and the public. Each has a different stake in the educational enterprise and thus different interests. Another participant is the American Association of University Professors. It acts as a pressure group on institutions in cases where academic freedom has been violated. Generally, in issues of governance its role is less direct but it is also known to advocate for specific changes within a certain institution. For example, at Utah, Lovejoy met directly with the Regents and explained things as they were at other institutions. With Pitt, Himstead and his committee explained that the problems under Chancellor Bowman were largely due to the governance arrangement at the University. The organization also advocates more generally, through its publications and members, for certain practices in the governance of universities, namely, that faculty have a voice in formulating institutional policy.

The key for many problems to rise to the level of a problem is for an entrepreneur to attempt to “set the agenda”—to garner enough attention that others focus on the issue—and propose a solution. In each of the main cases discussed in this study (and in several of the secondary cases) a policy entrepreneur is readily identifiable. They drew attention to their issue and transformed it to the level of a problem.

At Utah it was the small faculty committee that came together quickly in response to the “Great Debacle” to propose the Administrative Council, with a majority voice for faculty. At Virginia, Albert Lefevre and his committee proposed a senate to reassert faculty prerogatives at the institution. John Thomas at Penn State single-handedly
brought the issue of shared governance to the attention of the faculty and trustees and created a representative senate.

At Pitt, Rufus Fitzgerald waited until institutional conditions were right to implement his more participatory model of government of the faculty. And at Penn, it was Clarence Callender. Carnegie Mellon’s Faculty Senate came about as a result of the efforts of Meltzer and Friedberg, the chairmen of the General Faculty and the Engineering and Science Faculty, who advocated for a representative faculty body. The Ad Hoc Faculty Group took the initiative at Columbia to propose a solution to its governance crisis.

In most of the cases where faculty senates were proposed and created, multiple alternatives were considered (regarding the nature and form of the body) as solutions to the problem of finding faculty’s appropriate role in governance. Should the senate be a “mixed” or “pure” senate? How large should it be? Should all faculty be eligible for election or only tenured professors? Who should chair the body—the university president, the provost, or an elected chair? What should the scope of authority be for the new senate? The proposed constitution or senate plan often underwent multiple iterations, long debates, and several amendments before final passage. In the end, a senate in a certain form was deemed the appropriate solution.

**Isomorphism in the Creation of Senates**

There were often isomorphic forces at play in the creation of faculty senates. Many of the creators of senates looked to the examples of other universities to see how they had solved the problems associated with faculty governance. They commissioned...
studies or investigations of such matters to ensure that they would follow a similar path as other institutions that these leaders perceived as peers to their own, or as ones with greater prestige that they wished to emulate. The decision to mimic the form of governance at other universities was a rational means to find a solution to a problem that was likely similar to ones faced by these other institutions.

**Implications**

It is a truism that understanding yesterday helps us today. Faculty should be aware of the possible implications of efforts to reorganize the faculty or their role in governance by the president or trustees. The example of Kentucky, although an extreme case, is illustrative of why. Faculty were shut out of governance decision-making completely in the restructuring of the 1940s.

In the selection of presidents, much can be learned about what faculty can expect from a new president by his or her attitude and actions on governance at previous positions. Presidential turnover can mean a change in the governance structure or practices at an institution. At Florida it seems that the nature of faculty governance changes with every presidential turnover. Furthermore, some presidents seem to embrace faculty governance more readily than others—an important characteristic for search committees to consider.

The themes identified in this study can give us an idea as to when faculty (or other groups for that matter, e.g., students) may attempt to “set an agenda” to change some aspect of governance. This study serves to help us reevaluate the purposes of senates and for readers to evaluate what they believe their proper role is based on their history.
Faculty are not immune from the tendency to create greater levels of complexity in their organizations. But, what are the consequences of faculty creating complex bureaucracies to administer their concerns?

The increase in part-time faculty could have profound effects on the faculty role in governance as these faculty are seen (and treated) more as “employees” rather than autonomous professional (or even semi-autonomous “managed professionals”). For example, will this increasingly large body of part-time faculty attempt to set an agenda for a greater voice in governance? Will they seek access to tenure and other prerogatives of full-time, tenure-track faculty? And, if so, will they use senates or similar bodies as the (or one of the) mechanism for advocating for such accommodations?

Ultimately, if the past is prologue to the future, it seems that in the face of a governance crisis or sense of discontent among the faculty, they will band together. They will look to other institutions to see how they manage faculty governance and create a structure that addresses the inadequacies in the current environment.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Limitations of the Study

There is always an inherent limitation of historical research. We are only privy to the records left behind. The six cases based on archival research reveal a number of similarities in the types of records left behind. Although there are certainly gaps in the record, it does not appear that these would likely have affected the findings of this study in a major way. A more serious limitation is the use of secondary sources for the minor
cases, which is often uneven, but every effort was made to select reliable sources and to triangulate through multiple sources.

This study only examines the creation of faculty senates in American research universities. While the findings of this study are likely to be applicable to other research universities which were not discussed in this study, there may be other factors that come into play in the creation of senates at other types of institutions.

Directions for Future Research

There are multiple ways this study could be expanded. This type of study could be applied to other types of institutions. How do the trends play out in other institutional types—e.g., community colleges, comprehensive universities, or for-profit schools? Are the “how” and “why” senates are created the same in other institutional types?

How do senates adapt and change over time? If growth and size affect the creation of senates, can we expect to see senates forming in new universities or those experiencing high levels of growth?

This study has examined how the institutional agenda is set for the creation of a senate. But, how do senates, once they are created, utilize agenda setting within faculty senates? Who sets the agenda in a senate?

When faculty senates are reorganized, do those reorganization efforts follow a similar pattern to how and why these senates were created in the first place?

There are possible comparisons to be made about current senates. How are faculty senates at denominational colleges different than at public institutions? How do private versus public senates compare in terms of power, authority, structure, and levels of activity?
Conclusion

Faculty can and will assert a right to govern their prerogatives when necessary. Where their interests are not well represented, they may proactively seek to create a new system or structure such a senate, or react to conditions that preclude their participation, to give voice to the faculty in university governance. Symbols matter and senates, even if senates are not (or are perceived to not be) effective or influential, they are important institutions within universities. Those who want to do away with them or change them should be careful because of their symbolic power. And if a senate were abolished, who is to say that a crisis, an ambitious group of faculty, or president intent on changing the university wouldn’t reestablish it?
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